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Abstract 
 This dissertation comprises three papers that focus on the interplay of formal 
and informal institutional processes in the sharing of water between the Mumbai 
Metropolitan region and an agricultural area to its north and east in Thane district. The 
first paper focuses on the interests and motivations that influence the everyday practices 
of the canal bureaucracy in the Surya project in Dahanu. This paper is largely a critique 
of the application of rational choice theory to analyzing bureaucratic corruption in a 
literature in development studies that was pioneered by Robert Wade. Using an 
ethnographic narrative style, the paper seeks to provide an account of bureaucratic 
corruption by focusing on tensions within the local Irrigation Department over bribes 
and transfers. The poor maintenance of the canal system by engineers in Dahanu and the 
consequent wastage of water are highlighted as providing a rationale and justification 
for diversion of water to the Mumbai Metropolitan Region. The second paper traces the 
historical evolution of institutional practices and local water policy in the Tansa-
Vaitarna (T-V) water district, a major source of water for Greater Mumbai and others 
towns in the Mumbai metropolitan region. It analyzes the failure of collective action in 
the water district over local water needs and identifies prior appropriation and the 
fragmentation of metropolitan water governance as the two major factors that are 
constraints in meeting the water needs of the rural population in the T-V water district. 
The third paper focuses on the experiences of farmers with water scarcity and 
dispossession from land on a canal system in two villages in Dahanu. The paper uses 
survey and interview data from interviews with farmers to understand how water 
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scarcity is manufactured on the canal minor system and discourses of efficiency, 
abundance and waste are deployed by wealthy commercial farmers and local elites to 
deprive small and marginal tribal farmers from water.  
Key Words  
Water Politics; Urban Geography; Mumbai; Canal Irrigation; Political Ecology; 
Institutions; Peri-Urban; Adivasi; Thane District; Dahanu; Vasai-Virar; Konkan; 
Maharashtra; India. 
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1. Introduction 
There is more than enough water in the world for domestic 
resources, for agriculture and for industry. The problem is that 
some people – and notably the poor - are systematically excluded 
from access by their poverty, by their limited legal rights or by 
public policies that limit access to the infrastructures that provide 
water for life and for livelihoods.  
      (UNDP, 2006, p. 2)  
1.1   Introduction and Research Aims 
The increasing contestation of water resources in various parts of India is at the 
very centre of social struggle and academic debate about the environment there (Shiva, 
2002; Anand, 2004; Joy et al., 2008). On one hand there are claims of the World Bank 
(WB) and development economists who perceive those conflicts as an indicator of 
growing water ‘scarcity’ and of weak water governance in India (Briscoe & Malik, 
2005; World Bank, 2006; Ballabh et al., 2009). On the other hand, critical scholars, 
social movement leaders and organizations such as United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) emphasize unequal access to water as a more significant issue. 
According to the latter perspective, the main problem with the water sector in India is 
that current institutions governing water use and resource planning have historically 
excluded the poor and are in urgent need of reform (Shiva, 2002; Mehta, 2003 & 2005; 
Joy et al., 2008). As such, assuming that water is (always) a scarce resource distorts and 
limits how we perceive the issue, since “physical availability is only one dimension of 
water insecurity as issues around access to water also hinge around local context and 
institutions” (UNDP, 2006, p. 133). For example, this dissertation focuses on case 
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studies where scarcity is actually a policy induced consequence of water resources 
mismanagement. The academic debate on unequal access and water 'scarcity' also arises 
in a context of rapidly-expanding urban centres and increasing inter-sectoral conflicts 
over water, wherein institutional arrangements governing water-sharing between urban, 
suburban and rural areas have consistently marginalized small-scale, poor farmers in the 
urban hinterlands of Asia (Janakrajan, 2004; Ruet et al., 2007). In India this continuing 
exclusion of the poor derives from laws and public institutions governing water access 
(Singh, 1992).  
India’s policies towards water resources have two main dimensions: 
geographical and political-economic. The first involves a historical tendency of the 
federal state to prioritize large, multipurpose dam projects in order to address problems 
of growing urban and agricultural demands for water. Many argue that this preference 
for ‘megaprojects’ persists largely at the expense of poor farming communities in the 
rural hinterlands (Baviskar, 1995; Gadgil & Ramachandra, 1995; World Commission 
for Dams, 2000; Phadke, 2003; Mollinga, 2010). Since the 1990s, academic and activist 
critiques of such large dam projects have increasingly argued that they cater to the 
demands of prosperous, industrial-scale farmers and cities downstream, resulting in 
displacement and disenfranchisement of the poor (Dreze et al., 1997). The second, 
political-economic aspect of India's experience with large dam projects involves the 
growth of centralized, bureaucratic, metropolitan water supply systems (that have been 
underwritten by the World Bank). Such systems have also been criticized for catering to 
the needs of rich and middle-class urban and suburban inhabitants, while 
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simultaneously minimizing the needs of the rural and urban poor (Gandy, 2008; Anand, 
2011).  
These geographical and political-economic dimensions are central to current 
critiques of Indian water policies and provide a backdrop to my own investigation. 
What remains little-understood is how and why the Indian State — in developing, 
controlling and centralizing water allocation between urban, suburban and rural areas —
has helped concentrate political-economic power in ways that continue exacerbating 
differential access and status among various consumers of this resource (Wittfogel, 
1957; Vaidyanathan, 1999 & 2004; Gidwani, 2002; Wagle et al., 2012). That is, India's 
centralized, hierarchical water management system — in both its publicly and privately 
owned aspects — has enabled a few to (unofficially) monopolize control over water-
access, and profit from it as they increase their control over that resource. That multi-
pronged critique informs a large body of political ecology literature in human 
geography and water policy (Bond, 2002; Mollinga, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2004; Linton, 
2010; Budds & Linton, 2014), as well as key arguments in this doctoral dissertation. 
The persistence of the centralization of water policy decision-making by the State in the 
Indian context is a problem this dissertation attempts to analyze with a case study of 
water politics in the Mumbai-Thane region. The absence of any form of participatory 
institutions is particularly a serious problem in the context of water transfers from rural 
to urban areas. The principal focus of my dissertation is how the increasing conflict over 
access to water (among castes/classes of farmers in Mumbai's geographical hinterland) 
is a consequence of growing urban demands upon that water, exacerbated by the 
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systematic mischaracterization of a supposed water scarcity. This problem is examined 
in the context of the state’s claims of the underutilization of water by agriculturists and 
the claims of the latter that water institutions in the hinterland actually aid the state in 
claiming underutilization of water and help it divert water quotas to urban areas. 
Underutilization of irrigation water is a common problem identified in surface irrigation 
projects in Maharashtra. However, the factors behind underutilization have not been 
examined through a field study. Underutilization is the central research problem 
examined in this dissertation’s two papers (Paper One and Paper Two) and it is of 
empirical interest because it places the state’s claims on water distribution between 
urban and rural areas under critical scrutiny. Furthermore, it also helps us understand the 
role of formal and informal water institutions in managing the distribution of water 
between a fast growing metropolitan region and its rural hinterland. This helps the 
dissertation make a contribution to the theoretical literature on water institutions and the 
political ecology of water. 
My central aim is to identify and examine the causes and impacts of apparent 
water scarcity among poorer, small-scale farmers in the Command Area (CA) of the 
Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project (SMIP) which is located in the Dahanu block of 
Thane District in Maharashtra State, India. The Surya Project comprises two large 
reservoirs that provide water to Greater Mumbai and smaller cities in the Mumbai 
Metropolitan Region (MMR).  
A secondary aim is to understand how and why local administrative units and 
jurisdictions within Thane District continue to coordinate water distribution poorly in 
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relation to the goals of dam projects there. In this context, my dissertation presents a 
case study conducted in the Tansa-Vaitarna (T-V) lakes area of Shahpur, an 
administrative subdivision (taluka) of Thane District that lies outside of Mumbai and 
includes five separate dams (see Figure 1.1, below).  
   FIGURE 1.1: Map of Mumbai Hydrometric Area which extends into Thane District. Note the          
   Greater Mumbai area (lower left) and the Surya area (upper left). Shaded portions indicate areas   
   served by Surya, and Bhatsa Multipurpose Dam Projects (respectively). 
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1.2  Political Ecology of Water and Urbanization:  
 The Broader Theoretical Context of Research 
Within the literature on urban-rural relationships in the developing world, there 
are three distinct strands of research that inform theoretical aspects of my dissertation. 
They concern: (1) institutions; (2) development geography; and (3) political ecology. 
The first strand of research deals with institutional and common-pool resources 
(Ostrom, 1990), and generally adopts a wide definition of resource governance. It 
focuses mainly on rules and norms that shape dynamics of public policy making and 
civil society, within a broader context of complex, sociopolitical relations. Rights over 
access and use of water and land, in a quickly urbanizing region, influence institutional 
relationships among a vast range of administrative, agricultural, civil society and 
government actors who variously co-operate or contest one another’s claims to water. 
Moreover, allocation of water between large urban jurisdictions, smaller towns and rural 
water districts is also governed by property rights and historical uses of water in each 
region. Thus, local laws and state policy (and their interaction) play important roles in 
determining how water is shared, and requires analyzing existing water governance 
structures and practices in the region. The wide body of work on urban water in India 
has not adequately utilized theoretical and empirical work of the common-pool resource 
tradition to sufficiently analyze and understand the politics of urban and regional water 
governance. Therefore, in addition to social relations, this dissertation emphasizes how 
rules, laws, practices and governance frameworks inhibit or enable water sharing 
between jurisdictions. 
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The second research strand is the field of urban political ecology and is 
concerned with urban-rural relationships. In particular, with how the environmental 
transformation of cities and their respective hinterlands (including suburbanization of 
peripheries) is closely entwined with the broader geographical scale and processes of 
capitalist development (Cronon, 1992; Swyngedouw, 2004; Keil et al., 2013). For 
example, growth and expansion of metro Mumbai and its peripheries largely depends 
upon the commodification of natural resources. That produces new interactions that 
reshape (materially and symbolically) how natural and social resources are valued and 
constrained - for instance, water and access to water. This perspective highlights that, 
while water is a necessity and a crucial common resource, it has also become a key 
focus for political manipulation involving various classes and caste-groups, including 
emerging urban interest groups in and around MMR.  
The third, more recent strand of political ecology research on India considers 
agrarian change, emphasizing political economy and cultural factors - specifically, how 
upwardly mobile caste-groups function as vanguards of capital accumulation. This 
strand emphasizes how specific cultural, economic and geographic trajectories drive 
accumulation processes (Gidwani, 2000, 2001 & 2008; Chari, 2004). In other words, 
development (in various local contexts) contributes to particular social dynamics that 
guide specific trajectories of political, economic and ecological change (Gidwani, 2000; 
Dubash, 2002). South Asian human geographers have made especially significant 
contributions to this literature, and have expanded our understanding of the role that 
caste- and class-relations play in shaping the political economy of rural and urban India.  
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The dynamics of urbanization at the fringes of Mumbai have broader 
implications too, since we can also observe similar, urban-periphery dynamics in the 
shadow of other large, Indian metropolises such as Calcutta (Roy, 1997 & 2003), 
Bangalore (Ranganathan 2014; Mehta et al 2014), Delhi and even Chennai. Certainly, 
macroeconomic processes of economic liberalization and globalization play important 
roles in transforming cities and regions. But it is only by examining important local 
relationship differences (in politics, institutional arrangements and capital-state 
relations) that we can see how the progressive absorption of agricultural land into 
metropolitan rhythms and structures can produce quite divergent trajectories of urban 
and regional change - including how water resources are governed and used within the 
'orbit' of large, urban centres. The urbanization of formerly rural parts of Thane District 
(and the increased pressure on natural resources there) thus overlaps with processes of 
metropolitan expansion — including increasing claims by the city on neighbouring 
water sources — and with the larger transformation of the hinterland environment.  
These three important strands of scholarship all consider how notions of ‘nature’ 
are produced, and how regional changes in natural environments are shaped by social 
relations, water governance practices and institutions. In the MMR, processes of urban 
growth are closely linked to successive waves of ecological conquest and the extension 
of the 'water frontier' into its rural hinterlands (Gandy, 2008). As such, the institutional 
underpinnings of extending that frontier undergo close analysis in my research. In order 
to understand the dynamics of underutilizing water on the canal system specifically, this 
dissertation combines the political ecology of water with an institutional analysis of 
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water governance, and situates critical literature from the political ecology of irrigation 
(in South Asia) within institutional frameworks (Mollinga 2013).  
1.3   Regional Resources and Livelihoods 
1.3.1 Historical and Geographical Context of Inter-Sectoral Water 
 Politics in Thane District 
 The empirical focus of my research is an ethnographic study I conducted with 
key actors in the Command Area of Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project (SMIP) in 
Thane District, Maharashtra.  
 Surya Project was the first significant effort on the part of the Indian and 
Maharashtra State Governments, respectively, to harness water for local irrigation 
purposes - in particular, the west coast rivers of Konkan Region. The SMIP Command 
Area lies directly outside the peri-urban fringes of Mumbai Metropolitan Region and 
contains agricultural land increasingly being targeted for urban uses, including 
expressway projects meant to connect metro Mumbai with other cities in northern and 
western India. Surya Project taps the waters of the Surya River - which is a perennial 
tributary of a larger river, the Vaitarna, that flows through Thane District. Another major 
dam project in Thane is the Bhatsa Multipurpose Irrigation Project, also built on the 
Vaitarna River. The Bhatsa Project taps the Vaitarna upstream in eastern parts of the 
District, also for the benefit of metropolitan Mumbai, as well as for the benefit of a wide 
agricultural belt in Bhiwandi and Shahpur blocks of eastern Thane District.  
Both the Vaitarna and Surya Rivers have their sources in the Sahyadri 
Mountains, both rivers flow down from eastern parts of Thane to the Arabian Sea. SMIP 
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was the second built of these two major multipurpose irrigation projects in the District. 
The Bhatsa Project was completed in the late 1970s and, like Surya, was intended to 
benefit a large number of farmers in the Shahpur area. However, the Bhatsa Project (like 
Surya) has since come to cater mainly to the needs of suburban Mumbai. Since 
developing Bhatsa as a water source, the population of MMR has risen by 40%, along 
with similar increases in demand for water to support such growth.  
There are five major watersheds in Thane District that lie outside the political 
boundaries of MMR, yet within its hydrometric area (see Figure 1.1): the Vaitarna, 
Ulhas, Patalganga, Amba and Damanganga watersheds. Greater Mumbai depends upon 
water from Ulhas watershed (where Bhatsa Dam is located), as well as from Vaitarna 
watershed (where both Tansa-Vaitarna Dam and Surya Dam are located). Controversies 
now surround water from Bhatsa, Tansa-Vaitarna and Surya Dams, respectively, as 
conflicts increase between urban versus rural water needs - as well between domestic 
and irrigation water needs within rural areas of the watersheds. The Surya Multipurpose 
Irrigation Project in Vaitarna watershed is the focus of this study since conflict has been 
sharpest there between urban/industrial versus rural/irrigation water needs, and since its 
valley communities have been the focus of the most intense controversies (see Figures 
1.2 and 1.3 for data on urban versus agricultural water allocations in this area). The 
Damanganga watershed (shared by Maharashtra State, the Daman Union Territory and 
Gujarat State) is another that will likely see displacement of rural communities and thus 
also become a focus of similar controversy (see Figure 1.2). New dam projects to 
connect with existing Vaitarna watershed reservoirs are scheduled for construction there 
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during the next decade, in order to further expand the amount of water available to 
Greater Mumbai.  
The geographical area of these dam projects also bears highlighting. Most of the 
large and medium reservoirs in Thane are located in the predominantly tribal1, hilly and 
forested parts of the District. Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project is located in the sub-
administrative block of Jawhar, and its canal system benefits both tribal and non-tribal 
parts of Dahanu and Palghar blocks. Other dams on the Vaitarna and Bhatsa rivers are 
located in Shahpur block, about 80 km east of Surya Dam. This dissertation has thus 
focused on watersheds in the tribal parts of Thane District, north of Greater Mumbai 
and the MMR (see Figure 1.1); similar conflicts in the southern watersheds, south of the 
city of Navi Mumbai in the Amba and Patalganga valleys, have yet to be researched.  
FIGURE 1.2: Industrial/Urban and Irrigation use in major watersheds of Mumbai Hydrometric Area (in 
million cubic metres). Source: Irrigation Commission Report (1999); Government of Maharashtra, 
Irrigation Status Reports. Water Budgets (2003-2010). 
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FIGURE 1.3: Industrial/Urban and Irrigation use in the Vaitarna Valley (in million cubic metres). 
Source: Government of Maharashtra, Water Budgets (2003-2010), Irrigation Commission Report (1999).  
 Prior to the development of Bhatsa and Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Projects 
in the Post-Colonial period, other reservoirs dating to the early Colonial period were 
also constructed in northern Thane District for the exclusive purposes of Mumbai. The 
execution of such projects was also facilitated by implementing new laws that denied 
farmers in the neighbourhood of reservoirs access to water, even for domestic use. A 
consequence of those and other construction projects was widespread displacement of 
Thane farmers - along with several major legal claims to agricultural land which remain 
unsettled to this day. Thus, since the early Colonial period, there have been successive 
waves of activity in which farmers and agricultural communities in Shahpur, Dahanu 
and Palghar blocks of Thane have been prevented from accessing local water and 
consequently displaced. As well as preventing local communities from accessing water 
from Bhatsa and Surya reservoirs, respectively, planning and construction work has 
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been underway since 2012 for two new dams (the Middle Vaitarna and Pinjal Projects, 
respectively). Similarly designed for the exclusive benefit of MMR, those projects have 
also led to increased social and political ferment in Thane. 
Given such dynamics, Thane District is historically known for its class-based 
social movements, and has taken on great national significance among progressives 
mobilizing around agrarian and environmental issues. For instance, since the early 
1950s the Communist Party of India (Marxist) helped mobilize local tribal peoples 
against agricultural working conditions nearing servitude - which led the Maharashtra 
Government to enact land reforms. From the 1970s to the 1990s, Thane also witnessed a 
number of significant movements led by marginalized tribal farmers defending their 
timber and cultivation rights. However, poor implementation of land-ceiling laws and 
regulations governing access to forests, resulted in only modest changes to relations of 
production in Thane (Ambasta, 1998). The net outcome of such reform has simply been 
to create a new class of peasant landowners, largely belonging to the Maratha Kunbi 
community (Ambasta, 1998; Dewan, 1999). They (and the Vadavals in coastal Dahanu) 
are a politically influential, socially dominant farming ‘caste-cluster’ who have led 
mobilizations occasionally against new dams and industrial projects in Thane District. 
1.3.2 Irrigation and the Transformation of Class Relations  
 in Thane District 
During the past decade, urban expansion from metro Mumbai has increased 
pressure on land and water resources across the MMR and exacerbated livelihood 
difficulties already facing Thane farming communities there. Small-scale farmers in the 
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district now face problems related to water scarcity such as depleted groundwater 
aquifers and seasonal shortages of drinking water - as well as the looming prospect of 
further displacement among communities directly in the shadow of new dam projects. 
Indeed, growing scarcity of water poses new and immediate challenges for the future 
development and present welfare of rural Thane farming communities. Moreover, 
extreme variation in rainfall patterns - including a less predictable monsoon - has in the 
past decade transformed what, for many, used to be annual single-crop, subsistence 
farming into periodic episodes of drought (Menon, 2006).   
Yet, such dire water ‘shortages’ for small-scale farmers starkly belies the fact 
that, in recent decades, considerable funds have been invested to build two multipurpose 
irrigation projects and a medium scale irrigation project (ostensibly to benefit Thane 
farmers). Such projects were to irrigate over 50,000 hectares of land belonging to 
mostly small-scale, marginal farmers (tribal and non-tribal). Yet, according to data from 
the 2004-2012 Water Audit (Maharashtra Government, 2012) less than 10% of those 
areas have actually benefitted so far (see Table 1.1). The incomplete works on canals in 
Surya and Bhatsa Projects has also led to surplus water in those reservoirs, and an issue 
of ‘underutilization.' For instance, in 2008-2009 an average of only 10% of agricultural 
land was being irrigated by canals of the two large and medium irrigation projects. 
Surya Project fared worst, compared to Bhatsa and Wandri Projects (respectively), with 
under 10% of land in its Command Area irrigated. While utilization in small and minor 
projects is far better than in large and medium projects, some canal water management 
issues plague large and small projects alike. For example, just over half of the 7,564 
!15
hectares of irrigable land in various areas of Thane's small and minor projects is actually 
being irrigated. Thus, we see the 'problem of underutilization' in the management of 
small and minor irrigation projects too (see Table 1.2). The tardy pace at which surface 
and groundwater irrigation is being implemented in Thane District in the past 50 years 
is reflected in the data of Table 1.3. It clearly illustrates how the amount of net irrigated 
versus net sown area has not significantly increased during that period. Indeed, from 
2001-2011 the amount of irrigated land in Thane District has dropped to just 1.97%.  
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TABLE 1.1: Water Storage, Utilization and Underutilization in Large & Medium Irrigation 
Projects in Thane District, 2008-09.  
Source: Thane District Socio Economic Statistical Abstract, 2008-09. 
   
NO. SUBJECT
LARGE 
MULTIPURPOSE 
DAM PROJECT
LARGE 
MULTIPURPOSE 
DAM PROJECT
MEDIUM 
DAM 
PROJECT
1 PROJECT NAME BHATSA SURYA WANDRI
2 PROJECT LOCATION
SHAHPUR, 
BHIWANDI (THANE 
DISTRICT)
DAHANU and 
PALGHAR (THANE 
DISTRICT)
PALGHAR 
(THANE 
DISTRICT)
3 YEAR of PROJECT COMPLETION (in progress) (in progress) 1983
4 HEIGHT of DAM (in metres) 89 58.08 (Dhamni) 28 (Kavdas) 28.27
5 APPROVED HEIGHT of RESERVOIR (in metres) 89
58.08 (Dhamni) 
28 (Kavdas) 28.27
6 COMPLETED HEIGHT of RESERVOIR (in metres) 89
58.08 (Dhamni) 
28 (Kavdas) 28.27
7 APPROVED LENGTH of CANALS  (in kilometres) 67/50 29/47 8/17
8 COMPLETED LENGTH of CANALS (in kilometres) 54/3.40 29/34 8/17
9 TOTAL CAPACITY (in million cubic metres) 976
285.31 (Dhamni) 
13.7 (Kavdas) 37.11
10 TOTAL CULTURABLE LAND in COMMAND AREA (hectares) 48,910 30,547 4,038
11 NET CULTIVABLE LAND (hectares) 37,260 14,696 3,066
12
CULTURABLE LAND in COMMAND 
AREA that can be BROUGHT 
UNDER IRRIGATION after 
PROJECT COMPLETION 
(hectares)
23,000 14,696 2,044
13 IRRIGATED LAND AREA, 2008-09 (hectares) 2,038 1,701 600
14 WATER USE (in million cubic metres)
15 DRINKING 604.2 24.56 -
16 IRRIGATION 60 200.71 35.93
17 INDUSTRIAL USE 2.5 47.83 -
18 POWER GENERATION - - -
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 TABLE 1.2: Area of Underutilization in Minor Irrigation Projects in Thane District in  
 2009 (in Hectares). 
  Source (for above): Thane District Socio Economic Statistical Abstract, 2008-09 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
SUB-DIVISIONS in 
THANE DISTRICT
TOTAL 
COMPLETED 
PROJECTS
TOTAL 
COMMAND 
AREA
PRESENT 
IRRIGATED 
AREA
AREA TO BE 
BROUGHT 
UNDER 
IRRIGATION
TALASARI 4 0 0 0
DAHANU 19 285 50 235
VIKRAMGAD 2 380 127 253
JAWHAR 30 495 0 495
MOKHADA 15 115 8 107
VADA 47 2407 1198 1209
PALGHAR 30 1412 654 758
VASAI 18 799 60 739
THANE 3 0 0 0
BHIWANDI 12 211 85 126
SHAHAPUR 80 2031 338 1693
KALYAN 16 728 419 309
ULHASNAGAR 0 0 0 0
AMBERNATH 15 440 412 28
MURBAD 85 2066 454 1612
TOTAL 376 11369 3805 7564
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TABLE 1.3: Area Irrigated in Thane District in the Period 1961- 2011. 
Source: Maharashtra Govt., Various issues of Socio Economic Statistical Abstracts, 1960-61 until 
2010-11, Thane District. 
Like many rural parts of Asia, access to irrigation in Thane is vital to expanding 
areas of land under cultivation. For small paddy farms in Mumbai's hinterland, 
availability of irrigation water critically determines agricultural productivity (as well as 
demand for workers). Derivatively, it also affects opportunities for agricultural workers 
to gain bargaining power in seasonally-tight labour markets (Gidwani, 1996; 
Vaidyanathan, 1999). Thus lack of access to irrigation water has reduced several Thane 
farming communities to seasonal, highly casual labour forces in post-monsoon seasons. 
Since the 1970s, water policies for Mumbai and Thane District have oscillated 
between meeting urban and agricultural needs. But as local irrigation water is 
NO. AGRICULTURE & 
IRRIGATION
1960-
61
1970-
71
1980-
81
1990-
91
2000-
01
2009-
10
2010-
10
1 NET IRRIGATED AREA 
(in 100 hectares)
50 40 220 70 204 204 
(2001-0
2)
188
2 NET SOWN AREA  
(in 100 hectares)
3570 4410 3330 4480 4067 4740 4740
3 NET IRRIGATED to 
GROSS CROPPED 
AREA (percent)
0.48 0.33 0.13 0.06 2.18 2.18 1.97
4 NET SOWN to NET 
CULTIVABLE AREA
38.8 46.16 34.84 46.87 42.55 41.13 49.6
6 IRRIGATED to NET 
SOWN AREA 
(percent)
1.23 0.7 0.36 0.13 4.62 5.31 3.97
7 TOTAL AREA UNDER 
CANAL IRRIGATION 
(in hundred 
hectares)
- - -  N/A N/A 12 52
8 AREA UNDER WELL 
IRRIGATION (in 
hundred hectares)
437 299 104 480 186 138 71
11 AREA IRRIGATED BY 
OTHER THAN WELLS 
OR CANALS
- 12 11 112 2 54 31
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increasingly diverted to Mumbai, agrarian crises in Thane District have intensified 
along with conflict over dwindling supplies. During the past five years even 'middle 
farmers' in the District (who own 4-5 hectares of land and are in the upper tiers of the 
peasantry) are also struggling to sustain their families (Interview, June 2006)1.  
Massive demand for water by MMR has led to over-reliance on large dam 
projects in Thane that has maximized water production for urban and suburban needs — 
but also undermined sustainable irrigation for local, tribal farmers. The rural water 
crisis, including rising rural-urban tensions over access, has thus driven new waves of 
seasonal migration from Mumbai hinterlands to peri-urban areas (Punjabi, 2005; Gandy, 
2008).  The human dimension of the water crisis has been pivotal in recent politics of 
the district. For instance, in most parts of Thane, farmers of Kunbi and tribal 
communities historically often shared the same socio-economic status. In some interior 
areas where large dam projects are completed, both communities have similarly suffered 
water scarcity (for agricultural and domestic use) and displacement. But water shortages 
in Thane now result in intensifying struggles between those communities over water 
access. In that context, shortages have exacerbated nascent, inter-caste rivalries that 
emerged in the post-1945 political mobilization of tribal communities.  
As discussed, water made available by construction of Surya Project was to 
irrigate lands of tribal farmers and mitigate the need for seasonal economic migration. 
However, in 1998 a portion of water from Surya was officially allocated to development 
needs in Vasai-Virar sub-region (VVSR) of MMR. Further, a 2009 decision saw more 
water diverted from Surya to Mira-Bhayandar, a municipality of MMR (see Figure 1.1). 
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Thus, today the historical, seasonal migration of small-scale, marginal (tribal) 
farmers persists from November through April each year between Surya Command 
Area, the coastal plains, and Mumbai. Moreover, Kunbi groups have also lobbied the 
Maharashtra State Government (with some success) to re-allocate them irrigation water 
already earmarked for tribal populations. And Kunbi farmers from coastal parts of 
Dahanu have begun laying claim to water from Surya for irrigation (Navshakti, 2006). 
As such, Surya Project is now the focus of an intense, intra-rural conflict over water. In 
part, this is a result of logistics, i.e. geography-based differences in need. Yet it also 
contains strong class/caste motivations, including simmering Kunbi resentment over 
affirmative action policies aimed at supporting local tribal communities.   
The intensification of such claims and conflicts highlight the critical issue of 
water-access in the broader political economy of Mumbai-Thane region. They also raise 
questions about how water is differentially used and valued by different groups, 
depending on their respective geographical (and social) locations. 
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FIGURE 1.4: Details of the Surya Command Area. 
1.4  Geographical and Social Context of Thane District 
1.4.1 Rural-Urban Contestation over Water, and the Sprawling 
Influence of the MMR  
 One of the key developments of the past two decades in the Mumbai 
Metropolitan Region is the fast-paced growth of the Vasai-Virar sub-region (VVSR) at 
the northern fringes of MMR. From a population of 700,000 people in the 2001 census, 
to 1.2 million in the 2011 census, VVSR is now the fastest growing (and 6th largest) 
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town in Maharashtra State, as well as the fastest growing city in all of urban India 
(Census of India, 2011). The VVSR was reserved as a green belt in the 1970s, but 
controversially was opened up for urbanization in 1988. Subsequently, throughout the 
1990s, more and more agricultural land - and even ecologically sensitive coastal areas - 
were also re-zoned for urban development. Thus the re-zoning for urbanization of what 
was previously designated agricultural land has also become the subject of ongoing 
controversy in VVSR and the Mumbai region.  
Urban research on the VVSR belt has confirmed that the role of organized crime 
(including a prominent Vadaval caste-leader, Hitendra Thakur, from Palghar, Thane 
District) has also been instrumental in 'grabbing land' from the local tribal community 
(Punjabi, 2005). Thus, local ‘boss-ism,' and a nexus of politicians and gangsters, have 
also been central in the water-politics of this area.  
The rapid growth of the Vasai-Virar sub-region also reflects the urban 
transformation of Greater Mumbai. Gentrification in this island city has meant that 
populations of Mumbai and its inner suburbs - as well as migrants from others parts of 
Maharashtra State - are increasingly moving to outlying areas such as VVSR (Bhagat 
and Jones, 2013). Indeed, within the Mumbai Metropolitan Region, cities of VVSR are 
growing the fastest, almost doubling their populations in a decade (see Figure 5, below). 
Other towns in the MMR, such as Navi Mumbai (with 1.5 million people) and the town 
of Thane, also host large populations. Significantly, it is also the location of Vasai-Virar 
sub-region (on a major South Mumbai commuter railway line) that has led the towns of 
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this sub-region to outpace all other towns outside Greater Mumbai, in terms of 
demographic growth (Bhagat and Jones, 2013: p. 7-8).  
One characteristic of the pressure that Mumbai's urban expansion has placed 
upon VVSR is a chronic scarcity of potable water among the urban population there. 
For more than a decade, until the 1990s, the town had to rely on privately owned water 
tankers (a business dominated by local criminals and politicians), until the Maharashtra 
Government decided to divert water there from the Surya Dam, on the grounds that 
water was being under utilized in the Irrigation Project. However, contestation of that 
diversion in Mumbai High Court by social movements in Dahanu resulted in VVSR's 
access to Surya water being deemed temporary by the State Government. Although 
Maharashtra State Government submissions to the High Court in the early 2000s 
claimed that diversion of water from reservoirs on Tansa, Vaitarna and Bhatsa rivers in 
northern Thane District would be temporary (High Court Affidavit, 1996), the VVSR 
was unsuccessful in accessing water from those reservoirs. Subsequently, there were 
also fresh attempts to source water from other parts of Thane District. However, the 
mushrooming population of VVSR, along with a priority in State Government policies 
on water for drinking use, has ensured that the Maharashtra Government has renewed 
VVSR`s access to Surya water four times during the past 17 years. 
!24
FIGURE 1.5: Population of Mumbai Metropolitan Region, 2001-11. Source: Census of India (2011). 
Almost 75% of the demand for water in VVSR is now being met by the Surya 
Project. In 2009, the State Government also decided to divert water to Mira Bhayandar, 
a sprawling suburb of Greater Mumbai to the south of VVSR. But a growing resistance 
of a section of the sub-region's rural population (in the western coastal belt) to ground 
water mining has pushed the State to renew water diversions from Surya Dam (Punjabi, 
2005). That has also led to a proposal for a new dam in Dahanu called the Susari 
Project. All of these factors - including expanding populations on the northern fringe of 
the Mumbai Metropolitan Region, and growth of towns in the absence of reliable water 
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supplies - have set the stage for a very contentious scalar politics of water in the Surya 
Command Area of Dahanu region, which is the subject of this study.  
1.4.2 Topography of the Surya Command Area 
The geographical area of the Surya Multipurpose Irrgation Project can be 
divided into two parts: (1) the developed coastal belt (the bandarpatti) where various 
commercial crops flourish; and (2) the area east of the Sahyadri Mountains (the jungle 
patti). 
The bandarpatti is about 30 kms wide, extending west from the railway line 
situated at the foot of the Sahyadri range. The area has a fairly well-developed, fairly 
evenly-distributed infrastructure including roads, transport facilities, banks, 
cooperatives, schools, factories, etc. The main crops cultivated are fruits, vegetables and 
paddy rice, which are sold commercially and consumed domestically. A fairly large 
portion of this area enjoys good irrigation. The main farming castes are the Kunbis and 
Agris, respectively; tribals do not traditonally inhabit the area. However, tribals do have 
a regular presence, since they increasingly migrate from the jungle patti to satsify 
demands of commercial crop farmers for cheap, abundant labour on their expanding 
operations. 
The jungle patti lies to the east of the railway line, extending up to the Mumbai-
Ahmedabad National Highway. The land is barren during dry seasons and the hills are 
thinly forested. Villages, which tend to be isolated and are sometimes inaccessible 
during monsoons, are characterized by an almost total lack of infrastructure facilities. 
The (virtually non-irrigated) subsistence-economy there is based on producing a single 
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crop – paddy – with grass grown on some pasture land. Nearly 70% of the jungle patti 
population consists of tribals who have historically lived in forested areas there. Today, 
most tribals are agricultural labourers and small farmers, with few holding more than 5 
hectares of land.  
The Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project is located in the jungle patti area and 
was designed to irrigate 24,000 hectares of land. Rainfall in the Surya Command Area is 
very high (3,000 to 4,000 mm annually), making paddy the largest crop in the area, 
under both rain-fed and irrigated conditions. Project planners did allow for some crop 
diversification, and projected that 40% of the area's irrigation potential would 
eventually facilitate commercial crops such as vegetables (Borude et al., 1986). Indeed, 
the potential for surface irrigation to transform production relations in the region was 
touted by other researchers during the construction phase of Surya:   
Irrigation in Dahanu significantly affects the entire organization of  
production methods of cultivation, the cropping pattern as well as the  
relations of production. On the one hand it may lead to greater  
differentiation in terms of proleterianization of the small and the  
marginal peasant. On the other, the topmost class, the developed  
technology, HYV seeds, etc. A few better off adivasi middle peasants  
may improve their conditions my making use of the irrigation facilities.  
Extension of irrigation in Dahanu and other talukas in Thane may be an  
important factor in boosting agricultural production at least temporarily,  
on the one hand, and in establishing clearer capitalist relations on the  
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other. (Munshi, 1983, p. 221) 
And yet, paddy remains the dominant crop in the Command Area today. And 
even though the Surya Project has been funded under the Tribal Sub-Plan and was 
intended to primarily benefit small-scale, marginal, tribal farmers, over time it has come 
to cater to the needs of agricultural populations in western parts of coastal Dahanu. It 
also irrigates the fields of Kunbi farmers in Saphale Village (Palghar block). And, as 
discussed, it now also serves the needs of the rapidly urbanizing Vasai-Virar sub-region 
on the periphery of Mumbai. Such persistent diversion of water from its originally 
intended purpose is an issue that is currently being challenged in Mumbai High Court 
by local activists. 
 Also, almost half of the total cultivable land in the Surya Command Area lies in 
the middle of one of the District’s largest protected forest areas. The canals and sub-
minors (water channels designed to convey water to fields from canals) of the irrigation 
project criss-cross this forested area through a very hilly region, and irrigate only a very 
small portion of agricultural land owned by tribal farmers. At several places, the canal 
network and sub-minors are left incomplete due to non-clearances for construction from 
the Forest Department. In contrast, the canal system is soundly in place near Vanai 
Village (on the eastern side of the Project’s Command Area), where some sections of 
the tribal community there have managed to benefit from irrigation water. Nearby, close 
to the Mumbai-Ahmedabad Western Express Higway that passes through the Command 
Area, a substantial portion of agricultural land has also been opened up for urban and 
industrial development. That too creates further social, economic and environmental 
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pressures on the tribal community there - who seldom find employment in new 
establishments that arise.  
A majority of inhabitants in the 105 villages of the Surya Command Area are 
also some of the poorest in Thane District. The area is characterized by chronic poverty 
and malnutrition; poor infrastructure; poor access to water for domestic use; and an 
absence of basic literacy. Most of its inhabitants migrate to Mumbai and coastal Dahanu 
from September to April in the post-monsoon season for seasonal employment.  
While the Surya Command Area is populated by the tribal community, the 
adjoining areas of Surya Project (in the western coastal belt of Dahanu and Palghar 
blocks, on the Arabian Sea) are mostly inhabited by farmers of the Kunbi Maratha and 
Vadaval caste-clusters. In contrast to the economic stagnation of the Command Area, 
farmers from those communities have enjoyed a period of relative prosperity since the 
land reforms and Green Revolution of the 1960s. That largely stems from their 
proximity to Mumbai railway line, as well as from access to ground water for their 
fields. Thus, Kunbi Maratha and Vadaval farmers have good connections to markets in 
Mumbai where they sell their produce, and so have developed proximate relations with 
the economy of the city. The farmers there rely mostly on tribal labour from the interior 
of Thane (a majority of whom come from villages in the Surya Command Area) to work 
their fields between November and May. After that, tribal farmers return to their own 
fields to sow their monsoon crop.  
However, that 'symbiotic' relationship is not exactly mutually enriching. The 
tribal community continues to face exploitative practices from the larger scale, 
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commercial, coastal farmers who pay them quite meagrely. Indeed, relations between 
the tribal community and the non-tribal, coastal community have become antagonistic. 
One of the leading social justice organizations in Thane District - the Dahanu-based 
Kashtakari Sanghatana - has been at the forefront of organizing protests and marches 
over the Surya Dam issue. During the past two decades they have also been organizing 
seasonal labourers into a labour union.  
In terms of land use, agricultural development is uneven in the Dahanu block. 
Paddy is the main staple crop in the adjoining coastal belt, and is cultivated on 4,141 
hectares in 32 villages there. Slightly above 53% of paddy production in Surya 
Command Area is located on this coastal strip of Dahanu (even though there are a 
greater number of villages in the interior of the Command Area, and in other tribal areas 
of Dahanu block). In fact, that coastal acreage accounts for almost 24% of the total area 
under paddy in Dahanu, which reflects very uneven agricultural development in the 
region. Indeed, this extremely productive coastal area of Dahanu (about 6 km long by 
12 km wide) is known as the ‘vegetable bowl’ of Thane District (Dewan, 1999). 
However, in the past 5 years (because of proximity to the Arabian Sea), coastal 
farmland has suffered from the intrusion of salinity into groundwater aquifers, which 
has caused sometimes serious declines in agricultural production. The polluting 
presence of power plants on Dahanu coast since the late 1990s (to feed Mumbai's 
energy needs) have also adversely affected the agricultural economy there (Dewan, 
1999). Consequently, to ameliorate their declining economic conditions, coastal area 
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Vadaval farmers have made access to water from Surya Project a key point in their 
demands of the State Government to help revive agriculture in their area of Dahanu.  
1.5 Understanding Conflicts over Water in Thane District: 
Urban-Rural or Intra-Rural Competition?  
1.5.1 Questioning a Structural Interpretation of Water Politics in 
Thane District  
It is widely acknowledged by most social movement and political leaders in the 
interior of Thane that the largely agricultural Kunbi community - now caught in a 
downward economic spiral - has begun to recognize that problems of economic 
underdevelopment faced by local tribal peoples are likewise affecting their own caste-
group. In this sense, the Kunbi community now appears keen to forge a common 
alliance with tribals against water policies of the Maharashtra State Government that 
negatively affect both groups. This interpretation of current politics in the context of 
crucial access to water was vividly conveyed by Vishwanath Patil of the Kunbi Sena 
organization. Patil uses the term “Bahjuan unity” (lower caste unity) in various Sena 
pamphlets and in public meetings to support an alliance between tribals and Kunbis 
(Interviews, August 2006 & August 2008). Thus, two significant political organizations 
in the District - the Communist Party of India (Marxist), and the Kunbi Sena - continue 
to press the importance of common mobilization, and during the past two years have 
even organized joint rallies of poor tribals, and Kunbis around water access in the Thane 
District.  
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However, during my fieldwork in Dahanu that interpretation of the District’s 
water politics was contested by Brian Lobo of the Kashtakari Sanghatana (KS). The 
Sanghatana is a social movement well recognized in India for its concern about the 
welfare of Thane tribal communities, particularly in its advocacy on environmental and 
developmental issues that affect them. Lobo and KS view the conflict over water in 
Thane as unfolding in a different direction. His contention is that the tribals there are 
economically worse-off than both the local Kunbi and Vadaval communities, who have 
inflicted caste-ist oppression upon them in recent decades. As such, Lobo believes that 
local tribals’ interests are distinct, and that they would not benefit from an alliance with 
Kunbi or Vadaval communities around water issues. To buttress his claim, Lobo points 
to developments in Dahanu, where Kunbi communities are increasingly claiming water 
from the Surya Project that was meant to irrigate lands of the tribal community there. 
According to Lobo, some of the non-tribal communities from coastal areas in Dahanu 
and Palghar have even secured formal approval that the Maharashtra Government will 
pipe water from Surya Project onto their lands. As such, while acknowledging how 
Mumbai’s urban water demands have driven the dispossession of Thane farmers, Lobo 
points out that irrigation water is also being diverted away from tribal users to benefit 
rural, non-tribal farming communities such as the Kunbi (not just to benefit urban 
Mumbai).  
In Lobo’s view, this is evidence that one reason or another will always be found 
to justify government water allocation policies that persistently dispossess Thane's tribal 
peoples. In this sense, he emphasizes that such policies essentially serve urban and 
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agricultural capital interests and that, therefore, Thane tribal communities will never 
politically benefit from a 'class-based alliance' involving the Kunbi Sena and the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist). According to him, the nature of existing relations 
of production in that area of Thane simply outweigh the potential benefits of the 
proposed alliance. In other words, the importance of the ongoing availability of large 
numbers of marginal, small-scale, tribal farmers to work as labourers for Kunbi and 
Vadaval farming caste-clusters on the Dahanu coastline makes it unlikely for tribal and 
non-tribal political interests to coincide around the water issue. The relationship 
between caste-clusters and the Thane tribal community constitute my focus in Paper 
Three of this dissertation. 
1.6  Research Questions and Dissertation Outline 
Research literature on water politics in India and Asia has generally emphasized 
that the intra-rural dimension of water conflict is characteristic of regions where water 
resources are under pressure from growing, nearby urban demands. In that context, 
competing demands for water also emerge within such rural areas, where there is always 
a segment of the population with only small, subsistence landholdings who become 
further marginalized in struggles over access to water (Mollinga, 2003; Janakarajan, 
2004). However, the sizeable literature focusing on such intra-rural water conflict has 
mainly focused on policy aspects of the problem, as well as a rather narrow definition of 
water governance that relies on rules and government policy (Meinzen-Dick & Bakker, 
2001). As such, the social, cultural and political-ecological processes involved in the 
governance of water and irrigation remain largely obscured. Analysis of water 
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management (and associated conflict) must consider wider sets of social networks, 
political relationships, and cultural values and meanings that also underlie and inform 
the norms and conventions surrounding access to water (Mosse, 2003).  
With this dissertation on water politics in Thane District (India), I build upon 
recent research that views access to water as a lens through which a variety of social 
relations in local contexts become structured (and vice-versa). Within such literature, 
caste-identity and the changing nature of caste interactions - as well as the manner in 
which those are entwined with broader relations of production - are viewed as 
determinants of resource politics and of agrarian change in India (Gidwani, 2000 & 
2002; Mollinga, 2003 & 2010). Related literature on water research in the agrarian 
contexts of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu similarly argues that it is the interface of such 
relations of production with water institutions (including ways that such relations and 
institutions have historically co-evolved) which critically shapes local water politics and 
local water management practices (Dubash, 2002; Mosse, 2003). 
My research project was guided by two central and interrelated questions: 
 1) What aspects of farmers' social and economic locations (within overarching 
relations of production) influence their access to water? (For instance, do size of 
landholdings influence access to water? Does proximity to canals? Do farmer's relative 
class- or caste-positions affect access? And how is water scarcity experienced by 
farmers in Surya Command Area?).  
 2) What are the rules, institutions and governance structures underpinning water 
transfers from rural to urban areas (and water management more broadly) in Mumbai-
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Thane region? (For instance, what factors lead to water being [paradoxically] under-
utilized for agriculture in locations such as Surya Command Area? And, how do broader 
structures and practices of water governance interact with the social/class divisions in 
such rural areas?).  
Building upon that research, my dissertation is presented in the form of three 
manuscripts.  
PAPER ONE uses a case study to illustrate a nexus of corruption among 
politicians, engineers, contractors and a dominant local caste-cluster (the Vadavals), in 
the context of a canal system of Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project (in the 
agricultural belt of Dahanu, Thane District, Maharashtra). That paper begins with a 
critical analysis of Robert Wade`s work on the corruption nexus he observed at the 
Andhra Pradesh Irrigation Department (Wade, 1982 & 1985). Through my own 
ethnographic research on divisions and tensions inside the irrigation bureaucracy at 
Dahanu, I learned that the rational choice framework employed by Wade - including his 
conceptualization of 'the corruption nexus' - was useful. Yet, I have also argued that it 
was insufficient for analyzing and understanding the motivations of main bureaucratic 
actors within that corruption nexus. Therefore, while not entirely dispensing with 
Wade’s arguments, my first paper asserts that the hierarchy between engineers at 
various levels - and the incentives that motivate them to participate in or refrain from 
corrupt practises - were not sufficiently investigated in Wade`s research. And, as such, 
the overlapping interests and relations of rural elites with politicians and Irrigation 
Department staff have not yet been well understood. Through a narrative analysis of 
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interviews I conducted with department engineers, Paper One emphasizes how the rural 
poor in Dahanu (mostly small-scale, marginal, tribal farmers) have been most 
disadvantaged by that nexus of corruption.  
Thus, while critiquing Wade for not recognizing the serious impact of 
hierarchies and potential conflicts within ‘the bureaucracy,’ my paper also confirms 
Wade’s insight that (in its developmental role) the Indian State remains inhibited by an 
increasing entrenchment of the corrupt nexus connecting bureaucrats, politicians, 
contractors and rural oligarchs.  
As a study of water politics in the Mumbai-Dahanu region, Paper One also 
presents new ethnographic research concerning the local and regional politics of water. 
Indeed, the water made available by the Surya Project is at the heart of fierce, ongoing 
competition between Vasai-Virar sub-region and (tribal and non-tribal) agricultural 
areas of Dahanu. As well, the commercialization of local water is a result of increasing 
demands from urban and industrial areas of Mumbai - and a major factor facilitating the 
local corruption nexus which resembles that described by Wade.  
PAPER TWO applies field research and ethnographic observations to explain 
the politics of water access and of the provision of basic water entitlements for domestic 
use in villages of the Tansa-Vaitarna water district. That water district happens to be the 
main source of water for Greater Mumbai and other towns in the MMR. This paper 
attempts to answer the question of how the city of Mumbai has come to exert such 
enormous influence over local water policies (officially the purview of Maharashtra 
State) within and beyond the boundaries of MMR. Ironically, that influence coincides 
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with the State's apparent inability to meet basic water needs of rural populations in 
watersheds of Thane District. It is not insignificant that this water district is primarily 
controlled by Mumbai Municipal Corporation (in tandem with the Forest Department).  
Thus, the second paper traces the original decision to reserve unexploited water 
resources in Thane District (for the anticipated future use of Mumbai) to a key debate 
from the mid-1940s. It also traces the subsequent (yet retroactive) territorial extension 
of jurisdiction arising from that decision to deliberations of the 1950s and 1960s. The 
paper also shows how the subsequent creation (in the 1970s) of a 'hydrometric area' for 
Mumbai Metropolitan Region further exacerbated rural-urban water conflicts. In that 
context I drew upon Elinor Ostrom`s socio-ecological systems framework, and her 
action situation analogy to identify how local ecological, economic and legal factors 
constrain the outcomes of local government efforts to provide rural water access to 
villages in the T-V water district. 
PAPER THREE emphasizes agrarian change and politics of the commons in 
Dahanu, after the onset of canal irrigation from the Surya Project. That paper utilizes 
interview and survey data, as well as maps from the local Irrigation Department. It also 
makes use of information gleaned from legal affidavits about local challenges over land 
and water access, involving small-scale, tribal farmers and commercial Kunbi and 
Vadaval agriculturalists. All of that data provides evidence around which a cohesive 
narrative about the politics of resource conflict in two villages of Dahanu is presented. 
The main finding of Paper Three is that in both of those villages land has also been 
central to conflicts over resources - even as water from canal minors at the head, middle 
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and tail reaches of the system has been increasingly monopolized by commercial 
farmers of Vadaval-caste. Paper Three thus identifies the importance of a land-water 
resource nexus, and examines the social and political paradoxes that accompany the 
introduction of new water technologies (as implemented by Vadaval commercial 
farmers to help them conserve water resources on their holdings). The paper also 
critically analyzes the canal technology prevalent in the Surya irrigation system, as well 
as political claims about wasted and under utilized water there. Studying how intra-rural 
water conflict results from (or is exacerbated by) the pressures of geographically distant 
urbanization also urges us to answer important contextual questions about the major 
actors who are facilitating changes to the 'waterscape' of Mumbai-Thane region. 
Overall, my research into the issues described above has yielded significant 
insights about contestation of water rights and access - including the commodification 
of water and the political dimension of conflicts - all situated within local, 
environmental contexts. Insofar as there has not yet been a substantial treatment of 
water conflict (in this way) in the context of the rural hinterlands of a major Indian 
metropolis, this doctoral research represents a significant step forward.  
Situated within the frameworks of human geography, institutional theory and 
political ecology, this dissertation project has focused on contributing an integrated 
understanding of the social and economic geographies of development, as well as the 
politics of resource conflict, all within the context of the rural hinterland surrounding 
the City of Mumbai and its Metropolitan Region. 
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Notes 
1. The 'tribals' in this context refer to those communities in Thane District who have 
been categorized as Scheduled Tribes under the Indian Constitution (i.e. eligible for 
what North Americans call 'affirmative action'). Historically and culturally in India, the 
term tribals refers to communities who comprise the (substantial) indigenous minority 
of India's population. Several tribal communities in India follow their own tribal 
religions which are different from the mainstream faiths. Also known as Adivasis, 
tribals are particularly numerous in Bihar, Orissa, Jharkhand, West Bengal and the 
western Indian states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. Such communities are direct 
beneficiaries of affirmative action policies. For example, they are entitled to reserved 
electoral seats in the Indian Parliament. In Thane District there are three ridings (seats) 
in the state assembly reserved for representatives of tribal communities, and one riding 
reserved for them in the Indian Parliament. According to the 2001 Indian Census there 
are about half a million tribals living in rural parts of Thane District. 
2. Interview with Mr. Raju Paranjpe (June 2006), local politburo member and state 
politburo leader for Communist Party of India (Marxist), Thane District. Interview with 
Mariam Dhawle (August 2008). 
References 
Ambasta, A. (1998). Capitalist Restructuring and Formation of Adivasi Proletarians: 
 Agrarian transition in Thane District, Western India, c.1820-1990.  
 (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 
 Netherlands. 
!39
Anand, P.B. (2004). From Conflict to Co-operation: Some design issues for local  
 collective action. Journal of International Development, 15 (22), 231-243. 
Anand, N. (2011). Pressure: The Politechnics of Water Supply in Mumbai. Cultural  
 Anthropology. 26(4). 542-564.  
Ballabh, V. (2009). Governance of Water: Institutional alternatives and political  
 economy. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Baviskar, A. (1995). In the Belly of the River: Tribal conflicts over displacement in the 
 Narmada Valley. Mumbai: Oxford University Press. 
Bhagat, R.B. and Jones, G.W. (2013). Population Change and Migration in Mumbai 
 Metropolitan Region: Implications for planning and governance. Asia Research 
 Institute Working Paper Series No. 201. National University of Singapore.  
 Retrieved from http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/wps/wps13_201.pdf 
Bond, P. (2002). Unsustainable South Africa: environment, development and social 
 protest. Scotsville: University of Natal Press. 
Borude, S.G., Thakare, G.G., & Dalvi, H.M. (1986). Socio Economic Bench Mark 
 Survey in the  Command Area of the Surya Irrigation Project, District Thane. 
 Konkan Krishi Vidyapeeth (Dept. of Agricultural Economics), Dapoli,  
 Maharashtra State, India.  
Briscoe, J. & Malik, R.P.S. (2005). Handbook of Water Resources in India:  
 Development,  management, and strategies. New York: Oxford University  Press. 
Chari, S. (2004). Fraternal Capital: Peasant workers, self-made men and globalization 
 in provincial India. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.  
Cronon, W. (1992). Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the great West. New York:  W.W. 
 Norton. 
Dewan, R. (1999). Of Development Amidst Fragility. A societal and environmental 
 perspective on Vadhavan Port. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan.  
Dreze, J., Samson M., & Singh S. (1997). The Dam and the Nation. Displacement and 
 resettlement in the Narmada Valley. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.  
Dubash, N. (2002). Tube Well Capitalism: Groundwater development and agrarian 
 change in Gujarat. Mumbai: Oxford University Press. 
!40
Gadgil, M. and Ramachandra, G. (1995). Ecology and Equity: The use and abuse of 
 nature in contemporary India. Penguin India: New Delhi. 
Gandy M. (2008). Landscapes of disaster: water, modernity, and urban fragmentation in 
 Mumbai. Environment and Planning A., 40 (5), 108 – 130. 
Gidwani, V. (1996). Fluid Dynamics: An essay on canal irrigation and the processes of 
 agrarian change in Matar Taluka, Kheda District (Gujarat), India.  
 (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of California, Berkeley, United 
 States.  
Gidwani, V. (2000). Labored Landscapes: Agroecological change in central Gujarat. In 
 A. Agrawal & K. Sivaramakrishnan (Eds.). Agrarian Environments: Resources, 
 representations and rules in India. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Gidwani, V. (2001). The Cultural Logic of Work: Explaining labour deployment and 
 piece-rate contracts in Matar Taluka (Gujarat), India, Part I and Part II. Journal 
 of Development Studies, 38 (2), 57-108. 
Gidwani, V. (2002). The Unbearable Modernity of Development. Canal irrigation and 
 development planning in western India. Progress in Planning, 58 (1), 1-80.  
Gidwani, V. (2008). Capital Interrupted – Agrarian development and politics of work in 
 India. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Office of Registrar General and  
 Census Commissioner (n.d.). Provisional Population Totals, Census of India 
 (2011). Retrieved June 20, 2014 from http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov- 
 results/paper2/data_files/India2/Table_2_PR_Cities_1Lakh_and_Above.pdf 
Government of Maharashtra (1999). Report of the Second Irrigation Commission,  
 Volumes 1 & 2 [in Marathi]. Department of Irrigation, Government of  
 Maharashtra.  
  
Government of Maharashtra (2004). Irrigation Status Report, Maharashtra State – 
 India (Period  2003-2004): Executive Summary. Retrieved from   
 www.mahagovid.org/isr_es.pdf 
Government of Maharashtra (2004). Water Audit for Maharashtra State. Retrieved from 
 http://irrigation.maharashtra.gov.in/english/dcmNew/commonpdf/wa0405.pdf  
Government of Maharashtra (2000-2012). District Socio-Economic Review of Thane.  
 Mumbai: Government of Maharashtra. Retrieved April 23, 2014 from https:// 
!41
 mahades.maharashtra.gov.in/ppUpdateView.do?publication_id 
 =DSA-2012-0032&mode=2. : Directorate of Economics and Statistics. 
Janakarajan, D. (2004). A Snake in the Grass!! Unequal Power, Unequal Contracts and 
 Unexplained Conflicts: Facilitating negotiations over water conflicts in peri-
 urban  catchments. In Proceedings from Conference on Market Development of 
 Water & Waste Technologies through Environmental Economics, Paris, France 
 28-29 May, 2004. Retrieved August 15, 2013 from   
 <http://www.cerna.ensmp.fr/ Documents/cerna_globalisation/Janak_Paris.pdf> 
Joy, K. J., Biksham, G., Paranjpe, S., Gaud, V., & Vispute, S. (2008). Introduction: A  
 Million in the Making: Understanding Water Conflicts in India. In K. J. Joy et al.  
 (Eds.), Water Conflicts in India: A Million Revolts in the Making. London:  
 Routledge.  
Keil, R. (2013). (ed.) Suburban Constellations: Governance, Land and Infrastructure in 
 the 21st Century. Berlin: Jovis Verlag. 
Linton, J. (2010) What is Water? The History of a Modern Abstraction. Vancouver:  
 UBC Press. 
Linton, J. & Budds, J. (2014). The Hydrosocial Cycle: Defining and Mobilizing a  
 Relational-Dialectical Approach to Water. Geoforum, 57 (November), 170-180. 
Mehta, L. (2003). The Politics and Poetics of Water: The naturalization of scarcity in 
 western India. New Delhi: Orient Longman.  
Mehta, L. (2005). Water and Human Development: Capabilities, entitlements and  
 power: Background paper for the 2006 human development report. United 
 Nations Development Programme. Retrieved March 13, 2008 from <http://
 hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/background-docs/Background_papers/Mehta_L.pdf> 
Meinzen-Dick, R.S. & Bakker, M. (2001). Multiple Uses of Water in Irrigated Areas. 
 Irrigation and Drainage Systems, 15 (2), 129-148.   
Mehta, V., Goswami R. and Benedict, E. (2013). Social Ecology of Domestic Water 
Use.  Economic and Political Weekly. April 13, 2013. 
Menon, M. (2006). How the Other Half Lives. The Hindu. Retrieved November 1, 2006 
 from <http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/mag/2006/10/01/stories/2006100100020200.htm > 
Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (1996). Draft Regional Plan 
 for Mumbai Metropolitan Region 1996-2011. Mumbai: MMRDA.  
!42
Mollinga, P.P. (2003). On the Waterfront: Water Distribution, technology and agrarian 
change in a South Indian canal irrigation system. Hyderabad: Orient Longman. 
Mollinga, P.P. (2010). The material conditions of a polarised discourse: Clamours and 
 silences in critical analysis of agricultural water use in India. Journal of  
 Agrarian Change, 10 (3), 414-436. 
Mollinga, P. P. (2013). Canal Irrigation and the Hydrosocial Cycle: The morphogenesis 
of contested water control in the Tungabhadra Left Bank canal, South India. 
Geoforum, 57 (November), 192-204. 
Mosse, D. (2003). The Rule of Water: Statecraft, ecology and collective action in south 
 India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Mumbai High Court (1996). Affidavit on the Surya Water Diversion to Vasi Virar.  
 Shared with the author by Mr. Navneetbhai Shah, former Member of Legislative  
 Assembly, State of Maharashtra from Palghar.  
Munshi, I. (1983). Analysis of Class Structure and Class Relations in a Rural Unit of 
 Maharashtra. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Bombay (Dept. 
 of Sociology), India. 
Navshakti, Mumbai Edition (2006, May 18). Suryache paani Saphale, Kelva parisarale 
 milnar  (Trans: Water from the Surya project will be awarded to the coastal 
 parts of Dahanu in Saphale and Kelva).  
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for  
 Collective Action. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Phadke, R. (2003). Water for All. Some Water for All: Lessons from the people’s  
 science movements in the Krishna Valley in India. (Unpublished doctoral  
 dissertation).  University of California, Santa Cruz (Dept. of Environmental 
 Studies), United States. 
Punjabi, B. (2005). The State and Re-territorialization in Mumbai, India. (Unpublished 
 major  research paper). York University (Dept. of Social Anthropology),  
 Toronto, Canada.  
Ranganathan, M. (2014). “Paying for Water, Claiming Citizenship: Political Agency and  
 Water Reforms at the Urban Periphery.” International Journal of Urban and  
 Regional Research 38 (2): 590-608. 
!43
Roy, A. (1997). Paupers and Patrons: Class, gender and regime politics in Calcutta’s 
 rural-urban transformation. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of 
 California, Berkeley (Department of City and Regional Planning), United States. 
Roy, A. (2003). City Requiem, Calcutta: Gender and the politics of poverty.  
 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Ruet, J., Gambez, M., & Lacour, E. (2007). Private Appropriation of Resources: Impact 
 of peri- urban farmers selling water to the Chennai Metropolitan Board. Cities, 
 24 (2), 110-121. 
Shiva, V. (2002). Water Wars: Privatization, pollution and profit. Canada: South End 
 Press.  
Singh, C. (1992). Water Law and Rights in India. New Delhi: Indian Law Institute. 
Swyngedouw, E. (2004). Social Power and the Urbanization of Water-Flows of Power. 
 Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. 
United Nations Development Programme (2006). Human Development Report 2006: 
 Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and global water crises. Retrieved June 12, 
 2011 from  
         http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/human-development-report-2006.html 
Vaidyanathan, A. (1999). Water Resources Management. Delhi: Oxford University 
 Press.  
Vaidyanathan, A. (2004). Managing Water Scarcity: Experiences and prospects. New 
 Delhi:  Manohar Publishers and Distributors. 
Wade, R. (1982). The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal  
 irrigation in South India. Journal of Development Studies, 18 (3), 287-328. 
Wade, R. (1985). The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian state is not better at 
 development. World Development, 13 (4), 467-497. 
Wagle, S., Warghade, S., & Sathe, M. (2012). Exploiting Policy Obscurity for 
Legalizing Water Grabbing in the Era of Economic Reform: The case of 
Maharashtra. Water Alternatives, 5 (2), 412-430. 
Water and Power Consultancy Services (WAPCOS-India) Limited (1996). Evaluation 
 Studies for Command Area Development Programme, Surya – Maharashtra. 
 New Delhi, India. 
!44
Wittfogel, K. (1957). Oriental Despotism: A comparative study of total power. New 
 Haven: Yale University Press. 
World Bank (2006). India’s Water Economy – Bracing for a turbulent future. Retrieved 
 January 10, 2009 from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/  
           2008/06/16784682/indias-water-economy-bracing-turbulent-future" 
World Commission on Dams (November 2000). Dams and Development: A new  
 framework on  decision making. A Report of the Word Commission on Dams. 
 U.K.: Earthscan Publications Ltd. Retrieved January 2013 at http://        
            www.unep.org/dams/WCD/report/WCD_DAMS%20report.pdf 
!45
2. Methodology 
 In this chapter, I will present the methodology that guided the overall field, 
archival and library research that informs this dissertation. This includes the 
justification of researching the canal system in two villages as the unit of analysis, the 
strategy of following the water within the Surya command area and to other parts of 
Thane district, and finally a description of the analysis of data gathered during the 
research. 
 I begin with a general description of the methodology (in Section 2.1), where I 
will outline the reasons for my use of qualitative methods. I provide details on the time 
spent around field, archival and library research during field research in 2006 (Section 
2.2). I follow this up by providing the rationale for choosing the canal system in the 
Surya project as the unit of analysis (Section 2.3). A description of the methods chosen 
to interview engineers who manage the irrigation system for the Surya project is 
presented in Section 2.4. A description of field research in the Tansa- Vaitarna water 
district conducted in 2006 and in March 2008 in the interior of Thane district follows in 
Section 2.5. From Section 2.6 until Section 2.9, I provide more details about the 
sampling strategy and field and library research. Finally, I conclude this chapter in the 
last two sections by explaining the methods used to analyze the data. 
2.1  Qualitative Methods: Human Geography and the  
Political Economy of Water in India 
This dissertation relied on qualitative research methods for gathering fieldwork 
data. Research on the human geography and political economy of small town and rural 
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India respectively provided a methodological model for my research (Chari 2004; 
Dubash, 2002; Gidwani, 2000, also see Introduction to the dissertation for further 
background). While Chari’s work is on labour and the politics of capitalist accumulation 
in a small town of South India, Gidwani and Dubash’s ethnographic research on 
irrigation focuses on the ecological and cultural dimensions of agrarian change in 
Gujarat. Their research used a combination of methods, largely to triangulate findings 
from various modes of data collection, and revolved around a central ethnographic 
fragment discerned and unearthed in an earlier phase of fieldwork. In this thesis, I 
examined how the various narratives and findings on the politics of water and the 
impact of urban expansion on water governance square with existing theories of water 
politics in the Mumbai region and also other metropolitan regions in India. My 
fieldwork adopted a contingent, open–ended and process-oriented approach, one which 
tried to develop an understanding of the role of institutions, rules and the formal and 
informal mechanisms of water governance. It combined this institutional analysis with a 
study of social relations in the rural communities in the water districts outside Mumbai 
through interviews and survey research. 
In the context of Thane district, my earlier fieldwork in June-September 2006 
identified the perception of declining economic status within the Maratha-Kunbi 
community as a central feature of the recent political economy of social relations. 
Interviews conducted with leaders of the community revealed that the Maratha-Kunbis 
and Vadavals had begun to contend that contesting the inequity in the distribution of 
water between Mumbai and Thane was key to reversing their flagging economic 
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fortunes in agriculture. Further interviews conducted with farmers from both the 
Maratha-Kunbi and Vadaval communities also revealed that they had started perceiving 
the tribal community as sharing their sense of crisis, which emanated from an un-
remunerative agriculture, seriously affected by the lack of water access. “Aamhi 
Maratha-Kunbi pan Adivasi sarkhya jalo” (the state of Maratha-Kunbis has started 
resembling the economic condition of the tribals) is a cryptic comment in Marathi, 
which is often heard in conversations with political leaders and activists from the 
community in the district. Along with this is the demand of the Kunbi Sena, which 
represents Maratha-Kunbis to place access to water, land and employment at the centre 
of the new resource politics in the district and the Konkan region. However, in contrast 
to its stated objectives of attaining ‘farmers unity’ in Thane, the Maratha-Kunbi and the 
Vadaval communities in the coastal area of Dahanu under the aegis of their separate 
caste associations had also sought to consolidate their numbers and demand water for 
farmers from their own caste groups. They tried to use their influence to garner a share 
of water from dam projects at the expense of the tribal community (Navshakti, 2006). 
With this background information on social relations between the tribal and non-tribal 
communities from various parts of Thane district, I had focused on researching both 
social relations and the institutions that had evolved around water governance in the 
region during the 2006 trip.  
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2.2  Research in Regional Planning and Government Offices 
 on Water Governance 
The role of water institutions and social geography became quite central to the 
dissertation’s three papers after the first fieldwork trip to the Surya command area in 
2006. Data gathered during the interviews with metropolitan planners and engineers 
during this trip also led to some of the research questions around formal and informal 
water governance in this dissertation. The “abundant” availability of water and 
underutilization of irrigation quotas in Thane district was pointed out by both 
metropolitan planning officials in the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development 
Authority (MMRDA) and the Irrigation Department in Thane. This data gathered from 
interviews later led to research in the metropolitan planning reference libraries on the 
history of water planning. Here, various committee reports on large dam and canal 
projects in the Western Ghats and the regional planning aspects of urbanization were 
researched. Since these reports were from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the importance 
of developing a more contemporary picture of water management through field research 
surfaced. At the same time, the information from these reports (on the early experiences 
of communities in the Konkan Western Ghats with irrigation) provided a very useful 
window into my observations during field research in 2008. 
 This later informed my overall methodological strategy when I was reading and 
analyzing more contemporary metropolitan planning and Irrigation Department reports 
on water. I used some of these early insights on local water politics and information 
gathered from an analysis of both planning and irrigation reports to pose pointed 
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research questions around social relations, institutions and water politics. The 
incomplete state of the Surya irrigation project, the continued “underutilization” of 
irrigation water, the issues around access to irrigation water which vary from social to 
physical factors and the relationship between the tribal and non-tribal communities led 
me to devise a research design based on two villages in what became a study of regional 
water politics. At the same time, this dissertation did not plan on producing village 
studies. The choice of two villages (Sakhare and Vanai) in Dahanu was primarily used 
to address research questions around the underutilization of water in systems such as the 
Surya.  
The rest of this chapter outlines the fieldwork strategy that was employed during 
research for this dissertation. I begin with providing some social and geographical 
context to justify the rationale behind my choice of the canal system as a unit of 
analysis. I then move on to providing more justification about my strategy to using open 
ended interviews for my research on water governance in the Surya command area and 
other parts of Thane district. I finally end with a section that describes the analysis of 
qualitative and survey data for this dissertation. 
2.3  Canal Irrigation as the Unit of Analysis 
 My ethnographic investigation over a period of four months in the summer of 2006 
in the Surya command area revealed that the incomplete condition and the poor 
maintenance of the canal conveyance system, and the increasing per capita water 
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demands of the Mumbai Metropolitan region were the major causes of underutilization 
of irrigation water in the Surya project 1. 
For the purposes of my fieldwork and in order to answer my research questions 
around water politics in papers one and two, I divided the command area of the Surya 
irrigation project into two ecotypes. Most of the Vadaval farmers in the coastal area, 
who belong to caste Hindu communities, have large land holdings which are mostly 
irrigated by groundwater and are officially outside the Surya project command area. On 
the other hand, the interior areas which lie eastward, within the command area, are 
dominated by members of the tribal community, but have seen Vadaval farmers lease in 
land in the horticultural belt around the village town of Vangaon. Within these two 
ecotypes (see Fig 2.1, Zones I and II), detailed qualitative information was available for 
one village, Sakhare, located at the upper reaches of the canal system of the Surya, and 
qualitative data was available on Vanai village, which was downstream on the canal.  
Both villages lie in the Dahanu block of the Surya command area. Sakhare 
village was located in an area that has been the focus of a study on agrarian change by a 
University of Mumbai sociologist in the 1980s (Munshi,1983). This study was very 
useful as a baseline survey for my research. Ethnographic data on class relations was 
also available on this area from this study. The district census which is done once every 
decade is another useful source of data on population and agricultural land. My initial 
interviews with Surya dam project staff revealed that some of the richer Vadaval 
farmers have been default beneficiaries of the irrigation project because of the higher 
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groundwater tables in the village and the consequent prosperity they have come to 
experience. 
!  
Figure 2.1: Agro ecology situation in Thane district. Source: Irrigation   
 Department, Thane Irrigation Circle.  
The access to groundwater had played a role, but their access to canal irrigation 
has further enabled them to improve their prospects in horticulture. 
!52
Very little ethnographic data from the past was available for Vanai village. My 
choice of this village was facilitated by a local NGO, the Kashtakari Sanghatana, which 
had a strong presence in the village as they had developed a grassroots presence for 
advocacy work done on behalf of the tribal poor. Vanai lies in the lower reaches of the 
canal system of the command area of the project and some tribal farmers have benefited 
from irrigation water of the project, while there are substantial segments of the village 
which had not experienced access. Both villages also had a significant seasonal migrant 
population which travels to other parts of Thane district for work. Moreover, given the 
history and the formation of caste and class-based identities in the district, the 
importance of studying social dynamics in the aftermath of irrigation proved to be very 
insightful. Sakhare and its surrounding settlements in Dahanu are at the centre of an 
interesting, evolving regional water politics where the farmers from the coastal parts are 
increasingly laying claim to the canal water of the Surya irrigation project due to the 
their political influence in the state capital in Mumbai. In addition to the conflict on the 
canal system, this imparts an interesting intra-rural caste and class dimension to water 
politics in the region.  
 I chose villages purposively, with the main criterion being the strength of 
contacts in both villages and the possibility of obtaining credible information. The 
location of the villages on the canal system played an important role in my decision. 
Sakhare was located in the northern reaches on the Palghar Branch Canal 2 while Vanai 
was located on the southern reaches of the same canal. Both Sakhare and Vanai villages 
have benefited from irrigation water, but these villages also witnessed the inward 
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movement of Vadaval farmers from the coast who had leased in or purchased 
agricultural land for horticulture. Moreover, both villages are at the centre of a fast 
changing rural landscape, are geographically central to major transport routes, and lie 
on a geographical continuum (the right bank canal coming down westward from the 
mountains extending from Suryanagar across the Western Express Highway via Sakhare 
to Vanai on Palghar Branch 2) which allowed me to “follow the water” as part of my 
methodological strategy to study regional water politics. 
 Access to irrigation water has historically been an important marker of class 
relations in agriculture in Dahanu. The following quotation from a 1983 ethnographic 
study of a village neighbouring Sakhare (pseudonym used: Gavatgaon in Munshi, 1983) 
highlights the importance of water to production relations in the villages in this belt.  
While livestock and implements, especially the plough and bullocks 
which are necessary for cultivation may be borrowed on standard terms 
from the rich of the village, water remains a serious problem. The 
marginal peasants, the poor peasants and some middle peasants are 
entirely dependent on the rain water as the only source of irrigation. 
Wells are an extremely expensive proposition beyond the capacity of 
these classes. A few of the middle peasants, all the rich peasants and 
most of the landlord-trader-creditor own a well and a motor pump each, 
some even two. As a result, those without a well cannot grow a second 
crop, and get only one crop of rainfed paddy. Even more important is the 
harsh truth that the vagaries of nature which may affect all, may spell 
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ruination for the small peasants. “Last year the rains failed, we did not 
get even the seeds we sowed.  (Munshi, 1983:213) 
In Sakhare, there was a rich segment of Vadaval farmers who have done well in 
horticulture in Dahanu. Each farmer from this community on average owned more than 
twenty hectares of agricultural land and had good access to groundwater irrigation 
(Question 1 in the introduction chapter of this dissertation around the relationship of 
land ownership to water access). Using the study by Indra Munshi (Munshi, 1983) as a 
baseline, the canal system was the unit of analysis in this village. Both my fieldwork in 
2006 and past research such as Munshi’s dissertation documents that this rich segment 
of farmers have been the mainstay of the rural economy in Dahanu, since they have 
marketed their vegetable produce in various parts of India and the Middle East. These 
farmers who belong to the Vadaval community have good access to credit, a ready 
supply of tribal labour for their agricultural operations and command political influence 
in the state capital, Mumbai, which they have used from time to time for their 
commercial interests in horticulture. Vanai village was more homogenous in its ethnic 
composition and a majority of inhabitants are small and marginal tribal farmers who 
own up to two hectares. Like Sakhare, the village population was divided between 
farmers who had large land holdings and came from outside the village and tribal 
farmers who were from within the village. So access to water is an important marker of 
production relations in agriculture in the village.  
Canals constituted the major form of irrigation in Vanai village and the 
experiences of farmers with water availability and scarcity can be elicited only with an 
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extended stay as temporary resident in this village. In this village, as in Sakhare, the 
canal system was the unit of analysis. Canals are better maintained at certain points than 
others, depending in part on the political and social connections of the farmers. All these 
factors affect utilization of canal water and often contribute to the varying economic 
fortunes of farmers. The two research sites were part of the official beneficiary area of 
the Surya irrigation project. There is a major dimension of variance across the two 
communities in the two villages and purposive selection within these villages enabled 
me to seek answers to the questions on water access and its relationship with the state of 
production relations in this region. While I chose these villages for further field research 
in 2006, an IDRC grant made it possible for me to return to India at the end of 2007. I 
returned for field research in Thane district at the end of December 2007 and stayed in 
Dahanu until September 2008 to cover the irrigation season between November 2007-
May 2008. The latter research trip involved a prior round of semi-structured interviews 
in the villages with farmers and engineers and a survey that was administered to farmers 
in both Sakhare and Vanai in May, 2008. I had made initial contact with engineers in the 
Thane Irrigation Department as well as the Surya irirgation project in 2006. While the 
frequent transfer of executive engineers with whom contact was initiated meant that I 
had to renew my contacts with new personnel, my strategy being to write persistent 
letters to the Thane Irrigation Department seeking access to the Surya project, finally 
met with a positive response in January 2008. 
 Given that a pure focus on production relations is insufficient (Harris, 1982; 
Mollinga, 2003), the role of the state, in particular, the local Irrigation Department in 
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water development in this area was closely examined for it to serve as an important 
background to the study of canal irrigation in this dissertation. My interviews with 
engineers constitute the focus of paper one. The methods and the context for this 
component of the research are outlined in some detail in section 2.4 below. 
2.4  Following the Water: Institutions and Politics in the  
 Surya Project 
Throughout my research in Dahanu in 2006 and 2008, engineers from the Surya 
project had repeatedly drawn my attention to the fact that canal irrigation in villages 
such as Sakhare and Vanai faced tremendous challenges from the terrain and how this 
had come in the way of the project’s ability to meet its objectives. These constraints had 
also led to a high underutilization of water. Therefore, I chose not to restrict myself to 
studying canal irrigation within villages, but also observe irrigation rotations on the 
main canal level. A schedule of canal rotations from November 2007 until May 2008 
was shared with me by the Irrigation Department. Since one of the villages (Sakhare) 
was located on the junction of the Palghar Branch and Dahanu (main) canals, I kept a 
diary on whether the actual water rotations adhered to the schedule. This gave me 
important insights into the political economy of water in the entire region where the two 
villages were located. The Irrigation Department shared several reports with me on the 
state of the project, environmental reports and a socio-economic survey from 1996. 
Some of these reports had a description of the state of the canals, experiences of farmers 
with the early reception of canal technology in this area and the early technological 
rationale behind the water conveyance systems in the Surya project. These reports also 
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gave me important information on water diversions outside the project’s command area. 
Interviews with engineers were used to verify some of my observations both on the state 
of the main canals, but also some of the irregular events (such as the stoppage of water 
rotations on the main canal in May, 2008).  
 I interviewed ten engineers (of various ranks) and while most of the names used 
in this dissertation are pseudonyms, I made sure that I do use their ranks to describe the 
politics and responsibilities within the administrative hierarchy of the department (see 
Paper One). I also established a rapport with other employees of the irrigation project to 
triangulate my interviews with engineers. For Paper One, which describes the role of 
engineers, I have used a narrative style combining interview data with an analysis of the 
local Marathi media reports on corruption in the Surya project. It was impossible to 
understand all the layers of corruption because of the sensitive (and potentially 
dangerous) nature of the problem and the implications it had for my own safety in the 
field. But one that constantly came up was the resentment of the lower level of 
engineers towards their counterparts at senior levels. I made several notes from my 
interviews in June 2008 that helped me piece together the account of institutional 
corruption. The interview data gathered from fieldwork was brought into its proper 
perspective only after the state wide Maharashtra irrigation corruption scam was 
unearthed in 2012, which was also covered in the national press in India. The analysis 
of the persistent problem of graft in the Maharashtra Irrigation Department by the 
national and state level media helped me place the formal and informal politics of water 
transfers in the Mumbai-Thane region in a broader political context. It also helped me 
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confirm findings from the coverage of the local Marathi media in Dahanu (in 2008) on 
the poor maintenance of the canal system and the corruption in the Surya project. 
The open-ended nature of my field research and research with engineers helped 
me understand water governance issues and the reasons behind underutilization at the 
main canal level. The political pressures on executive engineers in the Surya project 
came up a lot during conversations. While they were unwilling to talk about their 
experiences initially, they often opened up to conversation when they were close to 
being transferred to other locations in the state of Maharashtra. The socio-technical 
nature of canal irrigation and the political dimensions of water management emerged 
powerfully during these interactions. These conversations helped me place the reports 
on water underutilization made available by the Irrigation Department in their 
appropriate social context. Finally, this research on the irrigation bureaucracy helped me 
answer the question on formal and informal mechanisms of water governance in the 
region (see Introduction for Research Question 2).  
2.5  Study of Tansa-Vaitarna Water District 
  The Tansa-Vaitarna water district entered the scope of my field research in the 
context of a major agitation on water in the interior of Thane district in February and 
March 2008. This agitation was a continuation of the protests against water scarcity that 
had been going on in the interior parts of Thane district throughout the 2000s. I had also 
travelled to this area in the summer of 2006. A study of this area was carried out mostly 
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through key informant interviews with planners, municipal engineers, activists, and 
conservation officers in the Tansa Wildlife Sanctuary and political leaders in the water 
district and Mumbai in 2006 and 2008. Newspaper archives, planning reports, and dam 
project reports were also gathered to draw a picture of the causes of the water conflict in 
this area that revolved around the growing water demand from Greater Mumbai and its 
impact on the basic water needs of the villages in the area. The T-V water district is 
located 80 kms north east of the Dahanu area, but its significance to the water security 
of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region and Greater Mumbai in particular, drew me to 
travel to this region and gather information on the situation with rural water 
entitlements. 
  Laws and governance entered the discussion during my interviews in this region. 
However, given that the local engineers at the dams in the T-V water district were not 
authorized to speak to researchers, I had to interview engineers and municipal officials 
in Mumbai at the headquarters of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation. The Mumbai 
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority’s planners provided information on the 
city’s water rights in Thane district and their library had several reports that were useful 
in helping me understand the water planning in this area. I also made careful notes from 
my interviews with engineers and planners in their offices.  
  For my research on the T-V water district, three regional planners at the Mumbai 
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA), one forest conservation 
official, three engineers from the Irrigation Department in Thane, three municipal 
officials from the Mumbai Municipal Corporation and four political leaders belonging 
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to various parties were interviewed. I have chosen to keep all their identities 
anonymous. They shared some of their own experiences in dealing with water scarcity 
in the T-V water district and spoke at length about how the entire area was committed 
for Greater Mumbai’s urban use. The Irrigation Department in Thane district had shared 
with me reports of the Bhatsa Multipurpose project, one of the largest projects in Thane 
district. The objectives of the project were outlined in this report and the rights of the 
local population also found a mention in this document. Dam project reports (DPR`s) 
for the Surya project (Dahanu, Thane), the Kal project (Raigad district) and the Bhatsa 
project (Shahpur,Thane) helped me understand the local rights situation in the T-V 
water district better. I used these dam reports to place the water rights situation in the T-
V water district in a regional context. These dam reports also helped me understand the 
engineering rationale behind the planning of the five urban water supply dams in T-V 
water district. 
  Crucial material on the planning of the T-V water district was gathered from the 
University of Chicago’s Crerar Library and the University of Chicago’s South Asia 
collections in the summer of 2009. Archives of the Times of India’s Bombay edition 
1954 at Robarts library’s Media Commons also helped place the long term evolution of 
the water district in context. These were supplemented by Claude Inglis`s original 
article that was found in an 1945 issue of an old Indian engineering journal in the 
basement of Gerstein Science Library at the University of Toronto. The absence of data 
from one single source was thus compensated by accessing these different sources of 
information. Information on water use statistics in the Water Budgets from the State 
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Government of Maharashtra and the various planning reports from the Mumbai 
Metropolitan Planning Authority were used to confirm, verify and and validate findings 
obtained from interviews with engineers and urban planners on the water problem in the 
T-V water district. Information from all these sources was triangulated through an 
analysis of the media coverage of the water district in newspapers in Mumbai city and 
Thane district. 
2.6  Research Design for Village Interviews 
  The core of my methodology for the study on canal irrigation is based on semi-
structured in-depth interviews with villagers and a sample survey on water access on the 
canal system in both villages. However, since conducted face to face, observation of 
agricultural practices, the state of dwellings in villages and the geography of settlement, 
maintenance of canal systems and wells and group relations played a supporting role. 
Most villagers are not trusting of filling out interview schedules or survey 
questionnaires in India and therefore I had to make handwritten notes with the help of a 
research assistant. Moreover, since water is a much contested resource and a source of 
political tension in the command area of the Surya project, qualitative research 
remained the best way of eliciting responses on access to irrigation. I conducted these 
semi-structured interviews (with my knowledge of the local language, Marathi) and 
observation with farming communities and their experiences with water scarcity in 
order to construct a picture of political and economic changes and livelihoods in the 
project area.  
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  A census of farmers from the irrigation project in both villages was gathered 
from the data shared by the Irrigation Department on the canal minor systems in 
Sakhare and Vanai. The Department also maintained topographical maps on the canal 
minor system that were used to mark the locations of the large Vadaval farmers on the 
canal system. Later these maps were used to map social differentiation in the villages. 
Before conducting a 35% random sample survey with farmers who owned or leased 
land on canal systems in both villages, an earlier round of semi-structured interviews 
was conducted as part of a snowball sample on experiences with water scarcity on canal 
minor systems. Purposive snowball sampling was used to choose farmers for the first 
round of semi-structured interviews. 50 farmers (mostly heads of households were 
interviewed) in each of the snowball rounds in both villages during the irrigation 
season, December 2007-June 2008. A total of 154 farming households were covered in 
this entire period. In the later survey round in May, a 35% random sample of farmers 
based on their landholdings was created from the census and the survey (attached in 
appendix) was administered after the snowball survey was completed. Farmers who 
owned, leased or accessed land plots which were two or less hectares were classified as 
small and marginal farmers (Mollinga 2003). Farmers who owned or leased ten hectares 
or more were categorized as large farmers. Access to land holding data and the stark 
inequality in land ownership and control made the task of researching social 
differentiation easier. Questions in both rounds focused on access to the canal system 
and experiences with access to water. Care was taken not to repeat the survey with 
farmers who were interviewed in the earlier qualitative snowball round. I chose only 
!63
those farming households which listed agriculture as their main occupation. The survey 
questionnaire and the interview schedule are attached as an appendix to this thesis.  
2.7  Qualitative Interviews 
  Semi-structured interviews with farmers and engineers were conducted only 
after a social rapport was established. In addition to semi-structured interviews, I also 
conducted open-ended conversations which were used to supplement information from 
the interviews. These conversations took place at farmers’ homes, in their fields and in 
public settings such as local grocery shops, tea shops (cafes) or the local dairy 
cooperative. Interviews with the engineers of the Surya project took place at their 
homes (often in Mumbai) and in tea shops. Respondents tend to be open during 
informal interviews and people in rural India are are eager to chat when one runs into 
them in the village. Such interviews and conversations were supplemented by continued 
analysis of secondary data, such as maps and agriculture data, procured from the village 
revenue officer and the Irrigation Department, on land and water use.  
  I used village maps that indicate type of irrigation facility and which are 
available from the canal officer. Information from these sources were used to provoke 
discussion with farmers about patterns of water use and also to place material gleaned 
from interviews in their appropriate physical context with help of maps of the canal 
minor system in the villages. During my stay in the villages, I also observed local 
village society in an anthropological mode of investigation, focusing particularly on 
social relations between various castes and classes of farmers, the role of water and land 
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institutions and the experiences of farmers with water access on the canal system in the 
villages. Most of the recent ethnographic research done on irrigation in agrarian studies 
in India on which this study is modelled has been done with the help of a long extended 
stay in villages as a temporary resident (Dubash, 2002; Mollinga, 2003). I have also had 
work experience in Thane district as a social worker, which makes me familiar with the 
customs, language and mores of the tribal, Maratha-Kunbi and Vadaval communities. 
Since I often stayed in the two villages in this period, the economic polarization 
between the tribal community and the Vadavals became far more obvious. I simply 
chose to be an observer and not openly participate in the various political agitations and 
lobbying around water which take place in the district. I was present only at one protest 
meeting in Dahanu in August 2008 as an attendee, but this was primarily to take notes 
on a new anti-dam movement. Nevertheless, I did depend on second hand accounts of 
such political activity through local newspapers and activists, which provided me with 
more clarity on the broader politics of water in this particular area in Dahanu block. 
These are aspects of water politics which can only be discerned through fieldwork and 
such ethnographic presence. Ethnography in this context is more about a mode of data 
collection where fieldwork is central and pays attention to the interlocking of multiple 
socio-political sites and locations in Dahanu and Thane district (Gupta and Fergusson, 
1996).  
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2.8  Logistics of Qualitative Research 
  A record of the names of respondents throughout the fieldwork was maintained, 
along with the time and location at which I spoke to them and their contact address. 
Some of the names of the respondents, especially engineers were kept confidential to 
meet the research and ethics protocol of Western University, where this dissertation was 
drafted. Some farmers also wished to stay anonymous, though a majority were 
comfortable giving their names. The politically sensitive nature of fieldwork in this area 
also meant that I have assigned pseudonyms to people who made such requests.  
  Two further kinds of records were kept while conducting this research: 
  1) A field note log where I jotted down notes from an interview as the 
communities were not comfortable on my reliance on tape recorders. Notes were also 
taken to assist in debriefing myself after an interview about the encounter – the nature 
of context and interaction in situations relevant to the research. This log included notes 
on any ad-hoc encounters with participants (e.g., a social gathering attended by many 
participants).  
  2) A research diary was maintained. The diary was a record of how I tried to 
obtain interviews, my encounters with farmers and my concerns and further questions 
that arose during the research process. I also included comments on my shifting 
positionality during the interviews and recorded my initial reactions to the interview 
sessions. Although some of this information was jotted down in my field note log, the 
research diary recordings provided context to the interview process.  
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I see these methods (semi-structured interviews combined with field log and 
diary) as the most appropriate in seeking to answer my questions around access to 
irrigation water and experiences with water scarcity. Ethnographic approaches 
complement surveys because village economies and economic relationships within and 
between villages are embedded within social relations, and these are best understood 
through the sort of in-depth “thick description” that an ethnographic approach can 
provide. Given the centrality of caste-based politics and institutions in the distribution 
of water in this context, the use of such qualitative research tools were key to 
understanding the socio-political processes which underlie access to water.  
2.9  Timeline of 2008 Field Research and Organizations that 
  Helped in Research 
  In between the stay in villages, the period January-February 2008 was also used 
to gather reports and data from district offices on irrigation. Secondary information on 
land records was gathered from the village revenue officer on landownership within the 
village. Data on net sown area and irrigated area (from canals and wells) in villages as 
held by the Surya project irrigation office. I gathered data for the last ten years and this 
helped me make some broad observations on changes in cropping patterns and agrarian 
structure in the villages. I also renewed contacts with organizations such as the 
Kashtakari Sanghatana in Thane district once I returned for field data collection to India 
in December 2008. Prior contact was established during an earlier field session in 2006. 
Other organizations with which I renewed contacts during the 2008 field research are 
the Maratha-Kunbi Sena, the Kashtakari Sanghatana and the Communist Party of India 
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(Marxist) as well as individuals such as Mr Navneet Shah who lives in Palghar block 
and was central to the legal advocacy efforts on the Surya dam issue. Further 
information and progress on the advocacy front was gathered from these organizations 
and individuals and their respective opinions and evaluation of the local politics was 
sought and analyzed to summarize the developments around water politics in the area in 
the past year. Due to the presence of the Surya project, the Dahanu area is at the centre 
of an intense political contestation around water. It was vital to update my 
understanding of the social, political and economic context through my access to these 
individuals and organizations. It also helped me develop a better understanding of the 
rural context which I was going to research. All the above mentioned organizations and 
individuals maintained good written records and documentation of the media coverage 
of the issue, which was also accessed and provided the much needed context for my 
interviews and ethnographic research. This part of Thane district had been witnessing 
social and political ferment over water throughout the 2000’s and local newspapers 
covered the events around water very well. Such secondary accounts from the media do 
not address any research questions on their own, but supplement and provide broad 
support to the data gathered from semi-structured interviews with villagers, engineers, 
officials and activists.  
  The bulk of interviews, surveys and ethnographic research in Dahanu block 
were conducted between January and June 2008. I also stayed for a brief period in both 
villages during this period. Most of the interviews and the surveys were conducted 
before the start of the monsoon (rainy) season in June, 2008. 
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2.10  Analytical Strategies  
All names of farmers, engineers, planners and most politicians provided in the 
dissertation from the interview and survey data are pseudonyms. This was in keeping 
with the ethics protocol of Western University to impart anonymity to all respondents. 
All interviews that inform the three papers were first hand written in the local language, 
Marathi (with the explicit permission of respondents) and duly transcribed. Respondent 
confidentiality was strictly preserved at all stages during transcription. Interview data 
was supplemented by field logs. A monthly report submitted to my PhD Committee also 
helped me summarize fieldwork. These data were ordered and interpreted using the 
qualitative data management software package NVivo. At the end of all the interviews, 
interpretative reports were built on the descriptive reports to suggest what findings 
might mean and take alternative explanations into account. Themes arising from the 
interviews (corruption, land grabbing, fencing of canals, hydrometric area, laws, 
Mumbai) were coded with different colours and different answers were given to 
different colours. A count of the various themes (e.g. land, political contacts, water, 
canals, rules, rotations, corruption, outlets) which emerged, was maintained. I kept 
electronic copies of the data on a computer so as to make analysis easier later. In terms 
of coding, I reviewed data documents, stored electronically, line by line, developing 
codes to represent themes, patterns and categories. Discourse analysis guided my 
conceptual development of the themes, patterns and categories, which emerged as the 
data were transcribed. I often returned to the conceptual and empirical literature around 
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water in human geography, political economy and agrarian studies for guiding my 
further fieldwork strategy. 
 Due to the lack of literature on irrigation in this region, I had to rely majorly on 
the reports provided to me by the Irrigation Department and the reports I found at the 
Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA) during my 
fieldwork. Thus, though my approach was inductive, this does not mean that I 
approached fieldwork devoid of any theoretical expectation. I deployed both 
institutional theory and tools I had learned from political ecology to determine 
situations that appear anomalous and aimed to reconstruct theory to address these 
anomalies as fieldwork proceeded. An instance of this was my attempt to develop a 
grasp of the rules that were used to regulate canal irrigation in this area around Mumbai. 
As secondary literature on Konkan irrigation was lacking, I relied on making very 
detailed notes from my conversations with engineers and villagers that eventually 
helped me write Paper One and Paper Three in this dissertation. Comparisons of the 
Konkan with research literature on the drier canal irrigated regions of interior 
Maharashtra and India helped me understand the formal rules and also the informal 
norms that influenced the day-to-day governance of water in the Surya project. 
All hundred interviews with farmers in both villages during the first round 
(where I had snowballed respondents) gave me a clear idea of the causes behind the 
scarcity on the canal minor system. A map that provided a layout of the canal minor 
system from the Irrigation Department for Sakhare village was printed and plotted on 
the basis of crop patterns with the help of local villagers. The map was used to verify 
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claims made by farmers in this round of interviews. Canals and large farms were traced 
on the map by actually walking through the entire length of both villages. Since most 
canal sub-minors were breached at certain points and fenced off into large farms, and 
the latter were inaccessible to outsiders, accounts narrated by neighbouring farmers and 
wage labour who worked on these farms were used to develop a picture of social 
differentiation and water conflict. Often, the large farmers invited me to their farms, but 
the access was limited to viewing the vegetable crops and wells. The sub-minors and 
canal minors (that were government property) were concealed from my view, however I 
did manage to take one picture of how water was stolen on a canal minor from within a 
large farm that had illegally encroached on the system. Visits to other villages in the 
horticultural belt confirmed that this was part of a widespread pattern of water grabbing 
in this entire area.  
The first round of interviews was conducted at the head, middle and tail reaches 
of the canal minor system in both villages. It helped me answer questions on how 
location on the canal minor system was a major determinant for the small and marginal 
tribal farmers in their access to water on the system. However, for the large farmers, due 
to their control of land on various reaches of the canal minor system, location did not 
really matter. The interviews also revealed difficulties with the canal system and the 
heavy flow of water that was experienced by both tribal and the large non-tribal 
farmers, an aspect that would not have been revealed, if I had relied purely on a closed 
ended survey questionnaire.  
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The produced nature of water scarcity became obvious during this first round. At 
the same time, the theory and empirical research on Indian canal systems did not help 
me a lot during field research as the canal system was designed to meet water on 
demand from farmers. More importantly, the system also witnessed massive wastage of 
water. Therefore, I relied on developing good field notes and also took pictures that 
were later used to understand experiences of farmers. These notes and pictures became 
useful after the publication of Bruce Lankford’s book (Lankford, 2013) that dealt 
critically with the conventional academic and policy analysis of the wastage of water 
and underutilization in irrigation systems and water policy. The Surya canal system was 
a productive irrigation system where water was available for a second paddy crop, but 
suffered from underutilization. While it had some protective features, it was a project 
designed mostly to increase agricultural production in a water rich belt.  
Lankford’s theoretical understanding of water wastage in irrigation systems like 
the Surya arrived only during my writing stage, but proved to be very useful in 
developing the institutional and political-ecological framework that informs this 
dissertation. It also became useful in understanding the phenomenon and politics of 
water underutilization (see Paper Three and Question 1 & 2 in the Introduction). Thus, 
the detailed field notes on scarcity (in the context of massive water wastage on the canal 
systems) from the interviews and observation during this round eventually proved to be 
very beneficial. 
During fieldwork, analysis of the qualitative data from the earlier round of 
interviews helped me develop a picture of social relations in this area and a survey 
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questionnaire for the next round was developed in April, 2008 for the two villages under 
study (attached in the Appendix). While the first round of interviews was very useful 
and yielded a lot of information on experiences with water access on the canal system, I 
saw the importance of a survey round to triangulate findings from my interviews with 
engineers and farmers and their experiences of water scarcity and management on the 
system. 
2.11  Survey Data: Triangulating the Interview Data 
Since the canal system in the villages was the unit of analysis, a census of 
farmers on the canal minor system according to land ownership was created from the 
data provided by the Irrigation Department. The methodological strategy followed for 
this round of research was based on Mollinga (2003). The village command area was 
subdivided into sub-commands on the maps provided to me by the Irrigation 
Department. Canal Minors that were chosen for the sample survey were different from 
the minors and sub-minors that were covered in the semi-structured interviews. Once a 
census of beneficiaries was developed, a total of 31 farmers (in both the small and 
marginal and large categories and based on a 35% random sample of the census) were 
surveyed on two canal minors in Sakhare. Similarly, a total of 23 farmers (based on a 
random 35% sample of the census) were surveyed on the canal minor system in Vanai. 
 All rice cultivating small and marginal tribal farmers in both villages came 
under the small and marginal category as they owned or accessed less than 2 hectares of 
agricultural land which was often sub-divided between family members. There wasn’t a 
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single large landholding tribal farmer who grew commercial crops in this particular 
region. The large Vadaval farmers (who owned more than 10 hectares of land on 
average) had already been identified during the earlier round of interviews. The 
objective of this round was to investigate water access on the canal system and verify 
findings made during the earlier round of semi-structured interviews. Data on questions 
relating to water access (non-access to irrigation water) on the canal minor system was 
tabulated from the survey in the second round in the villages and is presented in the 
tables and empirical analysis in paper three, which deals with canal irrigation. 
Responses to specific questions on water were counted and the reasons behind lack of 
access to water (unlevelled land, enclosed canal, poor maintenance of canals, cattle 
problem etc.) were categorized. Other socio-economic data not directly related to access 
to water was gathered during the survey, but is not used in this dissertation.  
The surveys were conducted with the help of a research assistant who was 
familiar with the geography of the canal minor system and the issues with water access 
and land titles in both villages. The experiences of farmers with issues relating to access 
to the canal system were also collated during the socio-economic survey. These were 
later assembled and triangulated with the findings from the earlier round of qualitative 
interviews that were conducted during the snowball round. The survey round mostly 
confirmed the findings of the earlier round of interviews on water scarcity, but yielded 
some additional information on the loss of land by tribal farmers on the canal system.  
Data on the extent of landownership of large farmers in both villages had been 
gathered during the initial snowball round, but was confirmed with more recent revenue 
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tables that were made available from the engineers. The revenue tables also revealed the 
presence of conjunctive use of water by the large farmers who had constructed wells to 
tap into the re-charge of groundwater made possible by canal irrigation.  
During the survey round itself, I also sought information on the experiences of 
the villagers with the engineers. This was done to verify the information provided by 
engineers on the canal system and their own impressions about the rural population. My 
stay in the villages and the informal conversations yielded rich information on the 
irrigation engineers, the guards on the canal system and the maintenance work on the 
canals. Most members of the tribal community were conspicuous by their absence from 
employment in the Irrigation Department, at the same time, since they worked as wage 
labour on maintaining the main canal levels, they were well informed on the quality of 
the maintenance work and the water rotations on the canals.  
2.12  Conclusion 
Field research undertaken as part of this dissertation was closely complemented 
by library and archival research (already outlined above). The narrow specialized 
research on the Konkan region`s irrigation by local economists (Mitra, 1990) provided 
some empirical data, but was more of a hindrance in understanding local water policy. 
Policy and committee reports, archival data and the easier availability of data on the 
internet on issues around Maharashtra irrigation helped me more in framing the 
arguments and developing a historical understanding of how water policy had evolved 
in this region. This policy dimension finds its place in all three component manuscripts 
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in the dissertation. This became especially important when I was drafting the 
dissertation, as one of the objectives was to understand the role, governance and policy 
had played in shaping the water conflict in the Mumbai-Thane region. The focus on 
institutions was greatly enabled by access to historical data on the Mumbai water supply 
system (made available from libraries in the UK, US and Canada) that was woven into 
the dissertation`s theoretical framework.  
The qualitative methodological tools and strategy that informed research for this 
dissertation proved to be very useful in developing a broader institutional-geographical 
profile of the water situation in Mumbai-Thane region. At the same time, I was unable 
to utilize the rich census data that was available because of the focus on social and 
political processes that underlie water access in this region. However, where possible, 
background statistics on local demography and water use from the Indian Census, Water 
Budgets of the Government of Maharashtra and reports provided by the Irrigation 
Department have been provided throughout the dissertation. This will give the reader an 
idea of the changing geography of water utilization in the Mumbai-Thane region. 
Notes 
1.Underutilization of irrigation water in a particular project is measured in two ways. If 
the actual irrigated area irrigated under different crops during a season turns out to be 
less than the area visualized, proposed and designed by project planners to be irrigated 
during the season, then it may be termed underutilization. Alternatively, if the volume of 
irrigation water used by farmers during the season turns out be less than the quantity of 
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water designed to be supplied during that season, it may be termed underutilization 
(Mitra 1986, 1990; 1998).  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3. Canal Bureaucracy and the Corruption Nexus around 
 Water in the Mumbai Hinterland: Questions for  
 Development and Governance in Maharashtra, India 
3.1 Introduction 
 As a case study of an irrigation project, this paper examines corruption in the 
context of the Surya Dam Project located in the Konkan, west coast region of 
Maharashtra State, India, just outside the boundaries of the Mumbai Metropolitan 
Region (MMR). Surya is one of six large dam projects constructed since the 1980s, and 
was designed as a multipurpose dam to tap the waters of a major and important river 
outside Mumbai. Its primary purpose was to produce hydropower and irrigation for 
24,000 hectares of agricultural land in a predominantly tribal belt of Konkan. Yet it has 
also come to supply one of the fastest growing peri-urban regions of Mumbai with 
water for domestic and industrial use - especially two urban townships of the MMR.  
The paper begins with a review and evaluation of existing literature on 
development and political economic corruption in India. From there it can be argued 
that, to understand the politics of water in that context, it is also essential to understand 
the role of the lower level bureaucracy in greater detail. In particular, lower level 
engineers tend to be the chief instruments and purveyors of development benefits from 
large multipurpose dam projects to rural populations. One of the objectives of the paper 
is to provide a general theoretical background for a critique of existing literature on 
water-sector corruption in India. This paper will thus examine a range of theoretical and 
case study research on corruption, by a wide range of social scientists. It will also 
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analyze the organizational structure of Surya project, as well present a case study on 
chronic corruption in the Maharashtra Irrigation Department. This paper concludes by 
making a case for a more layered understanding of the lower level bureaucracy 
(including its treatment of lower caste and tribal communities), as well as for reform of 
governance in irrigation projects. The conventional understanding of the political-
bureaucratic nexus around corruption in irrigation projects in India has been firmly 
represented in Indian social science scholarship by Robert Wade’s classic papers of 
1982 and 1985 (Wade, 1982, 1985). While acknowledging the strengths of Wade`s 
arguments, this paper points to the weaknesses in his use of the rational choice 
framework to explain the behaviour of junior bureaucrats who are unwilling or are 
uninterested in transfers to other locations. The chapter identifies possible reasons for 
junior bureaucrats not to seek promotions or transfers because of the potential for 
skimming off developmental subsidies in economically backward areas. In the context 
of this paper, I highlight the nexus of politicians, bureaucrats and rural oligarchs who 
project a myth of undeserving poor tribal farmers in helping justify water diversion to 
urban areas. 
3.2 Corruption and Bureaucratic Transfers:  
 Rational Choice, and Ethnographic Research on  
 Corruption in the Water Sector of India 
3.2.1 Geography of the Project 
Historically in the state of Maharashtra, areas of low rainfall have been the focus 
of large dam building projects. Since the Colonial period, such projects have been 
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concentrated in the Western Ghats and the drier, southwestern region, to benefit interior 
areas. Dams built on the eastern end of the Western Ghats mostly conveyed water to 
agricultural fields of Western Maharashtra via long aqueducts, ensuring that the drier, 
southwestern parts of the state were sheltered from threats of drought (Government of 
Maharashtra, 1984; Gadgil and Guha, 1995; Government of Maharashtra, 1999). 
However, by the late 1960s and 1970s, new engineering technologies made it possible 
to build large dams in western parts of the Sahyadri mountain range (part of the Western 
Ghats) in coastal Konkan region. Subsequently, this potential was publicized and 
projects for irrigation in this region were expanded (Government of Maharashtra, 
1981a, 1981b).  
Until then, dam projects in the Western Ghats around Mumbai had mainly 
focused on building medium, independent reservoirs to supply water and 
hydroelectricity for the city. Constructed at a huge cost of millions of rupees, the two 
large storage reservoirs of the Surya project were completed in the late 1970s, while the 
staff quarters and divisional offices (where I conducted field research) were completed 
in the early 1980s. Like many large, multipurpose projects in Maharashtra State, the 
canal building work for Surya was obstructed by hilly terrain and a lack of 
environmental clearances from the Forest Department. It was only in the early 1980s 
that the project began to provide irrigation for about two thirds of the command area 
and only in the late 1990 was a greater area brought under irrigation. More than three 
quarters of the canal works for Surya project are now complete, but the rest remain 
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unfinished due to a continuing lack of environmental clearance for raising the height on 
one of the project reservoirs. 
Currently, most of the project income comes from urban and industrial revenues, 
while the bulk of water storage remains utilized for canal irrigation. At least 20% of 
total water from the two Surya reservoirs is conveyed to industrial areas just outside 
metropolitan Mumbai, including one of the fastest growing townships in the MMR. As 
such, the Surya project has become a lightning rod for contentious water politics in the 
region. This involves, on one hand, NGO’s and social movements representing rural, 
mostly tribal, agricultural communities. On the other hand are real estate lobbies with 
an interest in profiting from the urban expansion of the MMR at its fringes. For local, 
tribal farmers, access to canal irrigation from a large project like Surya facilitates a 
second yearly crop, which reduces their dependence on seasonal migration. Access to 
such irrigation also enables them to diversify food grains production to include 
vegetables, fruits and other cash crops. It is estimated that such irrigation also helps to 
reduce poverty by about 50%, compared to Maharashtra households without access to 
irrigation (Panda, 2007).  
3.2.2 Wade's Research on Corruption 
Robert Wade’s classic studies of corruption in the bureaucrat-politician nexus set 
the standard in the field of development studies for research on corruption and 
governance (Wade, 1982, 1985). Wade’s framework for studying reasons behind 
bureaucratic corruption is especially useful and important here, when we consider 
!82
methodologies and theoretical framings in the specific context of Maharashtra and the 
MMR. This analysis and summary of Wade's work begins with a review of his methods 
and theory, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. It then lays out the foundations 
of an alternative strategy that provides for a more context-specific account of 
bureaucratic corruption.  
Two of Wade's papers are rooted in ethnographic research conducted on the 
canal system and irrigation bureaucracy in Andhra Pradesh, India during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. Wade sought to analyze the reasons behind the sub-optimal 
performance of large scale canal irrigation systems in India by combining a focus on the 
governance of water distribution (on the main canal level) with the administrative 
functioning of the state Irrigation Department. He later used these findings to produce a 
generalized framework that focused on transfer turnover to explain the 
underperformance of the Indian state in overall economic development (Wade, 1985). 
Borrowing extensively from disciplines as diverse as economics, political science, 
social anthropology, public administration and irrigation science, Wade`s framework for 
understanding the bureaucratic-political nexus in Indian irrigation highlighted how 
corruption has been facilitated by a market in public office (Wade, 1985). Wade’s main 
argument was that the control exercised by politicians over the postings of bureaucrats 
has engendered a corrupt, hierarchical structure, where bribes become exchanged for 
lucrative postings. That, in turn, results in a distorted and malevolent structure of water 
governance.  
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That structure facilitating the exchange of bribes has had negative implications 
for the performance of irrigation systems in modern India. Another important 
contribution of Wade’s research is his policy prescriptions for reform, to mitigate the 
negative impact of the politician-bureaucrat nexus - which still inform policy research 
on administrative corruption in India1.  
Wade identified five major causes underlying the persistence of corruption in the 
Indian irrigation bureaucracy. According to him, some causes can be generalized, while 
others are very specific to the irrigation sector. First I will examine whether the causes 
identified by Wade still persist in the contemporary Indian water resources sector. Then 
I will review the social sciences and policy literature on corruption that pertains to 
Indian development.  
Wade's five underlying causes of political-administrative corruption in the 
irrigation sector are as follows: 
• Electoral institutions that amplify pressure toward corruption and make it 
 systemic;  
• Political control of the irrigation bureaucracy through transfers of  
      bureaucratic staff;  
• Lack of user participation and control in irrigation projects;  
• Scarcity of water resources;  
• A wide gulf (in education and status) between Irrigation Department officials  
      and rural, user-populations.  
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Today, all of the factors observed by Wade that characterize poor governance 
continue to persist in the public administration of Indian water agencies. And elections 
and election funding remain as major factors underlying the Indian politician-bureaucrat 
nexus (Government of India, 2007). Politicians also continue to exercise their control 
over water-sector transfers and regulation in order to earn rents, which then fill ‘war 
chests’ that help them maintain or expand their power during elections, or after 
fragmented electoral outcomes (Das, 2002; Debroy and Bhandari, 2012; Corbridge, 
2013). Indian daily newspaper reports of politicians with wealth and assets 
disproportionate to their declared sources of income also indicate that political power is 
used to amass wealth. Thus, Indian politicians' influence and control over bureaucratic 
transfers persists at several levels (Jenkins and Goetz, 2005; Heston and Kumar, 2008) - 
despite recommendations of the Second Administrative Commission which 
recommended reducing such political involvement in the bureaucracy (Government of 
India, 2007, Ch. 6).  
In terms of Indian water-sector reform, Wade`s advocacy for greater user-
participation in irrigation planning has seen only limited success (Ballabh, 2008; Joy 
and Paranajpe, 2008; Vaidyanathan, 2010; Shah, 2012). Although some canal-irrigated 
parts of the country have witnessed some successful participation by farmers’ water-
user associations, such involvement in large irrigation projects has generally failed to 
bear fruit in large parts of rural India that are serviced by canals. The consequence of 
low participation at the local level, and farmers' inability to administer water systems 
they rely on, is that the water-resources sector remains largely centralized, and tightly 
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controlled and regulated by the irrigation bureaucracy. In this context, scarcity of water 
resources in India also persists as an influential factor. 
 
Table 3.1: Average Annual per capita Water Consumption in India  
Source: UNICEF (2013)    
The rapid growth of Indian cities, along with increased cultivation of water-
intensive commercial crops (including more harvests per year) has only exacerbated 
stress and inter-sectoral competition over control of water in several parts of India (see 
Table 3.1) (Joy et al, 2008b; UNICEF, 2013). Interestingly, recent political-ecological 
studies on water by anthropologists and geographers emphasize that local scarcity of 
water may often be artificially produced (Swyngedouw, 2004; Mehta, 2005; and UNDP, 
2006). Such literature broadly considers how water scarcity has been created/produced, 
both materially and discursively.2 (Mehta, 2005, p. 9). However, produced scarcity is a 
concept that remains under-utilized in water policy literature. A goal of this paper is to 
illustrate the role of the politician-bureaucrat nexus in creating such scarcity; how that 
dynamic supports a myth that poor, tribal communities are unable to use water 
efficiently for irrigation; and how these help justify diverting water to rapidly growing 
metropolitan regions. Finally, the wide gulf that Wade highlighted (Wade, 1982) 
between bureaucrats and farmers, in terms of social status and ability to navigate 
YEAR POPULATION 
(in millions)
PER CAPITA AVERAGE  
ANNUAL AVAILABILITY 
M3/YEAR
2001 1029 (2001 Census) 1816
2011 1210 (2011 Census) 1545
2025 1394 (Projected) 1340 
2050 1640 (Projected) 1140
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administrative bureaucracy, remains true of rural India. While some scholars have 
attributed this to India's particular evolution and local level structural factors (Harris-
White, 2003), recent anthropological and political economic studies support Wade’s 
view of corruption and dysfunction in rural India as a result of socioeconomic 
differences between upper- and middle-caste government employees, and poor, lower-
caste citizens (Shah, 2010; Dreze and Sen, 2013, Ch. 4; Harris and Jeffrey, 2013). 
However, although the strengths of Wade’s analytical framework remain, his 
analysis of the corruption nexus in the irrigation sector relies primarily on a model of 
bureaucratic behaviour in which the influence of non-economic factors is excluded. 
Both his 1982 and 1985 papers also use a theoretical framework influenced by public 
choice literature.3 The underlying assumptions there are that bureaucrats and politicians 
are self-interested, rent-seeking actors solely motivated to maximize their budget 
allocations, from which they regularly siphon off funds. To a large degree, with minor 
variations, this simple framework informs Wade’s research on corruption. It also 
informs his framework on how bribes are exchanged, and transfers and lucrative 
postings are traded, at various levels of the irrigation bureaucracy with collusion from 
elected politicians. The diagram below illustrates the structure of bribery that facilitates 
the flow of funds and gifts-in-kind between: 1) various ranks of engineers; 2) senior 
engineers and politicians; and 3) farmers, engineers and other irrigation staff, which is 
primarily funded by the theft of resources from operations and maintenance contracts 
(see Fig.3.1, below).  
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Figure 3.1: Diagram showing the power structure of an Irrigation Department, and the upward and 
downward flow of bribes and transfers/postings in Wade`s framework. Illustration by this paper’s author 
based on (Wade, 1982 & 1985).  
Corruption is also exacerbated through the illegal distribution and sale of scarce 
water, which is in turn facilitated by the subversion of rules on the canal network. The 
entire explanation is embedded in a framework of how power relations and money or 
non-monetary exchange flow upwards within the irrigation bureaucracy and the 
political structures of water governance (Wade, 1985).  
In addition, Wade’s theoretical framework on corruption synthesizes political 
and economic approaches to corruption. The political aspect of Wade’s model relies on 
an understanding of formal political structures (i.e. a competitive electoral system) as 
the dominant independent variable. Complementing this, the economic aspect of his 
model helps us understand the willingness of a bureaucrat to sell official goods in an 
informal market driven by scarcity. However, as the political scientist Robert Price 
writes in his account of administrative corruption in Ghana, there remains a problem 
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with such a model. Specifically, economic and political approaches to understanding 
bureaucratic corruption are not by themselves sufficient to help us understand why a 
bureaucrat is willing to participate in corruption (Price, 1975). In other words, Wade’s 
approach does not sufficiently anticipate the extent to which corruption can take 
complex cultural and organizational forms, and so ignores the influence of certain 
contextual factors. For instance, the hierarchy of the Irrigation Department in Wade’s 
research is presented as a structure that functions independently of contingencies that 
are a feature of local politics, such as the social background, aspirations and training of 
engineers; the social and official hierarchies within the bureaucracy; and the history and 
geography of water resource development in the region.  
An alternative view is that, through his ethnography of the Irrigation 
Department, Wade was actually attempting to develop a framework to explain the 
dysfunctionality of the developmental state in India more broadly. In fact, Wade himself 
acknowledged in his 1982 paper that, while his study on corruption may generally 
reflect the state of irrigation governance and administration in India, the corrupt 
administration-political nexus in irrigation might also manifest itself differently in other 
settings (Wade, 1982, p. 292).  
Thus, while Wade’s ethnographic work is partly informed by social and 
geographical particulars of Andhra Pradesh (where he conducted field research) and the 
influence of certain agro-ecological circumstances surrounding water politics, he does 
not address how the nexus integrates with patron-client relations in the local state (Khan 
and Sundaram, 2000; Harris-White, 2003). That omission may partly be due to the 
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anonymity Wade needed to extend to the main actors and to the irrigation project itself 
in his ethnography. As such, Wade’s account of corruption largely relies on interviews 
with senior executive engineers, and his 1982 paper communicates a certain kind of 
deference that assistant engineers, section officers and supervisors are expected to 
afford their senior engineers. It follows, then, that this dynamic could be changed by the 
cultural dynamics and local politics of a different context, i.e. where water scarcity is 
not a defining factor in the design of an irrigation project, and where junior engineers 
are not motivated by promotional opportunities.  
Therefore, in general accounts such as Wade`s, which are informed by rational 
choice and seek universal and parsimonious explanations, the complexity of individual 
motivations and of administrative and political decision making processes are 
necessarily excluded. For example, variations in personal identity and interpersonal 
relations are underemphasized, in a perspective that prefers to see decision-making as 
predictably stable over time, among individuals commonly motivated by rational, 
instrumental, utility-maximizing priorities (Griggs, 2007). However, rational choice 
alone cannot explain how self-interest develops or may evolve (Marglin, 2008), and 
thus, socio-historical and discursive frameworks remain useful (Mollinga, 2008)4. 
Besides, if we need to understand corruption as a social problem with many layers, 
highlighting local configurations of corruption could be crucial for effectively 
informing policy (Corbridge, 2013). Table 3.2, below, highlights methodological 
differences between researchers who rely more on qualitative and case study methods 
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(i.e. anthropologists, geographers), versus those who develop more formal approaches 
(i.e. economists, political economists).  
Table 3.2: Corruption in India: Various Methodological Approaches to Research, Across  
Disciplines. 
APPROACHE
S
PRINCIPAL 
AGENT 
APPROACH 
(Economics)
RATIONAL 
CHOICE and 
INSTITUTIONAL 
APPROACH 
(Economics, Economic 
Anthropology, Political 
Economy)
DISCURSIVE 
APPROACH 
(Social and Cultural 
Anthropology, Human 
Geography)
ETHICAL-
ECONOMIC and 
COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 
APPROACHES 
(Economics, 
Political Economy, 
Human Geography 
and Anthropology) 
FOCUS and 
METHOD
Institutional and 
Incentive 
Structure; self-
interested actors. 
Models
Bureaucratic political 
nexus; budget 
maximizing 
bureaucrat; rules of the 
game and institutions; 
self-interested actors 
Ethnography 
Socio-cultural norms, 
individual subjectivity. 
Ethnography and case 
studies
Public Action, social 
norms, governance 
of monopolies, 
social justice, 
politics of 
citizenship, 
affirmative action. 
Case Studies
CAUSES Information asymmetry, 
uncertainty, 
hierarchy of 
organizations and 
risk, natural 
monopolies 
Over centralization, 
hierarchies, lack of 
transparency, public 
sector monopolies, 
scarcity, transition 
societies
Neo-Patrimonialism, 
patron-client relations
Lack of enforcement 
and punishment, 
corruption as a 
problem of public 
ethics in a fast 
transforming society.
ADVOCACY Changing the incentive structure, 
institutional 
reform, reducing 
distortions arising 
out of resource 
allocations, 
electoral 
competition and a 
system of checks 
and balances 
Decentralization, 
access to information 
and collective action
Social Change and 
transformation
Legal democratic 
reform, Role of 
Media in exposing 
corruption, 
strengthening 
investigative 
systems, 
decentralization, 
transparency, audits 
& accountability
AUTHORS Ajit Mishra,(2005) Kaushik Basu, 
(2011) 
Robert Wade (1982 & 
1985) 
Akhil Gupta,(2012)  
Alpa Shah (2010), 
Stuart Corbridge, et. al 
(2005) 
Kumar and Corbridge, 
(2002)
Jean Dreze and 
Amartya Sen (2013) 
Stuart Corbridge,
(2008) Jonathan 
Parry (2000)  
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3.2.3 Critiquing and Reformulating Wade’s Framework 
 Overall, most of the factors that Wade identified through his own research on 
water-sector corruption in India remain relevant. What essentially makes corruption 
common in many Asian countries with large canal systems is that it is almost impossible 
for cultivators to assess water availability independently (Transparency International, 
2008, p. 68-69), or to assess the performance of government bureaucracies. For 
instance, irrigation management agencies are not accustomed to sharing information for 
the sake of transparency. And with bureaucrats firmly controlling information that 
remains inaccessible to irrigators, opportunities open up for corruption. For example, 
large irrigation subsidies for both construction and maintenance are generally provided 
to bureaucracies in the form of maintenance budgets, without a direct link to 
performance or output. Then, construction and maintenance tasks are privately 
outsourced with insufficient accountability for results. As such, large scale dam and 
irrigation projects are unlikely to succeed unless incentives for corruption among 
various stakeholders are reduced. 
 A prime illustration of this culture of non-transparency is the discovery of a 
recent irrigation scam in Maharashtra State (Jog, 2012) in which a nexus of politicians, 
contractors and bureaucrats are allegedly involved in fraudulent transactions amounting 
to hundreds of millions of dollars. On the whole, 14 billion dollars have been spent on 
dams and canal systems for irrigation since 1999, yet practically this has only increased 
Maharashtra's irrigation potential by a minuscule 0.1%. Government audits reveal that 
root causes for such underperformance comes down to poor project governance, 
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especially through processes that inflate costs. For example, Indian and Maharashtra 
media have reported of the recent scam that projects were often approved at lower cost, 
and then costs were gradually increased based on rationales such as augmenting project 
capacity, or improving the poor state of existing infrastructure. Given the crucial 
importance of water, and the importance to economic development of its fair and 
equitable distribution, the entire issue of effective governance over water resources in 
India has become an important subject in the public policy domain (Shah, 2012 for a 
review).  
 Yet, public ownership of water resource development makes reform 
institutionally challenging. Writing about the challenge posed by corruption in India`s 
government and public service agencies, Pranab Bardhan (an economist) framed the 
situation squarely within a post liberalization environment defined by growing 
industrialization and political fragmentation: 
Several scholars associated corruption with the excessive regulation of 
the Indian state and there was also a belief that a reduction in regulation 
would reduce the incidence of corruption in the bureaucracy and also 
undermine the bureaucratic-political nexus. While economic 
liberalization has meant a significant reduction in the discretionary 
power of the central bureaucracy, particularly in trade policy and 
industrial regulation, the state governments still retain a great deal of 
leverage on the industrial sector at the ground level through their control 
of land, water and electricity and labour and environmental standards. It 
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is in the regulatory apparatuses of the state and local governments that a 
lot of the corruption in contemporary India is concentrated. (Bardhan, 
2012: p.4) 
This paper describes just one instance of the corruption nexus, situated in an 
important tribal belt in coastal, western Maharashtra, India. I am not attempting as 
comprehensive or ambitious an explanation as did Wade, through his study of the 
corrupt administrative-political nexus and market for transfers. Indeed, my original 
research plan did not even focus on corruption in the bureaucracy. Rather, my field 
research primarily aimed to better understand the social, economic, cultural and 
geographical impact of a large irrigation project on a rural society located in the 
hinterland of a large metropolitan city. However, in the course of my ethnographic 
research I frequently encountered endemic corruption in the state Irrigation Department. 
I also observed the persisting, generally poor state of the canal system - despite its 
massive maintenance budgets. Local farmers also repeatedly described to me their own 
encounters with bureaucratic corruption. And, during my research, the Maharashtra 
media’s reporting of corruption in the irrigation project pertinent to my study provoked 
several interesting insights for me about this phenomenon.  
By focusing on corruption, I am also responding to recent pleas by both 
economists and other social scientists for more case studies to help us understand this 
phenomenon of corruption better. For instance, advocating for more case studies on 
corruption in the water resources sector, Peter Mollinga has written: 
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We need such analysis to understand better the structural dynamics of 
 the sector, which includes the systemic features of corruption and many 
 other issues to engage more effectively with the policy process and to 
 establish more constructive engagement among the interest groups  
 concerned. (Mollinga, 2008: p. 346) 
3.2.4 Organizational Structure of the Surya Project 
 In many ways, the hierarchical structure of Wade’s Irrigation Department in 
Andhra Pradesh mimics itself in Maharashtra. Given that the Surya project was handed 
over for at least a decade to the Command Area Development Authority, there is some 
overlap between the general structure for the Maharashtra Irrigation Department and the 
organizational structure of the Surya Project (see Fig. 3.2, below). Within the Surya 
Project there is one division under an Executive Engineer, who is responsible for the 
maintenance of irrigation works and management of irrigation in the field. The 
Executive Engineer is responsible for executing irrigation policy as per the 
Superintendent Engineer’s directives. The Superintendent Engineer in the Irrigation 
Circle Office is the administrative head at the regional level. He has full authority to 
sanction the allocation of irrigation water in the region for different purposes, and 
approves the annual utilization of storages, as well as the irrigation program from year-
to-year. The Executive Engineer of the project plays an important role in the day-to-day 
supervision, management and regulation of canals. He is assisted by: a) Assistant/
Deputy Engineers; b) Sectional Officers; c) a Canal Officer; and d) Measurers. 
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Operations and maintenance tasks remain the responsibility of the project's construction 
wing. Within the construction wing, each division has a subdivision that is entrusted 
with operations and maintenance tasks.  
Figure 3.2 - Organizational Setup of Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project. Source: WAPCOS (1996). 
Socio Economic Survey Report: Evaluation Studies for Command Area Development Programme New 
Delhi. Surya-Maharashtra. New Delhi: Water and Power Consultancy Services (India) Ltd. 
Contrary to Wade (who in his Andhra Pradesh study posited a correlation 
between corruption and a high turnover/transfer rate of engineers), my Maharashtra case 
study argues that the Junior Section Engineers and Canal Officers on Surya Project have 
largely avoided transfers to other locations and managed to keep their positions in a 
tribal belt for two decades. Lower level bureaucrats tend to be information-rich, have a 
good understanding of how local society and politics work, and by virtue of their 
residence in the command area of dam projects often have close relations with the 
dominant caste-groups in rural/tribal regions of India. I use the term ‘recalcitrant 
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bureaucrats’ to explain both the resilience and the ability of these Junior Engineers to 
retain their posting in a tribal belt for such an extended period. I attribute their staying 
power to their ability not only to earn unofficial rents from corruption, but also their 
skills at navigating the administrative system and local politics.  
This case study thus focuses on lower level bureaucrats who prefer to remain in 
tribal areas of Maharashtra and who are central to the entrenched nexus between local 
bureaucrats, politicians and powerful economic interests (Meeta & Rajivlochan, 1997). 
Such recalcitrant bureaucrats in water departments prefer to remain in their locations 
because their particular regions attract huge subsidies and cash transfers from the state 
and central governments. To their further advantage, such regions usually have illiterate 
populations, weak structures of checks and balances, and administrative systems that 
continue to function in isolation from other systems of self-government that have 
evolved in tribal areas of Maharashtra since the late 1970s.  
This administrative structure is important to analyze and understand if one is to 
gain a better grasp of how and why development projects in tribal areas often fail to 
deliver benefits to local people there. This case study should also be considered in the 
broader context of political and social ferment within contemporary irrigation politics in 
Maharashtra, including growing contestation and disputes between cities, rural 
hinterlands, and various other regions in the state over allocation of water resources 
(Wagle et al, 2012). 
Within this study I present data on the resistance of this lower section of the 
Irrigation Department bureaucracy towards the stratagems of Senior Engineers, 
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highlighting fissures between executive-level Senior Engineers and lower-level Section 
and Assistant Engineers. This focus on lower-level bureaucrats supports and affirms the 
recent direction that geographers and anthropologists (Corbridge et al, 2005; Shah, 
2010; Gupta, 2012) have charted in researching frontline bureaucracies responsible for 
supervising and administering welfare and development programs in rural India. This 
approach is crucial in order to understand the role of lower-level bureaucracy in rural, 
tribal areas of India which has often been blamed for poor development outcomes 
(Government of India, 2008; World Bank, 2011; Meeta & Rajivlochan, 1997). 
Moreover, this study has been conducted in the context of a productive irrigation 
project. Unlike protective irrigation projects, in a productive irrigation project water is 
not rationed, and is available to meet revenue and food production objectives. 
Productive irrigation is characterized by high irrigation intensity, is demand oriented, 
and production is geared towards the marketplace. The operational design and 
organizational structure of productive irrigation projects are geared towards meeting 
demand for water, which is not scarce in this context (see Table 3.3, below, to further 
understand the difference between protective and productive irrigation).  
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Table 3.3: Protective and Productive Irrigation - Source: Narain (2003) 
TECHNICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS PROTECTIVE IRRIGATION PRODUCTIVE IRRIGATION
IRRIGATION INTENSITY Low (around (100%) High (200% and more) 
DUTY (acres/cusec)
High (low water supply) Low (meeting crop water 
requirements) 
CROPS
Low water demanding (Sorghum, millet, 
oilseeds, so forth)
High water demanding 
(rice, sugarcane) 
OPERATIONAL DESIGN;  
ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Supply-oriented Demand-oriented
WATER AVAILABILITY
Planned scarcity requiring rationing Planned sufficiency, no 
rationing needed 
CROPPING PATTERN
Prescribed, or controlled by government 
(except warabandi system) 
Farmers choice
WATER-FLOWS;  
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Constant Varying with demand
YIELD OPTIMIZATION PER 
BENEFITS 
Unit of water spread Unit of land concentrated
MAJOR OBJECTIVE Food security/poverty alleviation Agricultural growth 
FARM LABOUR Emphasis on family labour Emphasis on wage labour 
ORIENTATION Towards subsistence Towards the market 
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3.2.5 The Centrality of the Lower Level Bureaucracy 
This case study focuses on divisions and tensions in a local irrigation 
bureaucracy in the broader context of researching the Surya Dam Project at the main 
canal level. This case study emerged from my dissertation research, which largely 
focused on the impact of a large surface irrigation project in a small agricultural belt 
upon the local tribal community. My units of analysis were two villages located at the 
middle and tail-end of the main canal system. My research used mixed methods 
including semi-structured interviews; ethnographic research; and review of newspaper 
articles from 2008 that focused on the activities of Sub-Divisional Officers, Section and 
Assistant Engineers, and Technical Officers in the irrigation bureaucracy. While 
conducting qualitative interviews and surveying farmers who experienced water 
scarcity, I also came across numerous media reports of chronic corruption in the Surya 
Project. Most of the newspaper articles focused heavily on corruption in the irrigation 
project, including accounts of corrupt practices related to canal system maintenance 
contracts.  
My examination of the engineering bureaucracy was largely centred around 
junior-level officials (mostly Section Engineers and Canal Officers) who had risen 
through the ranks yet in some cases remained posted to the Surya Project for more than 
twenty years. My research of junior-level officials was conducted at a Sub-Divisional 
Office where engineers of various ranks were interviewed. My focus on the junior ranks 
of the bureaucracy is deliberate. While I enjoyed close access to senior (executive-level) 
engineers, two of the Executive Engineers I interacted with commuted to suburban 
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Mumbai and so could not devote enough time to my queries. In contrast, the junior-
level of the bureaucracy resided on-site in living quarters constructed by the dam 
project, and were always available to answer my questions.  
This lower segment of the bureaucracy has tremendous clout in the 
implementation of project goals because of their familiarity with everyday, local politics 
and their experience with micro water management in command areas of irrigation 
projects. Their mastery and application of operational routines thus puts power in the 
hands of such Section Engineers, who have little formal authority in the department’s 
hierarchical structure, but who still exercise significant control over implementing 
policy day-to-day. These frontline staff carry out day-to-day tasks for the Irrigation 
Department, enjoy discretion in how they implement project objectives, and are 
information-rich because they know the farmers and other local stakeholders well. In 
that sense, they are close to what the political scientist, Michael Lipsky, defined as street 
level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1981). In general, such lower level employees also have 
different priorities than their superiors, as well as interest in minimizing danger and 
discomforts of the job while maximizing official and unofficial income.  
My focus on this section of frontline staff is partly inspired by a wide body of 
recent ethnographic literature from geographers and anthropologists on corruption and 
governance that focuses on the treatment of the rural poor in India by lower level 
bureaucrats. (Kumar and Corbridge, 2002; Corbridge et al, 2005; Shah, 2010; Gupta, 
2012). In the context of Asian irrigation, Wade has himself pointed out the importance 
of studying ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Wade, 1992, p. 306), although his paper on the 
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subject focuses more on irrigation guards rather than Section and Assistant Engineers. 
Moreover, even with his focus on the irrigation guards who police the canal network, 
Wade`s paper is ethnographically ‘thin.’ Thus, while I remain in agreement with Wade 
that incentive structures play a role in corruption, I modify his framework by focusing 
on the lower level bureaucracy and the lack of bureaucratic turnover at that level to 
provide a more thick and contextual description of corruption in the local Irrigation 
Department. 
In my work I attempt to describe how fissures within the Irrigation Department 
may cause the bureaucratic-political corruption nexus to manifest differently in a tribal 
context, albeit with still serious social and economic consequences for poor, tribal 
farmers. This consideration of water politics is in the context of a dam project that not 
only caters to a wide agricultural belt, but also delivers water to an important, rapidly 
growing town in the northwestern Mumbai Metropolitan Region. Essentially, it is the 
socio-spatial transformation of a major tribal-agricultural region directly under the 
influence of a major metropolitan centre (Mumbai) that has caused a change in the 
incentive structure for corruption at the main canal level. This, in my view, points 
toward a new moral geography and political economy of the expansion of large Indian 
cities. This 'intermeshing of scale' necessitates an analysis that combines both a 
geographical and anthropological framework. This case study also critically analyses 
the consequences of two parallel administrative systems (tribal and Irrigation 
Departments) that function in this region. I argue that the absence of any tribal 
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personnel in the local irrigation project has facilitated an administrative environment in 
which corrupt practices flourish.  
3.3 Social Relations, Politics of the Commons,  
 and the Role of the Lower Level Bureaucracy 
 This section is based on detailed interviews with two Executive Engineers, four 
Section Engineers, one Technical Officer, one Administrative Clerk and two Sub-
Divisional Officers over a period of nine months in 2008. I also had the opportunity to 
visit various field sites during my time at the Surya project, which provided me with 
unfettered opportunities to observe relations between engineers and their superiors, and 
between engineers and farmers. That also afforded me insight into how everyday work 
on the irrigation project was carried out. I also had substantial interaction with local 
politicians (one of whom held official responsibility for the public irrigation corporation 
that owned and maintained the Surya Project). It was not possible to select a 
representative sample of engineers, as I spent my time mostly with staff from one 
particular sub-divisional office that was engaged in construction and maintenance of the 
main canal and distributor canal system. I also undertook two visits to the Irrigation 
Circle Office in the district headquarters, and numerous visits to the Dam Office near 
the reservoir. Given that I spent about nine months in the villages and project area in 
2008, I developed an easy rapport with the engineers. My fluency in Marathi and Hindi 
helped me further. I was also able to triangulate data from my interviews with articles 
that appeared in local newspapers. Besides the engineers and local politicians, I also 
spoke to representatives of local, social movement organizations, caste-association 
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leaders, and large and small farmers who utilized irrigation water from the Surya project 
and so had some kind of relationship to it.  
 Canal water is distributed to agricultural fields based on a cycle of rotations and 
at different levels (Main Canal, Distributaries, and Direct Minors). These are meant to 
cater to the needs and demands of agricultural plots that vary in size. At the main canal 
and distributary levels, water is first conveyed to agricultural fields located in villages at 
the tail end of the main canals; this rule is supposed to be followed even at the level of 
the direct minors and the sub-minors (lower level branches in the canal system - see 
Figure 3.3, below). Farmers are then expected to construct field channels so that they 
can convey water into their plots from the direct minors and sub-minors that lie adjacent 
to their fields. Outlets and Gates are used to control the flow of water at this level. An 
even and fair distribution of water in this context depends both on co-operation between 
the farmers, but also on the effective regulation of the canals by the engineers.  
3.3.1 Attitudes of Lower Level Engineers towards Tribal Farmers 
 Engineers in general expressed views that were largely dismissive about the 
abilities of tribal farmers in the irrigation project. This section highlights such attitudes 
of lower level engineers in the project towards the tribal beneficiaries of the irrigation 
project and presents data to support this argument. 
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    Figure 3.3: Schematic Layout of a Typical Canal System in India.  
     DM1= Direct Minor #1; DM2 =Direct Minor #2;  
     SM1= Sub Minor #1; SM2= Sub Minor # 2; OL= Outlet 
 This junior level cadre in the department had more interactions with the farmers 
and also had day-to-day knowledge of the social profile of irrigation beneficiaries. This 
placed them in a somewhat advantageous position as far as their knowledge of the 
politics and society of the area was concerned too. Most engineers (irrespective of 
rank), were unanimous in their view that Konkan tribal farmers did not deserve a large 
dam and canal project because they had little experience with modern, canal-irrigated 
agriculture. According to one Section Engineer, ‘the Ghat area (canal-irrigated western 
Maharashtra) farmers are better at using canal water, the tribal farmers in the Konkan 
are inept.’ Though there was cynicism and prejudice exhibited towards tribal farmers, 
engineers also displayed ambivalence towards tribal users of the project by viewing 
them as victims of the machinations of the political class who ultimately controlled 
allocation of water in the command area of the dam. “All this water,” remarked a 
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Section Engineer, “will end up in Mumbai because of the wastage in the canal system. 
These tribals don’t deserve water because they waste it. They have no experience in 
using canal water. They are fortunate to have access to water, but they excel in wasting 
it.” Gaikwad, a Section Engineer further remarked: 
We have had some successful farmers in the project area. They are all 
horticulturists and have been engaged in this occupation because their 
caste is a caste of gardeners and horticulturists. They are from the 
coast and are using modern sprinkler and drip irrigation techniques 
(that optimize the use of water) and they brought this technology to 
the project area from periodic trips to Israel and Oakland, California. 
The tribals, on the other hand, do not know how to utilize the water. 
They waste the water and do not know its value. Moreover, they do 
not know how to cultivate anything other than rice. Agreed that this is 
a project that was designed to cultivate rice, but you just have to 
compare the sheer ingenuity of the horticulturists with the lack of 
initiative and risk taking of the tribals. (Interview: February, 2008) 
The skill and enterprise of horticulturists was contrasted with the supposed lack 
of ingenuity of tribal farmers. However, engineers seldom discussed the influence of 
social relations or the state of the canal system. That was perplexing, since my 
understanding from field research in a horticultural belt benefiting from the Surya 
project was the opposite. Most tribal farmers on the middle reaches of the minor canal 
system complained of the widespread theft of water by horticulturists who fenced off 
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entire canal minors and sub-minors, and that Section Engineers did nothing to stop the 
illegal practice (see Fig. 3.4, below and Paper Three, section 5.6.2 for how unfair water 
allocation entailed large farmers taking siphoning water from canals). Tribal farmers 
and their families were typically employed on the farms of horticulturists, and their 
labour was crucial to the profitability of such operations. Paradoxically, the vegetables 
and fruits grown on such farms did not require a lot of water and, for that reason, 
sprinkler and drip irrigation served the purpose. 
Figure 3.4: Photo of large horticultural farm. This photo was taken at a large agricultural farm near 
Sakhare Village served by the canal. The outlet on the canal minor was choked by a gunny bag to restrict 
flow to smaller, tribal farms downstream. Further, the canal itself was fenced off so tribal farmers could 
not access it. 
 The large farmers simply wanted to make sure they got their adequate share of 
water, and dumped the rest into the natural drainage system in the Command Area. At 
first, I never confronted engineers about the unfairness of arrangements as I knew of a 
nexus between large horticulturists and the bureaucracy. That changed later towards the 
end of fieldwork when I developed a better understanding of the canal rotations and 
schedule for releasing water. While my field observations of the canal system began in 
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January, 2008, the irrigation season started in December, 2007. One village where I 
conducted interviews and a sample survey was located near a small downstream 
reservoir where the main canal system branched into two canals (see Figure 3.5, below). 
 
Figure 3.5: Map of the Horticultural Belt in Dahanu that provides the larger geographical context for this 
case study. Parts of the canal network (in red) intersect with natural drainage features (in blue) of the 
area. It was at the intersection of the main canal system at Sakhare Village where I observed the sluice 
gates to the rivulets being kept open illegally. 
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Fig. 3.6: 'Waste' canal water being released into Khadkhada River in midsummer (May 2008). 
Khadkhada River is a non-perennial stream that forms part of the natural drainage of the Surya Project 
command area. The river meets the Arabian Sea less than half a km. from this spot. See Index Map 1.4 for 
more detailed view of natural drainage system for this area. 
That reservoir met the water needs of a small local town. Perplexed by the vast 
quantity of canal water in the rivulets and natural drainage system leading to the 
Arabian Sea during irrigation season, I investigated the operation of the main canal 
system. From January to May, 2008 sluice gates leading to a natural rivulet (Dehene 
Nalla) were kept open by engineers. Those gates were clearly meant for the contingency 
of excess rainfall and floods in the main reservoir areas. That channel led to a small 
river near the Mumbai-Ahmedabad railway line that joined the sea (see Khadkhada 
River in Figures 3.5 and 3.6). On inquiring about this in the department with Gaikwad, 
who flatly denied it, I was brusquely told that I was spending too much time in the tribal 
villages and should check facts better. Yet on inquiring with tribal farmers I was told 
that those gates were basically always kept open during irrigation season. That water 
(categorized as ‘wastage’) was picked up by horticulturists via pumps, said the farmers. 
Moreover, ‘waste’ water from Surya project was referenced to weave a local discourse 
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asserting tribal backwardness (Lankford, 2013). As such, it also fuelled much 
resentment in a rapidly growing, nearby town bordering the command area, given the 
apparent paradox of a tribal region constantly contesting Mumbai’s right to that water, 
which at the same time seemed to be wasting it. In this context, tribal farmers' lack of 
knowledge and experience regarding operational rules of canals also stood out starkly. 
With some engineers, prejudice also gave way to sympathy. On one occasion, 
for instance, in an oblique reference to social relations in the area, the engineers 
remarked, ‘the large horticultural farmers do not want the small tribal farmers to 
succeed. We brought in modern pipeline technology to this area and set up water user 
groups for the tribal farmers through the World Bank funded Command Area 
Development Program.’ A Section Engineer vividly described what had happened: 
The large farmers subverted the entire program by periodically  
 destroying the infrastructure with the help of their goons. This would 
 happen at night, but we wondered who the beneficiaries were, it was 
 indeed the large farmers who wanted agricultural labour on their farms 
 and much of it comes from tribal families in the area. Most of the  
horticultural farmers are interested in enhancing their own wealth, even 
 if it comes at the expense of the poor tribal farmers. (Interview: June 
 2008) 
The Command Area Development Programme was thus a failure in its efforts to 
re-engineer the water conveyance system in Surya Command Area. Some engineers 
pointed out to how social relations in the area worked against making the irrigation 
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project work for small and marginal tribal farmers. Others pointed out to the lack of 
cooperation amongst tribal farmers who would not contribute to the maintenance of the 
new pipeline conveyance system. Employees in the Surya Irrigation Department who 
were not engineers also pointed to graft in management of the Command Area 
Development Programme as being a major factor behind its lack of success. 
3.3.2 Making Large Projects Viable and the Cultivation of Informal 
 Norms in Water Management at the Main Canal Level 
During my interactions with engineers I gained much insight regarding their 
geographic origins in Maharashtra State, where they were trained, and how they 
managed blackmail and threats of transfer by local politicians. I later discovered that 
most engineers (at all levels) paid off the local Member of the Legislative Assembly 
(from the tribal community) as well as the powerful, local leader of the Congress Party 
in order to keep their positions on Surya Project. Once, while interviewing the 
Executive Engineer (EE) of the Project in a first class commuter train car, I observed 
him take a call from the MLA’s personal aide, who asked him to purchase an expensive 
cell phone for the MLA. The EE called it ‘blackmail.’ Yet he said he had to comply, as 
“the MLA calls the shots on the project and could stop work on maintenance tomorrow, 
if he wanted.” This particular engineer was also ambivalent about his posting to a 
remote tribal area. He had been posted to other parts of Konkan and believed that only 
small reservoirs could work in the region. He considered it a bad idea to build large 
projects there, but said the expansion of the city and industrial spillover created a need 
for more water. “Everything here works on percentage,” he said. When asked about the 
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revenue earnings of the project, he said “we survive because of the revenue we get from 
the township in Mumbai. Without the revenue from non-irrigation use, we would be 
shut down tomorrow. We earn very little from the tribal farmers, and the large 
horticultural farmers don’t pay a paisa as they have political clout. On the other hand, 
the city pays for the water.” (See coloured graphs below, in Figures 3.7a & 3.7b).  
Better cost recovery rates from non-irrigation use means that more water 
continues to be diverted for urban and industrial use. The deliberate wastage of water 
from the canal system made more sense now. I realized that engineers in Surya project 
had very little incentive to maintain the rural canal network since most of the revenue 
(almost 98%) for the dam now came from the city. P.S. Purandare is a commentator and 
former professor of irrigation at the Water and Land Management Institute; he writes 
insightfully on this new dynamic of water management, especially with regard to the 
attitude of engineers towards urban-industrial demands: 
As compared to day to day irrigation management, management of non-
irrigation is easy. Moreover, assessment & recovery of water tariff is also 
comparatively better in case of non-irrigation. Hence, some canal 
officers reportedly prefer an increase in water use for non-irrigation. 
They even at times, it seems, discourage water use for irrigation. That 
perhaps leads to ‘unutilized water.’ Showing unutilized water creates 
grounds and justification for more diversion of water from irrigation to 
non-irrigation.5 (Purandare, 2012, p. 19) 
!112
 The two graphs below (Figures 3.7a & 3.7b) illustrate the low cost recovery 
rates of water for agricultural use in Thane District, and the increasing dependence of 
such projects on non-irrigation revenue from Mumbai's hinterland. Note that dams in 
two neighboring districts of that hinterland are owned by Mumbai Municipal 
Corporation; the Tata Corporation; the Maharashtra Industrial Development 
Corporation; the local Irrigation Department; and various corporations in smaller towns, 
respectively. While the bulk of water storage in the three large multipurpose dams 
owned by the local Irrigation Department is intended for agriculture, an increasing 
portion of their revenues comes from non-irrigation use. This helps the dam projects 
remain profitable year-to-year. 
Fig. 3.7a: Source: Computed from Water Cess Recovery Tables for Thane Irrigation Circle 
Accessed June 1st, 2013 from http://www.seticthane.org/water-cess-recovery.  
Revenue Targeted from Irrigation(Rs. In Millions)
Revenue Earned from Irrigation (Rs. In Millions)
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Fig. 3.7b: Source: Computed from Water Cess Recovery Tables for Thane Irrigation Circle 
Accessed June 1st, 2013 from http://www.seticthane.org/water-cess-recovery.   
Closer interaction with Junior Engineers and Technical Officers also yielded 
greater information about their backgrounds, caste identities, and when they had first 
joined the project. I became intrigued by a number of Section Engineers and Junior 
Canal Officers who had managed to stay in their positions for more than two decades, 
since engineers normally stay in one location for no more than three years. The origins 
of most of these engineers turned out to be the Maratha-Kunbi community in western 
Maharashtra. Several Junior Section Engineers I spoke with preferred staying on the 
Surya project because, first, it was close to the commuter railway line to Mumbai, 
which afforded them the advantage of educating their teenage children in a suburban 
Mumbai college. And secondly, because working on a dam project that serves tribal 
areas where most farmers are illiterate and inexperienced with canal irrigation 
Revenue Targeted from Non-irrigation(Rs. In Millions)
Revenue Earned from Non -Irrigation (Rs. In Millions)
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bureaucracy afforded them opportunities to exploit circumstances for their own 
financial gain.  
Alternately, the Executive Engineers always lived in the suburban and peri-
urban areas of Mumbai and commuted to work at the Surya project. According to a 
clerk in the Division Office, this meant ample opportunities for Section Engineers to 
make money; indeed, the project was considered the most corrupt in the entire State of 
Maharashtra. The spread of the canal network into the edges of forests and ravines in 
the hinterland also meant that the Mumbai media never covered those dams or the 
quality of maintenance work on the canals in the Command Areas.  
This particular group of Section Engineers had the maximum level of interaction 
with all classes of farmers as they were in charge of regulating the use and wastage of 
canal water, and maintaining conditions of the outer bunds and water seepage in various 
areas under irrigation. They were also in charge of counting the number of wells in the 
Command Area, mostly built by the large farmers, who used these wells for irrigation 
when the canal rotations were stopped. In any irrigation project in Maharashtra State, 
Section Engineers, Assistant Engineers and Technical Officers play a vital role. They 
are required to inspect field irrigation, and are responsible to superior officers for 
carrying out orderly irrigation management and noting the misuse of water. They are 
also expected to monitor the working conditions of the channels and courses. Such 
responsibilities afford this level of Section Engineers a great deal of influence. Given 
that they continued to live in the same area of the project, they also developed social 
and cultural links with the large farmers (who were also from a Maratha sub-caste); in 
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one case, the sister of a local Section Engineer married the wealthiest horticulturist in 
the region.  
Such close ties indicate a certain local, moral economy of water use, wherein the 
Maratha engineers and horticulturist farmers see the latter’s access to water as a symbol 
of their local power and material progress, as well as an indication that they have finally 
“arrived on the scene” as rich, successful farmers. “We Vadavals are dominant here,” 
announced Raul, a farmer whom I interviewed in the summer of 2008. Such access to 
the irrigation project was also facilitated by a local leader and landlord from one of the 
ruling parties in Maharashtra, who was also Vice President of the local irrigation 
corporation. He used his control over the project to distribute contracts to cronies and to 
control the functioning of the local Irrigation Department.  
The presence of a very junior class of engineers who have never been 
transferred does by no means completely contradict Wade's findings on the market for 
transfers, as transfers remain prevalent in this context for Senior Engineers at the 
executive levels. The fact that these Junior Engineers had to pay off the Executive 
Engineers only indicates a different kind of market for transfers operating in this region. 
The implication is that there was a relatively junior section of the bureaucracy who 
preferred living in the tribal area, as there were prospects to make money there and to 
take advantage of being fairly close to suburban Mumbai. Upon digging deeper I also 
found that some of these junior engineers did not have the clout to arrange for transfers 
out of the Konkan to western Maharashtra; pay rates in the Konkan for Junior Engineers 
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were lower at 200,000 to 300,000 rupees (approximately US $3,500), thus more bribe 
money would be required to obtain a higher paid posting in Maharashtra. 
The local newspapers in the Surya Dam Command Area repeatedly pointed out 
that the staying power of these recalcitrant engineers clearly indicated the presence of 
an entrenched nexus of local contractors and politicians at that level of the bureaucracy, 
and the persistence of patronage politics in the maintenance of the canal system. At the 
end of May 2008, the local Marathi media began reporting on huge mismanagement and 
corruption in the Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project (see photo of newspaper article, 
Fig. 3.8). The newspaper reports, most of them in the local town's Marathi press, 
highlighted the brazenness of corrupt 
practices and the failure of the state 
government to address it - especially in the 
context of a project originally intended to 
benefit poor, tribal farmers. The articles 
carried graphic pictures of collapsed canals 
and distributaries from the interior, 
coupled with reports of how a chronic and 
malignant form of corruption had been 
afflicting this dam project for over a decade.  
The central theme of the news 
articles was how the poor sections of the tribal community were being divested of their 
rightful access to water from the irrigation project due to the shoddy maintenance of the 
Figure 3.8: One of many 2008 Marathi newspaper 
articles reporting on the complicity of engineering 
staff in massive corruption at the Surya Project.
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canal network and the diversion of water to Mumbai. I later discovered that tensions 
between the Junior and Senior Engineers had led to the selective leaking of information 
(by Junior Section Engineers) about specific instances of corruption regarding 
maintenance work. Invoking the plight of the poor is a common strategy employed by 
lower level bureaucrats when they are in conflict with superiors although, in fact, the 
interests of the poor are generally not important to those at that level of the bureaucracy 
(Gupta, 2012).  
This tactic of using the media to blackmail senior bureaucrats and politicians is 
not new to rural politics. Most of the newspaper reports targeted Senior Engineers at the 
project’s Irrigation Circle Headquarters in Thane. Later, the names of specific Senior 
Engineers (based at the Irrigation Circle and the Sub-Divisional Office) also began 
appearing in the news reports. The ethnographic extract below summarizes events over 
two weeks in June, 2008. The narrative describes how lower level engineers tried to 
navigate a situation that one of their own colleagues had been instrumental in creating. 
It speaks to the dynamics of intra-bureaucratic politics, as well as how local, rural 
politics and caste identities are inextricably linked with bureaucratic transfers and 
administrative corruption.  
3.3.3 Tensions within the Bureaucracy 
During interviews with farmers in the villages I was called on my phone by one 
of my informants (an administrative clerk) in the project. He conveyed news that the 
project’s Sub-division and Division Offices would be shut down due to serious 
!118
mismanagement and corruption reports in the media. Given the significance of this 
news for my research, I rushed to the office and saw that the engineers were in a 
despondent mood. I met my main informant and he mentioned that most engineers 
would be transferred, and the project’s Sub-Division Office which took care of 
operations and maintenance would also be shut down. As this news sank in, I was 
actually surprised by how forthcoming with details the Section Engineers and other 
officers were regarding the politics of the project. There was a clear feeling of 
uncertainty, and all of the Junior Engineers voiced how worried they were about their 
futures. As my chief informant came and sat next to me, I saw the engineers browsing 
cynically through the local evening newspapers for clues about the future of the dam 
project.  
I was informed that the real turning point had come when the state Irrigation 
Minister’s name had been mentioned in the reports of corruption. The newspapers then 
reported that the Minister had subsequently decided, with the local leader (the Vice 
President of the irrigation corporation) and the tribal MLA, to close down the project’s 
office. It had been decided to move maintenance work and its supervision to the 
location of another multipurpose project located in a more remote part of the district. 
However, the minister had also summoned all class one officers to the city of Nasik, 
where he was then touring. It was during that period that all Class One officers 
(including Executive Engineers) were arbitrarily transferred out of the project. In the 
view of the engineers I spoke with, that was done to cover up the shoddy maintenance 
work, and also to shield local politicians and the Irrigation Minister himself from 
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culpability, since they had benefited from payoffs on contracts awarded during 
maintenance work.  
My informant also noted that all of the engineers had made a beeline to the local 
leader’s home to try and get their transfers revoked, as he was the Vice President of the 
irrigation corporation. I had personally seen two engineers visit the local leader`s office, 
lobbying to retain their current positions and location in the project. My chief informant 
was himself transferred, but managed to get it revoked. Some of the Junior Engineers 
commented on how they did not want to go to the other dam because the project was in 
a very remote area, and they believed the educational facilities for their children were 
not good there.  
On the other hand, my informant attributed Junior Engineers' unwillingness to 
relocate to their reluctance to surrender lucrative money-making opportunities they 
enjoyed by being associated with the project. He also attributed the controversy that had 
been generated over the project to the overzealousness of a newly appointed Executive 
Engineer. That particular Executive Engineer had apparently put the Surya Project into a 
deficit position of 40 crores (equivalent to US $6.5 million), and had been responsible 
for overspending the allocated operations and maintenance budget. My informant and 
the engineers voiced constant slurs of the Chief Executive Engineer. They claimed that 
his approaching retirement had made him greedy, and that his lower caste background 
underpinned his failure to successfully manage the project.  
That afternoon, the normally reticent officials also opened up further to my 
questions. Until then, this level of staff had co-operated only by sharing dam project 
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reports and environmental assessment reports. Also, two engineers I had never spoken 
to walked up and inquired whether I was affiliated in some way with a local non-
governmental organization and whether my research project also included investigating 
the social dimensions of development. The junior engineers and technical supervisors 
began narrating how most of the large, commercial horticultural farmers were behind in 
paying dues and would never pay water charges to the Irrigation Department. When I 
inquired about the amount of arrears, I was at first met with silence; then they remarked 
that it ran into the millions of rupees (see figs. 3.7a & 3.7b for the low recovery rates 
from irrigation). Indeed, the clout that large farmers enjoyed with the local politician 
(who was also the Vice President of the Irrigation Development Corporation) meant that 
all of the money they owed the project was siphoned off by the local political class, 
which was proving to be the bane of the project.  
I confirmed that the information obtained during those interviews was true, by 
triangulating it with reports that had appeared in local newspapers, and by actually 
visiting some of the sites at issue. Curiously, there was never any information reported 
about the involvement of Junior Engineers in corruption at the project. That lent 
credence to the dominant view that information was leaked about project contracts at 
the behest of Mr. Gaikwad (pseudonym), a Section Engineer who was unhappy with the 
work of a certain contractor.  
Gaikwad had claimed that the shoddy maintenance work performed on a section 
of the distributaries canal could potentially fail and cause flooding in the area. However, 
the maintenance contractor had connections with the Executive Engineer as well as the 
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Superintendent Engineer and had paid them off. Given the circumstances, Mr. Gaikwad 
could not remedy the situation through official channels, but could raise awareness of 
the risk by leaking details to the media about the corruption of Senior Engineers, 
causing them to go on the defensive and, literally, do damage control. However, a major 
consequence of the leaks was that the local MLA and the head of the Irrigation 
Development Corporation sensed an increasingly negative public opinion about 
management of the project. Fearing that the news and negative mood would take hold in 
the Mumbai press too, they decided to shut down the project and transfer all operations 
and maintenance work to another dam project in the same irrigation circle.  
Similar tensions between executive level Senior Engineers and Junior Section 
Engineers were also the subject of commentary during the irrigation scandal of 2012-13 
in Maharashtra State. In a critical analysis of the state government`s handling of 
expenditures on both new and existing projects, Pradeep Purandare noted: 
The top heavy organizational set up of the Maharashtra irrigation   
department has meant that powers have been concentrated in the hands  
of Direct Class One officers and actual experience of work on site,  
barring exceptions, is mainly with the officers below the rank of  
Executive Engineers. Indifference towards grass root level functionaries  
& subordinate engineers has taken its toll on junior engineers and  
affected their morale. (Purandare, 2012) 
 By the end of June, 2008 the Sub-Divisional Office was forlorn looking, and 
gone were the long lines of contractors and local journalists who frequently came to 
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meet engineers for contacts and news of the project. Over subsequent months, the 
Junior Section Engineers, Technical Officers and Supervisors stayed back in their 
quarters at the Surya complex, as some successfully used their connections to retain 
their positions. My chief informant told me that most of them would manage to keep 
their current positions because most had some clout at upper levels, and could have 
even paid to keep their jobs. However, in the next few months it was decided that that 
level of staff from the Sub-Divisional Office would commute 100 kilometres to work at 
another major dam site on the fringes of the MMR, which also provided water to 
Greater Mumbai. This meant that the engineers and other staff would be away from 
their families for four days per week. The implication was that, while these engineers 
managed to keep their jobs, they were punished for leaking news of the collusion 
between Senior Engineers, local politicians and contractors to the media. As my chief 
informant told me: “there is a lot of money to make in tribal areas and they would do 
their best to keep their positions in the department.” 
  
3.4 Conclusion: Governance Reform and Tribal   
 Development in Rural India 
 The main contribution of this paper is to produce a different variation of the 
theoretical framework that Wade articulated in the 1980s, which has informed research 
on bureaucratic corruption in development over the past three decades. The layered and 
nuanced dynamics revealed by this case study suggest that it is too simplistic to focus 
on the turnover of bureaucratic transfers as a central cause of chronic corruption in 
India. In contradiction to Wade's contention that transfers encourage corruption, this 
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paper actually shows how a certain class of lower level bureaucrats has managed to 
‘stay put’ in the same location for decades, playing an ambivalent but permissive role in 
facilitating corrupt practices in the local Irrigation Department.  
 Transferring such lower level employees in tribal areas might contribute to a 
solution. That needs to be complemented by rigorous auditing and supervision of how 
development funds are spent, along with a more meaningful decentralization of the 
water management. A reform of the pay structure could also provide more incentives to 
lower level employees for ethical behaviour. And establishing adequate representation 
from tribal communities in management decisions is also necessary to help ensure fair 
play.  
 The case study also shows that the problem of corruption involves several layers 
of ‘social transactions,’ and plays out differently in various parts of rural India, given 
the nation’s complex, hierarchical social structures and highly variegated forms of 
governance. We need more case studies and ethnographies that focus on corruption in 
organizational contexts, which highlight local, political and cultural dynamics of this 
phenomenon (Gupta, 2013). Not least, this paper highlights the need for a pointed 
examination of the general lack of accountability within Indian public services towards 
the lower caste poor. In other words, empirical research on India must ethically engage 
the persisting problem of mistreatment of the poor by the public bureaucracy (Dreze 
and Sen 2013, chapter 6, for a treatment of corruption and how it disproportionately 
affects lower caste communities). 
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 In a landmark report by the Indian Planning Commission’s expert group on 
extremism in tribal areas, the failure of governance in those areas has been explained as 
follows: 
Overwhelmingly, large sections of the bureaucracy/technocracy 
constituting the delivery system in the tribal areas come from 
landowning dominant castes or well to do middle classes, with their 
attachment to ownership of property, cultural superiority, purity-pollution 
governed behaviour and a state of mind which rationalizes and asserts 
their existing position of dominance in relation to others. This influences 
their attitudes, behaviour and performance segment, which constitutes 
the power structure in rural and urban areas since colonial times. It is this 
coalition of interests and social background that deeply affects 
governance at all levels. (Government of India, 2008, p.19) 
Any ethical engagement with governance in social science scholarship thus begs 
researchers to ask tough questions about lack of accountability in the public sector that 
manages water services in developing countries like India (Bakker, 2010). As such, two 
issues stand out in the context of tribal India. The first is a broader level political issue 
affecting the governance of water. Specifically, elites from dominant caste groups who 
hold power in tribal areas are too entrenched in their privileged positions, and are often 
in nexus with an equally entrenched, lower section of the water bureaucracy that is 
complicit in corruption. The second issue relates to governance in general. Specifically, 
there is insufficient awareness and understanding amongst tribal communities about the 
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laws and policies in place to further their development. This dearth undermines their 
political and economic enfranchisement, and too often makes it possible for non-tribal 
bureaucrats and dominant caste groups to appropriate their voice and misappropriate 
funds meant for tribal welfare and development (TR & TI, 2002).  
This case study of the personnel structure in the Irrigation Department of tribal 
Maharashtra describes an anachronism that is actually similar to conditions which 
existed in the Tribal Development Department (and other jurisdictions outside 
irrigation) throughout the state and the rest of India during the 1970s, and which was 
first subject to critique by scholars such as B.D. Sharma (Sharma, 1978). Such critiques 
were followed by administrative reform in those areas, where a new class of bureaucrats 
from tribal communities subsequently came to be employed. The fact that one does not 
see even one tribal employee in the ranks of the local Irrigation Department in the 
Mumbai-Thane region represents a social and cultural vacuum that makes it much 
easier for corruption to thrive in the dam project there.  
While aiming to contribute value to the research literature on corruption, this 
paper also aspires to help fill a specific ethnographic vacuum within recent urban-
regional research in the Mumbai context, where there has been an interest amongst 
geographers to identify causal factors that influence unequal access to water within the 
Mumbai-Thane region (Gandy, 2008). The prevailing scholarship has not yet been able 
to throw much light on the internal workings of the local water bureaucracy, or the 
institutional architecture that plays a role in creating such a ‘quasi market’ in water. 
Given this, the present case study strives to make evident that unequal access to water 
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across the region is significantly facilitated by a bureaucratic apparatus engaged in the 
deliberate mismanagement of adequate and surplus water, resulting in serious 
consequences for the welfare of the poor sections of both rural and urban communities 
in the region.  
In doing so, this paper places a central focus on the social dynamics and political 
legitimization that underlie the ad hoc nature of administrative, rural-urban transfers of 
water in the Mumbai-Thane region. The main argument here is that water in this region 
is actually abundant and available, but is mismanaged because of archaic rules around 
the allocation of water from rural to urban use. And that, in order to politically and 
socially legitimize the transfer of water to Mumbai from the Surya Dam Project, an 
informal alliance of politicians and engineers have successfully projected the tribal 
community as undeserving of the benefits of modern irrigation, while at the same time 
becoming complicit in the deliberate mismanagement of water in the rural hinterland. In 
that nexus there is little incentive for creating transparent and democratic water 
governance institutions, or for transforming the rules and administrative structures 
currently in place concerning rural-urban allocation of water in the Mumbai-Thane 
region. 
Finally, this paper argues that understanding the regional governance of water in 
the (rapidly changing) Indian context also requires developing an analysis of the inner 
workings of a highly complex and layered water bureaucracy with multiple interests, 
including a wide range of formal and informal economic and social incentives. This 
paper therefore makes the case for a more grounded analysis of corruption in India, and 
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should be seen as a modest contribution to the ongoing public and intellectual debate on 
graft and governance in that country.  
Notes 
1. On Google Scholar the World Development article has been cited more than 325 
times while the Journal of Development Studies article (Wade, 1982) has been cited 
more than 450 times. Both contributions helped develop a better understanding of 
corruption in the water sector in policy and academic circles in the South Asian context. 
However, except for Davis (2005), there has been no case study research on corruption 
in the water sector in India and even the Asian context since Wade's articles. The term 
“nexus” here means the conflation of politics and corruption around political spending 
rather than its other meaning of energy/food/water. 
2. In her study of water politics in the Kutch region of Western India, Lyla Mehta (2005) 
argues for a distinction to be made between lived/experienced scarcity, which clearly 
affects the livelihoods of people and manufactured scarcity, where water scarcity is 
often manufactured to suit the interests of powerful actors (Mehta, 2005, p. 9). 
3. Besides the influence of public choice approaches, Robert Wade’s work on corruption 
and canal irrigation in India was equally influenced by the work of F. G Bailey, a 
Sussex social anthropologist who had worked on tribal Orissa in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Bailey is a political anthropologist with an interest in ‘prizes’ (hence resources of one 
sort or another and to that degree interested in economics) and attempted at developing 
an individualist account of politics in a classic work ‘Stratagems and Spoils: A Social 
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Anthropology of Politics, 1968.’ In retrospect, one can see Bailey’s work as a kind of 
‘individualist’ (but non-theoretical, hence non-rational choice model) account of 
politics. In his book, Village Republics: Conditions for Collective Action South India, 
which he published in 1990, Wade clearly credited Bailey's perspective for his study of 
collective action by water user groups and blended the latter’s framework with the 
sharper analytical tools of rational choice theory, borrowed from the work of E. Ostrom 
(1990) and M. Olson (1965). The theoretical frameworks in Wade’s ethnographic 
studies of corruption are a hybrid of these three theoretical approaches. The papers on 
corruption try to analyze and marry the rules of the ‘political game’ by way through 
Bailey’s with the public choice conceptualization of the ‘rent maximizing’ bureaucrat 
and politician, which is later extrapolated to the study of the bureaucratic-political 
nexus in the Irrigation Department in India. 
4. Having stated the distinction between rational choice and interpretative approaches, it 
should be pointed out that the logics of rational choice and interpretative approaches are 
similar in that they are intentional accounts that start with observed data (behaviour 
including documents and letters, practices and institutions and reconstruct actors and 
their inner attributes—meanings, beliefs and values) in such a way that the data are as 
fully explained or accounted for as possible (Griggs, 2007). 
5. Water Auditing of Irrigation Projects in Maharashtra: Dams, Rivers and People. 
September-October 2012. p. 10-16 accessed on 18th May, 2013 <http://sandrp.in/drp/
Sept_Oct_2012.pdf>. 
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4. Institutional Design and the Geography of Rural-
 Urban Water Conflict in Mumbai 
In the case study literature on the commons, there are few studies that examine 
the institutional implications of water demand for a growing metropolitan region on its 
rural hinterland.1 Urban expansion and growth often leads cities to take water from 
distant rural watersheds that irrigate agriculture for urban use. Urban water 
appropriation is rapidly becoming an important policy question in developing countries. 
At the same time, the institutional mechanisms and regulatory frameworks that underlie 
access to water from rural areas are poorly understood. Through a case study on the 
city-region of Mumbai, India, this paper tries to develop a new understanding of an 
unexplored institutional dimension of inter-sectoral water politics. 
This paper hopes to make a contribution to the institutional and metropolitan 
governance literature on water in large city-regions. The primary contribution is 
empirical where the paper seeks to examine how a large city’s ability to access rural 
water quotas and infrastructure has been mainly aided by a very particular evolution of 
the legal-institutional architecture around water (and land). Its second contribution is to 
highlight the common ground between the geographical and institutional economics 
(including the CPR) literatures on this subject, and in doing so, it tries to identify some 
of the key distinctions and commonalities between these fields.  
I begin with a critical evaluation of the literature on rural-urban water transfers 
in institutional economics and human geography and lay out the theoretical framework 
of the paper in Section 4.1. Sections 4.2 and Section 4.3 present the paper’s theoretical 
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framework. From Section 4.4 until Section 4.8, I deal with the case study of the 
collective action2 problem in local water management that has important implications 
for better understanding the mechanisms of rural-urban water transfers in the Mumbai 
context. I end with an institutional analysis of findings in Sections 4.9 and 4.10. 
4.1 The Problem: Water Abundance and Metropolitan  
 Water Governance 
Large and growing mega-urban regions in the developing world often source 
water from distant rural watersheds; however the basic water needs of human 
habitations near the reservoirs get clubbed with the problem of water provision for peri-
urban areas in the research literature. The abundant availability of water is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient prerequisite to meet basic water needs of rural communities living 
near source areas for large and growing cities. This paper focuses on two specific 
questions to answer the failure of communities and governments to meet the demand for 
basic water entitlements in such source areas outside Mumbai. The first question 
focuses on investigating the role of institutional arrangements in meeting the basic 
water needs of communities living near such source areas for large and growing mega 
city-regions? Furthermore, it investigates how these institutional arrangements on water 
sharing between urban and rural evolve at the level of geographical scale and how do 
they influence local collective action in rural areas? In the Indian context, the water 
problems of such source areas can often be a product of willful neglect by local and 
state governments, or of a larger exclusion of rural indigenous communities who usually 
live in proximity to dams located in forested watersheds. There has been a voluminous 
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literature in the Indian context on problems of peri-urban areas and rural-urban conflict 
in general (Joy et al., 2008a; Iyer, 2009), but very little research focused on institutional 
factors that influence the interpretation of local water entitlements in rural watersheds 
that serve as sources of water for large metropolitan cities. 
The action situation described and analyzed in this case study is in the context of 
a major water district called Tansa-Vaitarna water district (henceforth T-V) where five 
major dams for the city of Greater Mumbai have been constructed in the last 100 years. 
The five dams are located in a conservation area and water storage in the dams is pre-
assigned and quotas reserved for various cities in the metropolitan region, viz. Mumbai, 
Thane, Bhiwandi and some designated outlying villages. The T-V water district faces 
socio-economic problems typical of forested areas in tribal areas of Western India 
(Louw and Mondal, 2013, p. 50-51). Low levels of economic development combined 
with high rates of seasonal migration are central in the experience of these communities. 
Such problems of access to resources in forest areas and state monopoly rights are the 
focus of a large literature in South Asian political ecology since the 1980s. 
The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai had, during the completion of 
the Upper Vaitarna (1972) and Bhatsa projects (1983), promised water supply to 
villages and towns (Mulekar, 1985). Water is conveyed from this region through large 
aqueducts into the Bhandup complex of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation. These 
water mains, as they pass the villages near the source areas in the T-V water district, are 
all above ground. The sight of water being conveyed to a large metropolitan city while 
the inhabitants of the source area suffer from endemic water shortage became major 
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ground for resentment for inhabitants of this area. This led the Government to 
implement a rural water supply project that would source its water from the dams 
owned by the Mumbai Municipal Corporation under a water sharing agreement. The 
maintenance of the water supply scheme was handed over to the local government as 
part of state policy to decentralize water provision in rural areas. 
It is useful to see T-V as a “problemshed” within the Vaitarna sub-basin. 
Conflicts over water in this area have ranged from demands for water quotas that were 
originally promised for irrigating agriculture, to demands for water for domestic 
consumption in the villages that lie in the proximity of the reservoirs. The Vaitarna 
basin is the largest amongst the North Konkan river basin groups that constitute water 
sources for metropolitan Mumbai and the region. The Second Irrigation Commission of 
the State Government of Maharashtra went into this region and recommended that water 
intensive agriculture be encouraged (Government of Maharashtra, 1999, p. 432). The 
Committee report stated “that the requirements of the megacity and that of industrial 
use are going to remain the principal determinant of planning and management of water 
in this area instead of irrigation” (Government of Maharashtra, 1999, p. 432). However, 
thirty nine percent of the area was found to be cultivable and the report concluded that 
conditions in the basin were favourable for water intensive agricultural production that 
was amenable to the needs of civic supply (Government of Maharashtra, 1999). 
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Figure 4.1: Urban water demand and supply in Mumbai Hydrometric Area in million litres per day 
(1991-2011). Source: Government of Maharashtra, 2003-2010 & 2005. Tables on Water  Budget. 
The report thus indicates a sufficient availability of water for meeting both 
irrigation, and domestic and industrial water needs in this region. While there are urban 
water supply dams constructed in this water district, there are also multipurpose dam 
projects that supply water to irrigate agriculture through canal systems. This imparts a 
variety of water rights to the rural population. However, the last two decades have 
witnessed significant water quotas from this area’s largest dam, the Bhatsa multipurpose 
project, allocated for urban-industrial use (Government of Maharashtra, 2005). For this 
reason, Greater Mumbai and towns that access reservoirs with the city have not 
witnessed any significant shortfalls in supply since the early 1990s (See Figure 4.1 
above). The Bhatsa presently irrigates land in downstream Bhiwandi (in Figure 4.5, red 
lines indicate canals that bypass predominantly tribal parts of the T-V water district). 
An empirical focus on the main water district for Mumbai as a unique context 
for metropolitan water governance presents some advantages. Mumbai is one of the 
largest metropolitan cities in India. It is also an outlier in the Indian context on urban 
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per capita water consumption and ranks amongst the world’s leading and more 
prosperous global cities on this indicator. However, its water sources are located in an 
underdeveloped tribal area of rural Maharashtra where there is a seasonal scarcity of 
water. A recent National Sample Survey on the reliability and availability of drinking 
water in rural Maharashtra shows that the state scores below the rural average for India 
on both the sufficiency and availability of improved sources of drinking water (NSS 
2012,: p.15). This is despite the fact that the state has the largest and highest number of 
dams and per capita availability of water. This paper will thus explore disparities 
between rural and urban areas in India and will also shed light on how institutional 
arrangements crafted at the local level often influence regional water in one of the 
fastest growing metropolitan cities of the world. Secondly, this paper will explore how a 
city’s demand for water can crowd out the needs of outlying rural areas. In addition to 
identifying the main legal principles that have played an important role in the evolution 
of water governance system in the Mumbai metropolitan region, the paper will highlight 
the role of local agro-ecology in shaping institutional arrangements on water. 
4.2 Rural-Urban Water Transfers: Power or Institutions? 
A review of theory from human geography (HG) and institutional economics 
(IE) in a case study on a rural-urban water conflict might seem strange to readers of an 
institutional economics journal. While there is an active program within economic and 
environmental geography on institutions (Gertler, 2004; Adger and Jordan 2009), there 
has not been a great deal of interest amongst critical geographers in applying 
institutional theory to resource problems such as water. The main distinction between 
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frameworks in both disciplines towards rural-urban water transfers lies primarily in the 
different theoretical paradigms that are dominant in these disciplines. In critical 
geography, the dominance of Marxism and post structuralism has focused on the role of 
power and politics in water appropriation by cities from rural areas. In his landmark 
study of the City of Guayaquil, the geographer, Erik Swyngedouw has argued that urban 
water capture can be attributed to the power of capital located in urban areas and 
considers water appropriation an inevitable outcome of capitalist urbanization 
(Swyngedouw, 2004; Gandy, 2008). The political-ecological analysis in this Marxian 
framework hinges on social and political processes and is chiefly informed by 
dependency theory and ecological economics. Both of these fields explain contestation 
over consumption of resources as a result of competition between urban and rural areas.  
Another track within critical geography that uses power revolves around 
analyzing the governance of urban water appropriation and inter-sectoral water conflict 
by applying a Foucauldian lens. Here, the concept that has been utilized is 
“governmentality” where the argument is that governments control populations by using 
the knowledge acquired from their information gathering abilities. This post-
structuralist framework takes the view that institutions, such as the government, its 
regulatory frameworks and even organizations promoting people’s participation in the 
management of public works, are part of a power gathering exercise, which in the 
process of development, craft a complex (but amorphous) system of governance.  
It is important to see this framework as complementary to the Marxian 
approach. Both try to examine the role of power, but both often overlook the fact that 
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state power in relation to water is exercised through specific legislative mandates or 
executive decisions, especially in democracies. Empirical data on regulations and 
instruments of governance are also conspicuous by their absence in these frameworks. 
The complexities of geographical scale, boundaries and institutions that often manage 
through overlapping jurisdictions around large metropolitan cities are also ignored. An 
example of the application of a governmentality framework is Matthew Gandy’s 2008 
paper on Mumbai. While the main focus of this paper is the uneven distribution of water 
among rich, middle class and poor residents of the city over time, Gandy also grapples 
with the regional power and influence of Mumbai’s claims to water over other towns 
and villages in the region. However, his use of governmentality does not help us to 
understand Mumbai’s total control over water in the region, beyond an argument about 
the “performativity” of local right-wing populist politics and the influence of the Shiv 
Sena over local water policy through its influence within the Mumbai Municipal 
Corporation. This “performativity thesis” assumes that right-wing politics and neo-
liberal ideology act in tandem and completely explain the phenomena he describes. This 
argument does not stand critical scrutiny as it ignores two important facts: a liberal/
mainstream party, the Indian National Congress, enacted water policy for the entire state 
for the last fifteen years; and the state government’s Irrigation Department owns two of 
the largest reservoirs that constitute the water sources for Greater Mumbai. Moreover, 
neo-liberal policies have made little headway in the transformation of the regional and 
urban water system -- which continues to be a state monopoly at both levels. Because 
Gandy seems to ignore these facts on the ground, the paper is unable to analyze why the 
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Municipal Corporation of Mumbai -- despite the construction of numerous dams and 
high per capita water consumption -- is unable to meet the water needs of the poor in 
the urban and rural areas. Formal state law on water and mechanisms of legitimation 
and enforcement that shape water rights and entitlements are treated as epiphenomena 
and ignored. 
Research on rural–urban water transfers within IE has been primarily influenced 
by common pool resource (CPR) theory. Water’s characteristics as a renewable 
resource, its variable legal status within different contexts and the ability to store it in 
reservoirs makes it amenable for empirical analysis using CPR theory. In the last two 
decades, economists and even social scientists using institutional theory have also 
outlined a variety of market and non-market mechanisms that exist in the context of 
inter-sectoral transfers of water from aquifers and surface water storages (see Saleth and 
Dinar, 2004; Molle and Berkoff, 2006; Crase and Gandhi 2009). There has been a large 
range of theoretical approaches, from transaction cost analysis to empirical examination 
of rules that undergird rural-urban water transfers. From the water markets of the 
Western United States and Australia to administrative water transfers in Asia, one of the 
main strengths of this literature is a close attention to the wide variation in institutional 
arrangements on rural-urban water transfers that can exist in real world contexts. 
 While the gap between the HG and IE literatures on this subject of rural-urban 
water transfers can be wide, some scholars have recently tried to bridge the distance by 
producing case studies on water transfers that draw on insights from both disciplines. 
An instance is a recent contribution, by Celio et al., (2010) who in their case study of 
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Hyderabad, Southern India have pointed to the interesting complementarities that exist 
between both the IE and HG perspectives. Applying institutional and geographical tools 
to water transfers, their research finds that “appropriation of water” often has a spatial 
and temporal dimension and involves the capture of rural water infrastructure by cities 
(as Marxian geographers have argued). At the same time, the authors also present 
counter examples of water transfer that focus on two reservoirs and are part of the same 
context in the Hyderabad region. While transfers in the first example within this case 
study points to outright appropriation of water, the two other examples in the same case 
study also leads them to identify the importance of rules around such transfers that 
ensure compensation for farmers. 
While common features to IE and HG have been highlighted, there are also gaps 
in both literatures on the subject of inter-sectoral water transfers. For example, the 
power and influence of complex water bureaucracies and the path dependence of 
institutional rules are not particularly well researched in either literature. On the other 
hand, the general problem with the IE literature (given the influence of common pool 
resource theory) is that resources are defined too essentially and “presuppose a cause 
and effect of ecological analysis that may or may not be universal” (Forsyth and 
Johnson, 2014, p. 9). Also, while institutional scholarship has been very useful in 
furthering our understanding of these processes and the dynamics of collective action in 
small scale communities, it is yet to develop a theory of local collective action could be 
influenced by the sharing of the commons with larger geographical entities (Harvey, 
2013: p.68-72). However, scholars working within CPR literature have now begun to 
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point to the lack of attention to the interconnections between different institutions and 
resources, which are primarily a legacy of the decades of engagement with the tragedy 
of the commons argument within CPR theory (Cole et al., 2014). This is particularly 
relevant to developing our knowledge of how water is shared between geographically 
dispersed rural communities and large urban areas. Given the dependence of rural poor 
in developing countries on common resources and land, an evolutionary understanding 
of the relationship between various institutions that manage these resources is crucial. 
4.3 Institutions and Action Situations:  
 The Context of the Socio-Ecological System 
This paper utilizes some of Elinor Ostrom's key insights and methodologies that 
she developed using institutionalism to research commons problems within the field of 
development studies. Ostrom (1990) inspired a wide body of work within development 
studies, economic history and other disciplines in the social sciences in India, in 
particular, and also by overseas scholars studying environmental problems in India and 
other parts of South Asia. This literature has consistently pointed out how the excessive 
authority and power placed in a centralizing colonial and post-colonial state and the 
consequent failures of governance and institutions had characterized the experiences of 
the rural poor in their access to the commons (Wade, 1988; Gadgil and Ramachandran, 
1995; Chakravarty-Kaul, 1996; Agrawal, 1999). In a recent review of Ostrom’s 
contributions to development studies, Tim Forsyth and Craig Johnson have highlighted 
the integration of theory from political science and economics that emerged from her 
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work on resources as her chief theoretical contribution to this field (Forsyth and 
Johnson, 2014). 
For the purposes of this paper, institutions are systems of established and 
embedded social rules that structure social interactions between individuals and 
organizations (Hodgson, 2006). Though I explicitly identify and give a central role to 
formal rules and organizations that manage water in this context, my description and 
analysis of water politics in this paper does not strictly distinguish between formal and 
informal institutions. The role and presence of caste groups and associations, the media, 
political parties, and everyday enforcement of rules by various organizations viz. the 
municipal corporation, irrigation and forest departments as actors in the water district 
are examples of how the formal and informal interact. The treatment of institutions in 
this paper is thus different from that in the new institutional economics, which 
emphasizes the role of quasi-autonomous individuals (Hodgson, 2006; 2012; 2014). 
Within common pool resource theory, a socio-ecological system is defined as an 
ecological system intricately linked with and affected by one or more social systems 
(Berkes and Folke, 2000). It can loosely be defined as an interdependent system of 
organism or biological units. In her initial outline of the socio-ecological system, 
Ostrom identified five design principles for the successful implementation of bottom up 
solutions for socio-ecological systems. The first was that a resource system has clearly 
defined boundaries. The importance of internal rules comes next, where it is critical that 
there should be rules that prevent users from appropriating too much of the resource. 
Third, rules work better when they are locally adapted as it helps prevent free riding. 
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Next, strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms also play an important role and 
so do dispute resolution mechanisms. If dispute resolution mechanisms are transparent 
and clear and well-established procedures are in place, any decentralized resolution of 
common pool resource problems can be successful. Finally, it is also important to focus 
on the interaction between different systems of rules. Often governments try to 
decentralize resource management but the overall legal frameworks in place means that 
central authorities still assume responsibility for determining most of the rules that 
govern the use of resources (Pennington 2012, p. 26-29). All these factors affect the 
incentive structure that faces actors in the context of specific common pool resources 
and these incentives constitute what Ostrom calls “action situations.” In this paper, the 
term “commons” is used to describe water storage as well as water that is distributed 
through conveyance systems as public and club goods. 
The case study I present in this paper uses social ecological systems (SES) and 
action situation methodologies, which are drawn from the CPR literature. The paper 
uses this framework to relate the water question in the action situations to conflicts 
around resources such as land within forests and tries to develop a more contextual 
understanding of the institutional arrangements around resources (Ostrom, 2009).  
An action situation following Ostrom (2005) refers to a situation whenever two 
or more individuals are faced with a set of potential actions that jointly produce social 
outcomes. Within every action situation an individual occupies a certain social position. 
The same participant can interact in another action situation where they occupy 
different positions. An action arena combines the action situation, which focuses on the 
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rules and norms, with the participants who bring with them their individual preferences, 
skills and mental models. Action situation methodology has been employed by scholars 
investigating outcomes of collective action situations with respect to the 
decentralization of resource management, but also in general studies of the commons 
(Anderies and Janssen, 2013). Unlike other studies using the SES and action situation 
methodology, this paper draws on cartographic and archival data, and synthesizes 
ethnographic research with data collected from local newspapers, and dam reports. 
Figure 4.2: Action Situations embedded in socio-ecological systems. 
The action situation (see Figure 4.2) described in this paper is located within 
what is called the Mumbai hydrometric area (see Note 2) in the T-V water district in 
Thane. Following Ostrom (2011), I utilize the Social - Ecological Systems framework to 
research a particular SES, namely the coastal plains and uplands in the region that are 
located between the Western Ghats and the Arabian Sea coast. The city of Mumbai has 
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identified a hydrometric area in this region on which it claims a priority of ownership of 
water use since the early 1970s. The Regional Map (see Figure 4.3) is a cartographic 
representation of the location of various dams for the entire Mumbai metropolitan 
region. The Mumbai hydrometric area has several reservoirs (large, medium and small) 
that impart a variety of local water rights to the various agricultural regions and smaller 
towns and villages adjacent to Greater Mumbai within and outside the metropolitan 
region (Government of Maharashtra, 2005; UNDP, 2009; SANDRP, 2013). 
These local rights create grounds for contestation over the city’s claims that the 
water belongs to it exclusively. The action situations analyzed below describe the state’s 
attempts to resolve these disputes by the construction of a rural water supply system and 
the attempts of the communities to inject transparency into local water governance. 
Later, I examine how the attributes of a resource system (i.e., the coastal plains below 
the Western Ghats), resource units generated by that system and its ownership (i.e., the 
large dams), and a governance system affecting who is authorized to undertake what 
policies under what conditions jointly affect and are affected by outcomes of the action 
situation (See Table 4.1 and Table 4.3). 
This paper uses a framework combining socio-ecological system and legal 
institutionalist (L-I) approaches in order to understand the role of law in access to 
resources (Rhodes, 2006; Deakin et al., 2015). The L-I approach helps to identify 
important legal principles and to analyze the influence of water laws and their evolution 
in particular local contexts. Thus, this paper departs from a spontaneous conception of 
law and property rights that downplay the role of the state, as in the transactions cost 
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literature. A weakness of that literature is an assumption of relatively small numbers of 
agents and an underdeveloped conception of the nature of law. The L-I approach on the 
other hand shares with other institutional approaches an emphasis on social rules. It 
argues that the “more important and powerful social rules are legal in character and they 
are backed by the power and authority of the state” (Deakin et al 2015: p 17). 
Figure 4.3 - Regional Map of Mumbai Hydrometric Area. 
The institutional complexity of the Indian context makes one ask; “how should 
we frame and analyze institutions in all their contextual variety, so that our approach is 
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relevant for the purposes of institutional design?” (Aligicia, 2013, p.73). The analysis of 
contestation in contemporary India requires examining place specific laws and rights 
and how they emerged from constitutional provisions in relation to the socio-ecological 
context. For the purposes of this paper, legal rules and procedures are the independent 
variable and water governance and institutions in this region are the dependent variable. 
In summary, this paper applies common pool resource theory by using SES and 
action situation methodologies to analyze how state actors attempt to resolve disputes 
between urban and rural water supply in the Mumbai hydrometric area. This action 
situation also analyzes attempts of communities to advocate for transparency in local 
water governance. A legal institutionalist (L-I) approach is applied to analyze influence 
of water laws and social rules in the institutional complexity of the Indian context. 
4.4  Placing the Action Situation in a Historical-Evolutionary 
Context 
In a critical review of the CPR literature, Arun Agrawal has pointed out that 
researchers within the common pool resource literature have paid more attention to the 
characteristics and functioning of institutions than to the social and historical context in 
which those institutions actually function and evolve (Agrawal, 2002). A large body of 
empirical research in the common pool resource literature has also ignored the 
evolutionary trajectory of institutions and the knowledge systems that influence 
resource management systems. The CPR literature also fails to analyze how institutions 
of resource governance interact with one another horizontally or across levels of social 
organization (McCay, 2002; Young, 2003). This gap is widely prevalent in CPR 
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research because it is considered impossible to combine the use of historical data with a 
socio-ecological framework (for two exceptions to this trend, see Chakravarty-Kaul, 
1996; Mwangi, 2007). In a context where institutions managing varied resources 
intersect and overlap, a discrete approach to one resource may not be particularly 
insightful. While privatization and extractive practices around resources could be one 
vital aspect of social and ecological transformation, other factors such as choice of 
technology, organization and legal frameworks are also important to develop a better 
understanding of institutional evolution in the context of resources. 
My focus on the evolutionary aspects of water resource management in the 
Mumbai context is thus informed by combining the substantive and methodological 
lessons from Ostrom’s corpus of theoretical work on the commons, with Geoffrey 
Hodgson's recent collaborative research on legal institutionalism within institutional 
economics (Deakin et al., 2015). The broad lessons from this literature include 
embracing complexity and developing an understanding of how institutions have 
evolved in concrete and real situations through interdisciplinary empirical case studies 
(Frischmann, 2013, p. 393; Pennington, 2012). An understanding of rules that underlie 
water governance entails developing an in depth understanding of what legal principles 
have played an important role in the evolution of organizations that manage water 
systems for large metropolitan urban regions. From an institutionalist perspective, a 
closer scrutiny of debates on dam location in the Mumbai context yields important 
information on the institutional evolution of the regional water system. Urban water 
supply dams fall in a category of engineering projects where technological choices are 
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considerably influenced by the institutional framework around land, water, and 
geography. While planning these reservoirs, engineers have to be mindful of both the 
costs and efficiency aspects of these projects, but they also seek to provide a reliable 
water supply to large cities without creating conditions of legal insecurity around water  
rights. Such debates on dam location were and continue to be covered in great detail in 
engineering journals and Government reports and often reflect competing visions of 
what can be accomplished by these dam projects. 
4.5 The Action Situation - Hydropower versus Urban Water 
 Supply: Creating Mumbai’s Property Rights over Water 
 in the Mid–Twentieth Century3  
In the mid-1940s, Mumbai was faced with severe water shortages. Financial 
constraints to expand the city’s water supply network during the war had made the 
situation precarious. The Mumbai Municipal Corporation turned to two of the best 
experts in India, Sir M Viswesarraya and the English hydrologist Claude Inglis, for 
advice. Claude Inglis, in a paper in the Journal of the Institute of Indian Engineers, 
advocated the use of the tail race water of the Tata hydroelectric power project in the 
Lonavala area (also in the Western Ghats) (see Figure 4.4) for meeting the future needs 
of the city. Though located in the Western Ghats, the Tata project was an independent 
private sector project and developed independently of the Bombay water supply system.  
This understanding of institutions and legal-evolutionary aspects of water 
governance help to contextualize the action situation in the Mumbai hydrometric area 
and illuminate the legal principles significant to this case. 
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Figure 4.4: Creation of Tansa-Vaitarna water district in Shahpur, Thane District. Note on Source: 
This map was re-worked from a 1948 original by Modak. I thank the University of Chicago Crerar    
Library for making available the microfiche with the original map. 
 The Tata power project (Bhivpuri, Andra, Walwan, Shirwata reservoirs) (see 
Figure 4.4) was completed in 1919 to generate electricity for the city of Mumbai (Vora, 
2009). Inglis advocated that Mumbai access the Lonavala reservoir system because he 
saw it as the most ‘efficient’ and cost effective solution to the city’s needs. These 
reservoirs were built in the 1920s and the water from the dams (after generating 
hydropower) drained into the Arabian Sea through the Ulhas River. This water was seen 
as being wasted. Inglis pointed out that thousands of acres of valuable agricultural and 
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forest land would be inundated in any potential project in Thane district and exercising 
the Lonavala option would therefore provide a good alternative. 
4.6 Outcome of the Action Situation under the BMC Act 
 of 1888 
In a dissenting response, first in an interim report in 1947, and later in a final 
report in 1948, NV Modak, the special engineer of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation 
advocated the construction of a new dam in Thane district on the grounds of meeting 
future needs and the creation of an exclusive water district. He argued that the growth of 
the city due to industrialization and an influx of population after the partition of India, 
coupled with the existence of a massive forested watershed in tribal Thane, made the 
Tansa-Vaitarna area more attractive for building a new dam and could also become a 
future site of large scale dam building (Modak, 1948, p.47). He also argued that “an 
adequate infrastructure existed in Thane since the nineteenth century to haul the pipes 
and the various machinery to build a new reservoir.” This, according to him, would 
provide economy to any dam project and future dam projects undertaken in the next 100 
years. The Tata project, in his view, had limited yield and the tail race water from the 
reservoirs was in fact accessed to some extent downstream by farming communities and 
smaller towns that lay along the Ulhas River, thus imparting towns and villages riparian 
rights (Modak, 1947). Along with the potential issues arising out of the riparian rights of 
rural communities, Modak also pointed out the legal complexity and uncertainty that a 
water sharing agreement with a private corporation producing hydro power would cause 
in years with erratic rainfall. That would create potential pitfalls in securing Bombay’s 
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future water needs from a legal perspective (Modak, 1948). In a 1948 report authored 
again by Modak, the two other interlocutors in this debate, Claude Inglis and the Indian 
engineer S. Visvesvaraya gave their written assent to Modak’s proposals, one to build a 
new independent dam on the Vaitarna river and secondly, to link the new project with 
the Tansa dam (built in the 1890s) through an aqueduct (Modak, 1948) (See Figure 4.5). 
As the Bombay Municipal City Corporation decided to construct the next dam in 
Vaitarna, the region to the north in the Tansa-Vaitarna water district was reserved for 
meeting demand from Mumbai with all the attendant socio-ecological consequences for 
the local population (Times of India, 1954). The eventual choice to build a dam at 
Vaitarna highlights the importance of the local water rights situation in the 1940s. 
Indian water law in the late Colonial period was (and largely still is) informed by 
riparian principles (Singh, 1992; Cullet, 2010) and the Municipal Corporation used its 
knowledge of the local water rights situation in its eventual choice of dam location. 
Communities in T-V water district enjoyed weaker water rights since they lived in what 
were mostly forested areas. A broad local scholarship has highlighted the historic 
contestation over land rights (in tribal parts of Thane district) where T-V is located 
(Ambasta, 1998; Munshi, 1998). Since most communities in T-V did not have clear 
rights over land, Modak and the Municipal Corporation of Mumbai did not foresee any 
major legal challenge to the claims and authority of Mumbai over water in the area. In 
an American urban context, the late Vincent Ostrom pointed to similar strategies 
employed by the City of Los Angeles to secure and control its own water supply. 
Ostrom highlighted that “the phase of the cycle involving the movement of water across 
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the land represents the most strategic opportunity for human control and 
development” (Ostrom, 1953, p.232). He argued that while most governments are not 
based on that notion, Los Angeles was deliberately organized to assure control over the 
San Fernando Valley, a basic hydrological unit of the Los Angela river system. He 
argued that having the hydrological unit as the area of government has been the basis of 
annexation policies for the Metropolitan Water District (Ostrom, 1953). 
Similarly, in the Mumbai context, while advocating for a second dam in T-V 
water district, Modak foresaw how construction of a new dam project in the district 
would potentially strengthen the city's rights in a forested watershed where there were 
no other claimants to the water (Beaumont, 1943). Given that there was agricultural 
activity in T-V watershed, (as pointed out in Inglis’ 1945 paper) the only way to secure 
the city’s interests was to reserve the watershed and land around it for the future. In 
1964, the technical report of the Bhatsa multipurpose dam further confirms this 
perception of the importance of the watershed and the role of land rights in influencing 
dam location. The Bhatsa report points to the “non-existence of riparian rights upstream 
of the river” where the reservoirs were built (Government of Maharashtra 1964, p. 10). 
The construction of more dams in the same water district in subsequent decades 
indicates a preference of Mumbai Municipal Corporation to construct reservoirs in 
forest areas and is further evidence of the important role of engineering perceptions of 
the relationship of local land and water rights in the region. The absence of strong 
riparian rights for local populations in T-V water district in the 1940s and the absence of 
water claims made it attractive to engineers for exploiting rivers in the area. The 
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subsequent reservation of the watershed in the 1950s weakened whatever future claim 
local communities might have to water resources there. Reservation, by default, 
recognized Mumbai as having prior appropriation rights to water in the area. 
In the early 1970s, when metropolitan planning was introduced in Mumbai, the 
T-V water district was not included within metropolitan region boundaries. The two 
major institutional developments in this period were the creation of a local Water 
Resources Board in the late 1960’s and the drawing of a hydrometric area that would 
help with water planning in the region; the hydrometric boundaries of the Mumbai 
region were extended far beyond those of the metropolitan region and included the T-V 
water district and the major watersheds to the north, east and south of the metropolitan 
region (see Figure 4.4). The Water Resources Board did not survive beyond a few years 
and was disbanded (Binnie’s Consulting Engineers, 1971; World Bank, 1996), but the 
hydrometric area continues to inform water planning and is a term often used to affirm 
the city’s claims over water (MMRDA, 1996). This period from the early 1970s until 
the late 1980s coincided with the planning of major new towns in the metropolitan 
region and an attempt was made to balance agricultural and industrial water demand by 
constructing large multipurpose dams in the T-V water district and in other parts of the 
hydrometric area. Some of these projects were designed to both irrigate agricultural 
land and supply water to Greater Mumbai and the metropolitan region, whereas some 
others existed to simply irrigate agricultural land (such as the Surya, that lies outside the 
T-V water district but within the Vaitarna basin, see Figure 4.5).  
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Figure 4.5: Tansa-Vaitarna Water District (Pathak, 2005). This map is a reworking of originals from 
Tansa Wild Life Sanctuary and GIS shape files from the Water Resources Information System of 
India at http://www.india-wris.nrsc.gov.in. Population of this 659.75 sq. km area was about 95,487 
people in 1991 (Pathak, 2005, p. 449). Precise figures unavailable for current period. 
How does this specific account of water policy and politics of dam location help 
illustrate the role of water institutions and rules in an action situation today? Case 
studies on Indian water governance completely ignore the historical evolution of rules 
in local contexts. Moreover, it is often claimed that Indian water law comprises many 
formal and informal laws, norms and principles (Cullet, 2010). Yet the influence of 
common law tradition on Indian water law means local water rights and rules in any 
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context carry their own weight. Any exercise of state power in a democracy must 
depend on the prevailing legal system and local rules that evolve (or remain) over time. 
The above account shows us that Greater Mumbai’s claims to water in the T-V 
district were strengthened by the decision to reserve the watershed in the T-V water 
district (after the construction of the Vaitarna dam in the 1950s). The city’s water rights 
were further entrenched in law by the creation of a wider hydrometric boundary which 
later became the basis for water planning and the assignment of quotas from the 1970s 
(MMRDA, 1996; Binnie’s Consulting Engineers 1971: 37). Both these decisions to 
create boundaries had direct implications for the rights of local communities to the 
water of the T-V watershed. The paper now examines how these institutional choices 
impacted policies and state and grassroots-led collective action attempts to resolve local 
water conflicts in the T-V water district. 
4.7 Action Situation in the T-V Water District: Outcomes 
under the BMC Act 1888, the 1976 Maharashtra 
Irrigation  Act, the 1972 Wildlife Act and the 2005 
Maharashtra Water Resources Regulation Act 
In the early 1970s, a wide, forested and mainly tribal watershed in Tansa-
Vaitarna water district was incorporated into the Tansa Wildlife Sanctuary. Figure 4.6 
shows the evolution of water governance in Mumbai-Thane region from 1892 to today.   
The map of the Tansa-Vaitarna Water District (Figure 4.5) displays more than 
four hundred habitations in the core and buffer zones of the Sanctuary (see Table 4.3 on 
the laws that govern resource management in the area). This development brought part 
of the Vaitarna watershed under the Wildlife Protection Act 1972 and its stringent 
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provisions governing access of farmers to water, land and forest resources. Since the 
nineteenth century, communities in T-V district have had a long history of conflict with 
the state over access, ownership and use of land plots in the forest area for agriculture 
(Tucker, 1979; Saldanha, 1992; Ambasta, 1998; Munshi, 1998; Bokil and Dalvi 2000; 
Louw and Mondal, 2012). Over the last 25 years, frequent conflict between the forest 
Figure 4.6: Chronological Timeline: Evolution of Water Governance in Mumbai-Thane region. 
  
department and local inhabitants has intensified due to attempted evictions by the local 
Forest Department of the local tribal populations engaged in agriculture on their forest 
land plots within the sanctuary. The conflict has been amplified by a growing 
curtailment of various rights of the rural population over the last three decades (Draft 
Forest Plan, 1996; Pathak, 2005) that has seen the state declare more than forty human  
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Table 4.1: Resource and Governance Systems. Sources: Pathak (2005); Census of India. (2001). District 
Census Handbook, Thane District. Bombay: Government Central Press.; Louw and Mondal (2012); 
Gazetteer of Thane District (1981).  
Resource System Attributes of the Resource System
Type of resource system Coastal alluvial plains and forest ecology
Location Konkan; North of Mumbai city
Productivity Varied, but high in the coastal alluvial plains in Thane district
Clarity of watershed boundaries Clearly demarcated in the 1980s
Constructed infrastructure  
Not Well developed until the 1940s
Diversion dams Weirs mostly set up on rivers to convey water to cities from larger storages
Headworks These are mostly located in forest areas
Channels and Canals These have been constructed in very difficult terrain
Road and Rail network Markets well developed because of an infrastructure
Resource Units
Spatial distribution of rainfall Concentrated in the monsoon (June-September)
Temporal distribution of rainfall Heavy in the mountains and hills near storages
Economic value of land High 
Economic value of water High
Actors
Tribal farmers Poor-below the official Indian poverty line
Non-Tribal farmers Middle Farmers, owning more than 2 hectares
Landless 20% of farming population
Economic Status
Tribal Farmers Poor access to modern crops or industrial jobs, and they don’t migrate to the city
Non-Tribal Farmers Less poor; 50% are marginal cultivators with access to urban and industrial jobs
Central Government and State Government
Members of Legislative Assembly Can request water for their constituency, deny water for certain kinds of demand
National Water Development 
Agency Planning large water projects
State officials Mostly involved in water planning
Local Officials Not involved 
City Officials City Corporation officers and engineers 
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settlements in T-V water district as “illegal” (see Figure 4.5). In the last 140 years 
populations living in settlements in this area have been periodically displaced to create a 
category of “protected forests” that serve to protect the watershed (Tulloch, 1872; Times 
of India, “Water Supply of Greater Bombay. A report Submitted to the Bench of 
Justices.” 1954; Ambasta, 1998). At least four thousand tribal cultivators, therefore, 
continue to live in the forests of Tansa (see “encroachment villages” in Fig 4.5), 
precariously clinging to patches of land while battling state forest department 
regulations that threaten their livelihoods. In order to understand the relationship of land 
and forest tenure to water, it is important to understand the institutional diversity of 
property rights around land and forests and the implications it has for collective action. 
 Forest regulations establish three categories of agricultural land. While a third of 
land holdings are recognized by the state, at least two thirds of the land plots fall under 
land tenure systems that are renewed every year. Some agriculture is also located within 
forest areas where cultivation is carried out in contravention of the state regulations 
around forest land. A majority of farmers in this region are small and marginal 
cultivators and are dependent on their land holdings and access to the forests for their 
livelihoods. In terms of pursuing an everyday existence and basic livelihoods, the 
population living in the Tansa-Vaitarna water district thus face a very difficult situation. 
A preliminary examination might fault the absence of clear land rights as a problem in 
resource management in this area (see Table 4.1). However, such a perspective would 
Shared knowledge of resource system
Shared norms among actors Very low due to caste status of rural communities
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be overlooking the problem of geographical scale in resource governance in the water 
district.  
 The changing agro-political-ecology of the T-V water district has had a more 
significant influence on the resource rights of the local communities. For reasons that 
are elaborated below, it can also be discerned that the institutional design and 
biophysical boundaries of both the forests and watersheds in the Sanctuary and the T-V 
water district show considerable overlap. This spatial fit and the legal architecture that 
has been created in the 1970s to draw a boundary around the forests in the watershed 
also completely leaves out the local communities (who are one of the main 
stakeholders) from the decision making and planning process around water and land. 
The Mumbai Municipal Corporation’s stated policy for discouraging human habitations 
is not to allow pollutants from rural settlements to enter the water within the reservoirs. 
This has led to very tight regulation of human habitation and land use in the forested 
belts between the Upper Vaitarna and Modak Sagar Dams (Mulekar, 1985, Gokhale, 
1995). However, the exclusion of local communities from the governance of the T-V 
water district by the various agencies also leaves out any potential co-operation between 
local communities and the state agencies. 
Two local researchers have highlighted the following about the predicament of 
the local communities when it comes to livelihoods in the T-V water district: 
Faced with the choice of either surrendering completely to the dictates 
of a market economy they are ill equipped to deal with or seeking to 
eke out a miserable living on small patches of land, most tribals have 
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chosen the latter option i.e. occupation of the conservation area in the 
T-V. The close symbolic attachment that tribals have to traditional 
forest land underpins this choice and determines, clearly, a rational 
choice that underpins their livelihood strategies. Not surprisingly, this 
reinforces a destructive circle, bringing tribals and conservation 
authorities into increasing conflict over the two critical resources 
discussed earlier, namely, access to land and water. (Louw and 
Mondal, 2012, p. 54) 
The current institutional-geographical profile of the T-V water district has thus 
been influenced by past enclosures around land and forest resources. These struggles 
around forests and land have also helped shape place based collective identities in the 
action situation around water. Figure 4.5 vividly illustrates the spatial geography of 
land, forests and water resources which the rural communities have to deal with in the 
T-V water district. It also shows the spatiality of the commons problem and the spatial 
domains of resource users and the commons. These agro-ecological features and the 
resource governance system in the area are further delineated in Table 4.1. The poor 
economic status of farmers in the water district and high value of water (due to urban 
water demand) in what is a forested area makes water provision for local communities 
who are socio-economically poor a challenge.  
The denial of basic amenities such as water to the local population in the T-V 
water district as part of a conscious policy by the Mumbai Municipal Corporation 
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(which owns most of the infrastructure in the area) led to the local self-government to 
plan and construct a rural water supply system in the T-V water district. 
4.8 Rural Water Supply Project: Decentralization in Action 
In the T-V water district, the provision of rural water services takes two forms. 
Rural water supply is a subject of local self-government in the state of Maharashtra. 
However, communities in rural Maharashtra are also reliant on their own village based 
wells. The presence of a large Municipal Corporation’s reservoirs and water main 
infrastructure in the water district meant that the water problem could only be alleviated 
if the Municipal Corporation shared water from its reservoirs in the T-V Water district 
with villages. Traditionally, in the Indian context and in the state of Maharashtra, water 
storage and supply are within the domain of state owned enterprises and the state 
Irrigation Department. Partly, this is a historical inheritance from the Colonial period, 
more importantly “the characteristics of water with a high degree of natural monopoly, 
high capital intensity, the presence of sunk costs, the multipurpose and hydrologically 
interconnected nature of water itself ensures that the state continues to monopolize the 
provision of water in rural areas in India” (Sangameshwaran, 2010, p. 54). However, 
two dominant trends in the area of water distribution took over in rural areas of Western 
India from the mid-1990s onwards. One was sectoral decentralization which was 
particularly influential and the second was privatization. Noting wide disparities in 
water access between cities and rural areas, a White Paper on the Drinking Water 
Problem (Government of Maharashtra, 1995) had acknowledged and emphasized the 
needs of water in source areas that were located next to dams on a priority basis. In the 
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T-V water district, overhead water tanks were constructed as part of a project to 
alleviate the problem for eighteen villages with a total population of 15,000 people by 
decentralizing water provision. The Maharashtra State Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation Corporation (MSRWSSC) now called the Maharashtra Jeevan Pradhikaran 
set up a Water Supply Division in the T-V water district to provide water to eighteen 
villages. The construction of water tanks to provide water to the villages in this region 
started in 1992. Upon completion in 1995, the scheme was to be handed over to the 
village councils for operation and maintenance. Water for this scheme came from the 
Mumbai Municipal Corporation reservoirs in the T-V water district. This water supply 
project in the T-V water district claimed to have involved participation of rural 
communities, but in fact this was a scheme mostly implemented by a parastatal 
corporation that supplied water to peri-urban areas in Mumbai (IRHDP, 1997). 
The completion of the project and the transfer of water supply systems to local 
self-government, which did not have the technical capacity to maintain the project, 
caused recurrent failure in water provision within various villages (IRHDP, 1997). 
Water provision in rural areas in India is considered the domain of local self-
government and village councils (also called Panchayats). However, local village 
councils that were put in charge of the project complained of shoddy work and poor 
maintenance, but the main complaint of the local villages was unavailability of water 
from the Municipal reservoirs and the exorbitant water tariffs. What made the water 
problem difficult to solve for the inhabitants was the scattered nature of the human 
habitations with the main villages cut off from several tribal settlements by forests and 
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rivers (see map in Figure 4.5). Given the forest department’s control over land in the 
area, maintenance work on the water pipes that conveyed water to the tanks through 
forest land was often not allowed. The location of some of the eighteen villages within 
the buffer zone of the wildlife sanctuary also added to the challenge. Land use in the 
buffer zones of wildlife sanctuaries is always marked by a priority to the ecology of the 
area over human habitations. In the case of the T- V water district, the fact that the water 
district is located in the middle of a conservation area (where the interests of the local 
inhabitants on the one hand and the Forest Department and Municipality on the other 
have been in conflict) led to frequent impasse over the maintenance of the pipeline 
infrastructure. However, no such obstacles are encountered by the Municipal 
Corporation in maintaining its own water mains infrastructure for the city of Mumbai as 
it enjoys more rights of access in the T-V area. Section 263 of the Mumbai Municipal 
Act that applies to the T-V water district empowers the Municipality to access “any 
water work within or without the city, adjacent to or in the vicinity of such water-work, 
in whomsoever such land may vest” (BMC Act, 1888, p. 352). The hierarchy of local 
rules on land that privilege the BMC over the local self-government institutions in the 
maintenance of their respective water infrastructures was also perceived as a major 
cause of failure of the rural water supply project. Moreover, most of the village councils 
in this area did not have the revenue to purchase water from the Mumbai Municipality, 
as they are located in a conservation area where land use is severely regulated by the 
local Forest department and economic activity is severely curtailed. As a result, their 
!169
revenue base could not meet the expenditure required to maintain an independent rural 
water supply scheme in the T-V water district (People’s Daily, 2007). 
 The policy to decentralize water through the rural water supply project for 
eighteen villages thus did not take into account the complex ecology of the area and the 
evolution of the socio-economic context through the 1980s and 1990s. In this period, 
the structure of local rules around water and land had further entrenched the interests of 
the city. The construction of a new dam and the reduced forest in the T-V water district 
in the 2000s (Singh and Mishra, 2012) as a result of dam building only further widened 
the lack of trust between various state departments that manage water, forests land and 
the local communities. The centralized policy making around water planning in the T-V 
water district where most of the decisions around dam building and water allocation 
were taken by bureaucracies in New Delhi and Mumbai further worsened the prospect 
of a good outcome. The role of geography, types of water storage, and water rights in 
creating a complex water governance system is highlighted in Figure 4.7 and Table 4.3 
below. The over concentration of urban water supply dams in a forested watershed has 
only helped worsen the uneven geography of water entitlement between the city of 
Greater Mumbai and the T-V water district (see Table 4.2). Since the water district is 
outside the boundaries of the metropolitan region, per capita water consumption can be 
even lower than what is in the table. 
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Figure 4.7: The Varieties of Water Conflict – Politics of Water in the Mumbai Region. 
Table 4.2: Water consumption disparities between villages and towns in the Mumbai 
metro region (Government of Maharashtra, 2005).
4.9 Nested Nature of Rules: 
 An Obstacle or an Opportunity in Collective Action? 
Problems with lack of access to domestic water such as the ones facing the T-V 
water district are not unique to this context. Where multiple and often competing policy 
and legal frameworks around water exist, the problem of rural water supply and 
Per Capita Domestic Water Use Per day in Liters (Mumbai region)
Area Water Usage in Liters
Greater Mumbai 240
Navi Mumbai 150
Other Areas 150
Villages to be incorporated in 
municipalities 70
Other Villages in Rural Areas 70
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provision is difficult to solve. These issues are exacerbated by chronic corruption 
fostered by the lack of participation of local communities in water supply projects and 
drinking water laws that do not recognize the right of rural communities to a minimum 
per capita quantum of water. Given that the basic water entitlements of the local 
communities were not addressed by state agencies in the T-V water district through the 
water supply project, the only alternative to the population in the T-V water district and 
their representatives was to mobilize rural communities and seeking the intervention of 
higher levels of government. 
The early 2000s witnessed the emergence of a local movement that managed to 
bring the local tribal and non-tribal communities on a common platform and widened 
the list of demands from domestic use to water for irrigation use. It also questioned the 
wisdom of the government constructing multiple urban water supply projects in an area 
where people displaced by past projects were yet to be rehabilitated within the same 
forested belt. Given that the local context was characterized by divisions of caste 
amongst the poor inhabitants of this water district, this rare moment of rural collective 
action was a significant development. Mobilizations, work stoppages on maintaining the 
Municipal Corporation’s infrastructure (local communities are employed in maintaining 
the city corporation's infrastructure) and information campaigns on the water issue 
followed (Centre for Science and Environment, (CSE) 2013). In the summer of 2006, 
communities living in 104 villages next to the reservoirs threatened to break the valves 
of the water mains supplying water to Mumbai. The immediate cause for such direct 
action was an acute water problem and a localized crisis with non-availability of water 
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for irrigation. The State Government’s persistence in going ahead with a new project led 
to a major change in the strategies of local actors in their advocacy on water issues in 
the T-V water district (CSE, 2012 see ‘Mumbai’s Water Fuels Rural Ire’). 
In 2007, another local political party in the T-V water district revealed that the 
Mumbai Municipal Corporation which accessed the T-V water district owed millions of 
rupees in water revenue to local village councils and district level governments 
(People’s Democracy, 2006). This symbolized a major change of strategy from action at 
the local level to a higher level of governance. The tax revenue according to the party 
was to be paid as part of an inter-governmental transfer of revenue from the Municipal 
Corporation to the local village governments as the Corporation had sourced water for 
decades from a rural area. This change in strategy by local political actors was an 
acknowledgement of the nested-ness of the water rules that governed the management 
of reservoirs in the water district. This change in strategy also revealed a major dilemma 
for the local movements with the governance arrangements in the water district. The 
ownership and management of various reservoirs in the T-V water district was found to 
be divided between the Mumbai Municipal Corporation and the State Irrigation 
Department. Three of the five major reservoirs in the T-V water district are owned by 
the Mumbai Municipality and two are owned by the Irrigation Department. Dams south 
east of the T-V water district are owned by parastatal agencies like the Maharashtra 
Industrial Development Corporation, smaller municipal councils while some others are 
owned by the Mumbai Municipal Corporation (see Table 4.3 for ownership and water 
rights to reservoirs in the T-V water district and the hydrometric area) 
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Given that there is no formal monitoring authority (other than a committee 
headed by the State Irrigation Minister of the state of Maharashtra) to manage the 
apportionment of water between various users and adjudicate water disputes, the higher 
status accorded to Mumbai’s water demand in the T-V water district is identified in this 
paper as one of the major factors that led to frequent conflicts between the state 
Irrigation Department and the Municipal Corporation. These problems often reach their 
peak in the summer when the State Irrigation Minister has the sole authority to manage 
water conflicts between various large users in the T-V water district. Given Mumbai’s 
senior water appropriation rights, the beneficial aspects of urban drinking water use, and 
the political clout of the city, water quotas are always allocated to Greater Mumbai, 
even if such a decision clashed with the water needs of other Municipal Corporations in 
the region that use the T-V water district as a source (Indian Express, 2010; Asian Age, 
2012). 
The unwillingness of the state government to reform the local institutional 
architecture around water in the T-V water district echoes a similar problem with water 
governance throughout the state of Maharashtra where the absence of water councils at 
the district level is noticed in the above analysis. Decisions around water allocation in 
the context of disputes are made by the state Irrigation Minister (or the Chief Minister) 
on an interpretation of existing state policy and local water laws and rights. This has led 
to a situation where there are conflicts between governmental authorities at various 
levels in the metropolitan region (Pethe et al, 2011) and growing discontent within rural 
communities that are faced with very poor per capita access. Thus, in some respects, the 
!174
action situation in the T-V water district is also characterized by ‘institutional opacity.’ 
The lack of co-ordination between the territory planned and governed by the 
metropolitan/municipal authorities and the so called hydrometric area has further 
contributed to a fragmentation of metropolitan water governance. The resulting 
fragmentation in water governance is further exacerbated by the ownership of reservoirs 
by different state and parastatal entities which in turn is sought to be coordinated 
centrally by the state ministry in Mumbai when a local district council in the Mumbai-
Thane region could better adjudicate water disputes between different actors (see table 
4.3 for data on institutional ownership of dams).  
Identity politics in the water district with antagonistic relations between caste 
Hindus (locally called the Kunbi Marathas) and the tribal community also had their own 
negative impact on the outcome of the action situation. Culturally, tribals are placed 
outside the fourfold hierarchy of the Hindu caste system and past struggles around land 
have often pitted caste Hindus against the tribal community in the water district. 
Moreover, every village and the local self-government is structured in a manner where 
caste Hindus inhabit the main villages and tribal communities that are part of the same 
village are dispersed in settlements in the forest surrounding the villages. This 
geography of human settlements had its own impact on collective action. Political 
leadership in the villages is usually drawn from the tribal community, but caste Hindus 
tend to be dominant which tends to influence rural collective action (Varshney, 1995). In 
the water district, however, both Kunbis and tribals are equally impacted by the 
monopoly of the Municipal Corporation over the water in the T-V water district 
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However, the tribal community is poorer and faces high seasonal distress migration 
rates. 
4.10 Prior Appropriation and Local Water Institutions:  
 Implications for Water Governance and Mumbai’s  
 Senior Water Rights 
 The eventual outcome of the action situation was influenced by the social and 
economic constraints faced by participants that result from the structure of water 
governance in the T-V water district. The rural water supply project was also located in 
a forest area where at least a third of the farmers in the T-V water district did not have 
legal titles to their land plots, were mostly poor and also as a result faced high seasonal 
migration rates as a result of a lack of viable livelihood options within agriculture (see 
tables 4.1 and 4.3 on the governance system around land and water).   
 Access to information on the management of water and the vertical hierarchy 
between various organizations (the Mumbai Municipal Corporation, the State Irrigation 
Department and the Forest department) are also a major constraint to successful state 
led or bottom-up collective action.   
 The civic officials in the Municipal Corporation are not equipped to be sensitive 
or deal with the problem of rural water supply in the T-V water district.  
 Most importantly, the action situation highlights how the local institutional 
arrangements enable the regulator (in this case, the state Government of Maharashtra) to 
favour one user of water over another. This interpretation and use by the state 
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government of local water law to privilege Mumbai over other water users in the region 
is a significant finding from the above analysis. 
Another example of appropriation in the T-V water district is the case of water 
diversion from the Bhatsa multipurpose dam project (Mumbai Mirror, 2010). When the 
World Bank funded this project in the 1970s, no known allocation rules from rural to 
urban use were tied into the dam’s project design, though the Bank had advised state 
officials to manage water resources in a comprehensive multi sectoral way (World 
Bank, 1996:p.29; Binnie`s Consultancy 1971: p.35-38). The city of Greater Mumbai has 
benefitted from a diversion of water from the Bhatsa project since the mid-1990s 
(Chitale, 1994). This is unlike the Hyderabad context, where the World Bank (perhaps 
due to its knowledge of the local rights of farmers in the Andhra Pradesh context) 
ensured that it funded a dam project that had allocation rules written into its objectives. 
This ensured that the state government could follow these rules when it regulated the re-
allocation of water from rural to urban use (Celio et al, 2009). Not much is known 
whether such rules exist in the context of Mumbai. 
How do Ostrom’s design rules help us understand the working of institutions in 
this particular context? While the T-V water district has clearly defined watershed 
boundaries and Mumbai’s water resource boundaries are defined by the hydrometric 
area that coincide with these boundaries, the internal rules of allocation do not prevent 
the main user, in this case, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, from over- 
extracting water from the T-V water district (See Table 3 on dam ownership and Section 
5.3.3 in Paper three below on how ownership and water rights affect rules of allocation 
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Table 4.3: Large and Medium Dam Project Ownership and Water Rights 
Sources: Irrigation Department, Thane Irrigation Circle: http://www.seticthane.org/storage-position. Data 
on dam completion dates from National Register of Large Dams, 2014: 
 http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/NRLD%202014.pdf 2
Dam Name 
and year of 
completion
District Institutional 
Ownership of 
reservoirs
Urban Water 
Supply (to 
Mumbai and 
other cities in 
metro region)
Irrigation Industrial 
Water 
Supply
Hydro 
Power
Legal frame 
work that 
influences 
rights to 
stored water
Designed 
Live 
Storage in 
Mm3
Dhamani 
(Surya 
project) 
1987
Thane Irrigation 
Department of 
Maharashtra
☑ ☑ ☑ R 276.52
Kawadas 
(Surya 
project) 
1979
Thane Irrigation 
Department of 
Maharashtra
☑ ☑ ☑ R 9.96
Bhatsa 
1983 
Thane Irrigation 
Department of 
Maharashtra
☑ ☑ ☑ R, PA 942.10
U.Vaitarna 
1972
Nashik Irrigation 
Department of 
Maharashtra
☑  PA 331.31
Wandri 
1987
Thane Irrigation 
Department of 
Maharashtra
☑ R 35.94
Mulshi 
1927
Pune Tata (Pvt. 
Corporation)
☑  R 522.76
Andhra 
1916
Pune Tata(Pvt. 
Corporation)
☑  R 339.14
Walvan 
1916
Pune Tata (Pvt. 
Corporation)
☑  R 66.12
Shirawata 
1916
Pune Tata (Pvt. 
Corporation)
☑  R 191.28
Lonavala 
1916
Pune Tata(Pvt. 
Corporation)
☑  R 11.72
Modaksaga
r 
1954
Thane Mumbai 
Municipal 
Corporation
☑ PA 128.93
Tansa 
1892
Thane Mumbai 
Municipal 
Corporation
☑ PA 145.08
Vihar 
1860
Mumba
i
Mumbai 
Municipal 
Corporation
☑ PA 27.07
Tulshi 
1860
Mumba
i
Mumbai 
Municipal 
Corporation
☑ PA 8.05
Middle 
Vaitarna 
2012
Thane Mumbai 
Municipal 
Corporation
☑ PA 194.72
Barvi 
1978
Thane Maharashtra 
Industrial 
Development 
Corporation
☑ ☑ PA 180.03
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in the Mumbai-Thane region). The following excerpt from a water bylaw of the 
Brihanmumbai Municipal Act (1888) provides some insight into the power of the 
Corporation in the water district,   
The Municipal Commissioner of Mumbai may supply water from a 
municipal water-work to any local Authority or person without 
[Greater Mumbai] on such terms as to payment and as to the period 
and conditions of supply as shall be, either generally or specially 
approved by the corporation. (BMC Act, 1988, Provision 288, p.188) 
 The excerpt above tells us that the Municipality of Greater Mumbai has the sole 
authority to decide if other towns in the metropolitan region and villages in the T-V 
district can share water from the dams owned and accessed by the Mumbai Municipal 
Corporation. Given the mandate provided to the state government by the Irrigation Act 
of 1976 as a regulator, the decisions on disputes over water allocation and the 
construction of more dams in the T-V water district by the Central and State government 
has only affirmed these senior rights of Greater Mumbai. This means that not only do 
the local rules of allocation in place favour the Municipal Corporation’s rights to draw 
more water from the water district and build more reservoirs, but the higher level rules 
that are meant to balance that right of the Municipal Corporation with those of the rural 
communities have not been utilized optimally by the state government. 
The status of the T-V water district being located in a designated tribal area 
actually empowers its elected representatives to advocate for the interests of the villages 
and their basic water needs under constitutional provisions that protect tribal areas. 
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However, the interpretation of the local water rights structure and the priority accorded 
to Mumbai’s water demand coupled with the political clout of the city ensures that this 
mandate is never exercised. The situation is worsened by the absence of an impartial 
monitoring and enforcement mechanism at the regional or the state level. The 
Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority, a regulatory body, that was set up 
in 2002 to adjudicate disputes and allocate water entitlements, has a provision that 
subordinates its power to make decisions to state water policy, thus making the act 
ineffective in dealing with water disputes in a fair and transparent manner (Wagle et al., 
2012). 
A legal-institutional analysis of local water governance in the T-V water district 
reveals that the water laws of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation and the State 
government of Maharashtra rely on a combination of prior appropriation and riparian 
principles (Beaumont, 1943; BMC Manual, 1976); also see Table 4.3). The implication 
is that since the Mumbai Municipality was the first to harness water resources in the T-
V water district and reserve the watershed for its purposes, Indian water laws confer 
upon it a status for senior rights over local users and even other cities that share water 
from T-V reservoirs. However, the riparian influences in state and central water laws 
only confer usufruct rights to local water users in the T-V water district thus rendering 
their claims weaker in comparison to those of the city of Mumbai and other towns in the 
Mumbai metropolitan region (see Table 4.3). Table 4.4 summarizes the attributes of the 
governance system at play in the T-V water district. The reservation of the T-V water 
district in the 1950s for Greater Mumbai had a direct impact on both the water and land 
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rights of the local communities. While the implementation of the Bhatsa Multipurpose 
irrigation project sought to balance the water needs of the city and irrigation demand in 
this water district, the governance arrangements around the intersectoral sharing of 
water ended up turning out to be inadequate. The conferral of senior water rights to 
Mumbai from the Bhatsa project only reinforced this disparity since national water laws 
such as the Indian Easements Act only grant customary rights to local communities and 
no contestation of prior appropriation through the existing legal framework is possible 
In 1992, the Indian legal scholar, Chatrapati Singh critiqued the influence of prior 
appropriation principles in national water laws (like the Indian Easement Act) and local 
water laws. Singh pointed out that prior appropriation fails to recognize the rights or 
needs of new users for distribution and does not meet the demands of natural justice. 
The influence of prior appropriation principles that inform the senior water rights of the 
city of Mumbai in the T-V water district is primarily a vestige of the colonial period in 
India. It merely records and recognizes “political fact of acquisition or appropriation.”  
Table 4.4: Governance System and Outcome of Action Situations under Central, State and  
local water laws in northern and coastal Thane District. Sources: Following Bombay Municipal  
Corporation Act (1988), People’s Democracy (2006) and Pathak (2005). 
Governance System Attributes
National Legislation • Indian Easements Act, Statute of Limitations
State Legislation • Bombay Irrigation Act 1976
City Legislation • Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1988
Rules regarding Landholding 
and Forests
• Land Ceilings in place 
• Tenancy rights under Bombay Tenancy Act 
1953 
• Wildlife Protection Act governs Forest land 
• Eksali laws (one year leases to cultivate land 
in forest area)
Average size of landholding
• 0.2-0.5 hectares 
• Contestation around land in forest areas
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Furthermore, “it also provides no legal grounds for why the new settlers or users cannot 
appropriate water for their own beneficial use.” Moreover, “instead of providing a legal 
arena for conflict resolution, prior appropriation leaves the entire matter to political or 
Formal rights to land
• Not always assigned formally. 
• Land in forest areas under control of farmers 
(see Figure 4.5) 
• One Year leases for cultivation. 
• Formal Land Titles needed to access water 
from canals
Property rights to water
• Riparian Principles in areas serviced by canal 
irrigation 
• Prior Appropriation principles in Tansa-
Vaitarna water district 
• Rights to water under the Indian Easement 
Act 
• Bombay Irrigation Act
Ownership of irrigation and 
water supply dams
• Water in storages owned by different 
parastatal entities such as state Irrigation 
Department, public water agencies, state 
industrial corporations & Municipal 
Corporations. 
• Other River use regulated by state
Financing of rural water supply 
for domestic use
• State support; grants provided by the state 
government
• Water charges paid by village councils
Monitoring of relevant 
transactions
• Public sector irrigation corporation/Bombay 
Municipal Corporation
Conflict = resolution arenas
• Local Courts, High Court, District Council 
(Zilla Parishad)
Action situations around water Attributes
Maintenance of rural water 
supply systems. Water for 
domestic use in rural areas
• Poorly serviced infrastructure 
• Revenue often not shared by city with rural 
areas 
• Multiple agencies with conflicting agendas 
• Low revenue base of Village Councils due to 
their location in forest areas
Maintenance of irrigation in 
major and minor projects
• Poorly maintained conveyance systems; lack 
of co-operation amongst farmers; absence of 
participation by farmers 
• Arbitrary diversions of water to urban areas
Social Action and search for 
institutional alternatives
• Demands for rural water quotas 
• Struggles against displacement
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coercive methods” (Singh, 1992, p. 69-70). Many countries that share the common law 
framework with India have reformed their water laws to reduce the influence of 
riparianism and prior appropriation, South Africa being a case in point.  
4.11 Conclusion 
From a theoretical perspective, this case study on the Mumbai region has 
identified some of the potential common ground between the IE and the HG literature(s) 
on the theme of water sharing between large cities and their source areas. First, the 
findings could remind environmental geographers that bad rules are as much to blame 
as political power and the social and cultural hierarchy of different places in the uneven 
distribution of water. The paper identifies the influence of prior appropriation in the 
water bylaws as a major constraint in the ability of villages in the T-V water district to 
meet their basic water needs and their demand for irrigation quotas. Ostrom’s SES 
framework is a useful tool to identify the influence of rules that are implicit in the 
application of local water laws and policy. On the other hand, institutional economists 
could better appreciate the significance of geographical variables in the outcome of 
action situations. The demands of a large and growing urban centre, the forest ecology 
and the evolution of land, forest and water institutions are some of the enabling spatial 
factors that influenced the outcome of the action situation. An understanding of the 
politics of scale can thus be a helpful addition to the toolkit of institutional economists; 
they can be useful in telling us how geographical scales are socially produced in the 
course of action situations (Swyngedouw, 2004). In addition to the rules and the 
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geographical context of the water district, a third factor that overlaps geography and 
institutions is the fragmentation of water governance in the so called Mumbai 
hydrometric area. This is identified as another major impediment to ensuring a fair 
distribution of water between various regions. Recent research in the Mumbai context 
has argued that the presence of multiple Government agencies with overlapping 
functions has actually obstructed the effective implementation of decentralization and 
governance reform in several development schemes (UNCHS, 1993; Pethe et al., 2011). 
Reform of water governance in Mumbai could begin by confronting the archaic 
legal institutions on water in this growing mega-urban region. Reform also needs to 
address the fragmentation of metropolitan governance, and establish a more democratic 
arrangement that is representative of sectoral interests on water. Empirical evidence 
from Southern India that cites court judgements indicates that the state has an absolute 
right to regulate prior appropriation and use by legislation, and to change the 
entitlements and rules of allocation at its discretion (Vaidyanathan and Jairaj, 2009: p. 
7). However, such reform in local and regional water governance is possible only if it is 
realized that the power of the city over the water resources in the T-V water district and 
the rest of the hydrometric area is written in rules that were crafted for another time. 
Notes 
1. My reference here is primarily to developing countries. This lack of attention could 
be attributed to the focus on small-scale communities in the common pool resource 
literature. However, a classic in the institutional literature on this subject of the creation 
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of water districts that predates the common pool resource literature is Vincent Ostrom’s 
book Water and Politics, a study of Los Angeles (Ostrom, 1953). There are also several 
multidisciplinary studies on inter-sectoral water management and water conflict in 
development studies, political science, geography, but few of these have focused on the 
institutional and geographical implications of an exclusive water district for a fast 
growing city at the level of contextual detail as V. Ostrom’s 1953 case study of L.A. 
2. This debate from the 1940s is presented to further my argument that the Mumbai 
Municipality and the Metropolitan Planning Authority's present refusal to countenance 
any claims by rural communities towards water has been shaped considerably by 
engineers to take for granted that the water within the “hydrometric area” has been 
allocated to for urban and industrial use. The Mumbai Municipality has refused to take 
any lessons from its experience because as an organization, its behavioural habit and 
institutional disposition to serve urban interests are mutually entwined and reinforcing. 
Its stated commitment to serve urban demand completely ignores rural aspirations. This 
is despite legitimate rural claims for minimum water entitlements that even the state 
government has acknowledged. There is no official acknowledgement by the Mumbai 
Corporation or the State Government of Maharashtra of a water district, though water 
resources in the hinterland have been reserved for future urban utilization since the 
early 1960`s. Instead, the vague technical term ‘hydrometric area’ has been constantly 
referred to in the water plans and the metropolitan planning documents since the 1970s. 
The first reference to a hydrometric area was first made in Binnie’s consultancy report 
of 1971 for the Government of India on planning water resources in the Mumbai region. 
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A hydrometric area is generally referred to a grouping of catchments for monitoring and 
reporting purposes. My interviews with planning officials in Mumbai revealed that 
water in this entire hydrometric area is reserved for the city, though the reality is that the 
water rights situation in rural communities is far more complex and variegated with 
small, medium and large irrigation projects that continue to supply water and meet 
irrigation demand in some pockets (see Figure 4.3). 
3. Data on ownership accessed from Chitale Committee Report (1994); Maharashtra 
Irrigation Commission Report (1999); and Thane Irrigation Circle website. PA stands 
for prior appropriation, and R for riparian rights. This classification is based on 
analyzing water diversion data from various reports, and responses of State Government 
to legal affidavits challenging such diversions. Dams in T-V water district are reserved 
for Mumbai, which has senior rights to water. In the case of Bhatsa Dam prior 
appropriation and riparian rights overlap. The primary objective of Bhatsa Project is to 
meet demands of Greater Mumbai and other MMR towns, but water is allocated by 
Ministry of Irrigation based on local water rights, needs and scarcity. While this dam 
was built in a watershed reserved for Mumbai, farmers in Shahpur and Bhiwandi have 
rights to water from the reservoirs, and other cities in the metro region downstream of 
Bhatsa but upstream of Greater Mumbai also have developed rights to Bhatsa water. 
Tata stands for Tata Power Corporation. 
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5  The Paradox of Dispossession Amidst Plenty: 
 Social differentiation and Institutions in  
 Intra-Rural Water Conflict in the Mumbai- 
 Dahanu Region 
In his fictional 2011 novel, Dahanu Road, the Indo-Canadian author Anosh Irani 
shares with his readers the story of Dahanu, a fertile and scenic agricultural belt outside 
Mumbai, famous for its vegetables, fruits and orchard farms. Irani narrates the saga of 
the intertwined fates of feudal landlords and the agricultural labourers of the indigenous 
Warli tribe in a gripping account that combines drama with accounts of exploitation of 
the tribal community over the last century (Irani, 2010). Missing in Irani's dramatic 
account of violence and dispossession in Dahanu are three social and cultural 
contradictions that now characterize the landscape of this region outside Mumbai and 
the wider metropolitan region. 
The first and primary contradiction is the one between the city of Mumbai and 
its agricultural countryside to the north that finds growing expression in the increasing 
number of anti-dam and anti-urban water diversion movements. The second is between 
tribal and non-tribal commercial farmers around access to resources, where the former 
are at the receiving end of water and land grabbing practices of the latter. The third 
contradiction is the conflict between modern and traditional agriculture within Dahanu. 
This is a place where large commercial farmers are bringing in new technology for 
growing horticultural crops, whereas tribal farmers continue to cultivate domestic and 
traditional paddy varieties. These three contradictions increasingly characterize the 
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Mumbai- Dahanu region with the contestation around water at the very centre of this 
cultural landscape. 
This paper is an ethnographic account of how all these contradictions play out in 
the horticultural belt of Dahanu, Thane district in western India. Dahanu is located in 
northern Thane district in Maharashtra and borders the western Indian state of Gujarat 
to the north and Palghar to the south. It lies outside the boundaries of the Mumbai 
Metropolitan Region, but it has witnessed some industrial spill over from both Gujarat 
and Mumbai over the last three decades. Dahanu is one of the most fertile parts of 
coastal Maharashtra state and is also home to a diverse population of the local Marathi 
and Gujarati speaking communities. It is also the site of a new struggle over the 
construction of a new dam to meet water demand of towns in the Mumbai Metropolitan 
Region. Using an account of social relations around land and water in an agrarian 
context that enjoys the benefits from canal irrigation, this paper focuses on experiences 
of water scarcity in the context of intra-rural conflict on a canal system. It narrates the 
story of the uneven development of Dahanu's horticultural belt, where the promised 
benefits to the tribal Warli community from the Surya irrigation project have not been 
realised. The two central empirical themes of this paper are a study of social 
differentiation in the geographical context of an agricultural belt irrigated by canals and 
an examination of the role water technology and local land and water institutions have 
played in shaping intra-rural conflict over water. As a contribution to the literature on 
nature-society relations in the Mumbai region, this study of intra-rural conflict on the 
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canal system in Dahanu will build understanding of the claims of the fast expanding 
Mumbai Metropolitan Region on water from this particular irrigation project. 
Using a hybrid of two institutional approaches from political ecology, the socio-
technical and hydro-social, this paper explores the institutional and technological 
architecture of canal irrigation and the everyday working of irrigation systems in rural 
India with a focus on the experiences of farmers with water access and scarcity. This 
paper takes six main steps in investigating social differentiation and local water 
practices with a focus on the role of water and land institutions. The paper begins by 
examining the broad interface of local geography and institutions around water, canal 
systems, urbanization and agricultural land in the Mumbai-Dahanu and Konkan regions. 
Secondly, it presents an argument from the interdisciplinary environmental politics 
literature on how ethnography can be an important tool for researching the scalar 
dimensions of local water management. The paper then presents qualitative evidence on 
social relations in irrigated agriculture and shows that the practices around water use 
and grabbing by large commercial farmers during the irrigation season is an act of 
power meant to serve accumulation objectives. It later situates this evidence in the 
context of the institutional architecture around water rotations and the functioning and 
state of the canal system in the Surya command area. It also presents cartographic data 
on the transformation of the ecological and agricultural landscape, and the functioning 
and governance of the main canal system in the everyday context of the two villages. 
Finally, it presents the broader socio-ecological consequences of formal and informal 
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water practices in Surya project, the varied social response to irrigation and its 
implications for growing claims on Surya water from outside the project. 
5.1 A Hybrid Institutional Framework 
From within the discipline of human geography, this paper is closely informed 
by two theoretical approaches that have been influential in the critical literature on 
water and irrigation research. These are the socio-technical and the hydro-social 
frameworks. Both these frameworks have been useful in analyzing the interactions 
between social relations, technological systems around water and the everyday micro 
politics of water governance. The main argument of the hydro-social approach is that 
the “models of the hydrological cycle that dominate water science need to be combined 
or integrated with conceptualizations of social dynamics” (Mollinga, 2013, p.1-2). 
Theorizing the hydrological cycle as a hydro-social cycle is also an effort on the part of 
geographers to avoid the pitfalls of reductionist and depoliticized water resources 
management analysis (Mollinga, 2014, p. 1). Here, the theoretical contributions of 
critical geographers such as Jamie Linton, Erik Swyngedouw and Jessica Budds have 
been important. Working in diverse contexts and exploring the history of water science 
as in Linton’s case, this geographical scholarship has made compelling arguments about 
the importance of a critical analysis of state-led hydraulic paradigms and water 
governance practices that have become hegemonic in the twentieth century. The hydro-
social cycle’s key objective is “to capture the ontological complexity of water resource 
management as being structured, stratified and heterogeneous and in critical 
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perspectives, contested systems and processes animated by configurations of actors 
networked in a variety of social relations of power that shape their individual and 
collective agency” (Mollinga, 2013, p. 2). All three scholars have thus advocated for a 
process and human centred understanding of the water cycle. The socio-technical 
approach to water systems research has its origins in an influential argument from 
science and technology studies about the social construction of technology. Here, “the 
inter-relationship of technical/physical, organizational/managerial and socio-economic/ 
political control of water” are the central issue (Mollinga, 2013, p. 2). In the Indian 
context, the canal system can thus be seen as a socio-technical configuration of 
relationships of communities of irrigators with the outlet structures on canals which in 
turn are the important sites of contact and contestation between the system’s engineers 
and irrigators (Mollinga, 2010: p.424). The re-working of these canal systems in the 
local context and the experiences of farmers with this system and its managers 
constitute the main focus of this theoretical framework.  
Both the hydro-social and the socio-technical frameworks have been used by 
interdisciplinary scholars studying water conveyance systems such as canals in the rural 
context. Thus, within this body of critical water literature, the recent research of 
scholars like Peter Mollinga and Vishal Narain on canal irrigation systems in southern 
and western India is important (Mollinga, 2003; Narain, 2003). Influenced by this latter 
scholarship, this paper pays close attention to the institutional and technological 
architecture of canal irrigation and analyzes their functioning from both the socio-
technical and hydro-social perspectives. At the same time, it also tries to develop an 
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understanding of the working of irrigation systems in the everyday context of rural 
India keeping in view the cultural specificity of the local context with a focus on the 
experiences of farmers with water access and scarcity. The main theoretical argument of 
this paper is that these critical approaches drawn from human geography, when 
combined with an ethnographic study of the actual movement of water in a conveyance 
system, can be usefully deployed to distil the materiality of water and the manner in 
which it shapes and is in turn shaped by social relations. Thus, while I have much in 
common with recent researchers who have used these critical frameworks to analyze 
canal irrigation systems in the Indian context, I supplement the hydro-social and socio-
technical approaches to utilize a new emerging body of theoretical literature, namely the 
paracommons approach. 
5.2 The Paracommons Approach 
Conventional intellectual and policy understanding of the impact of irrigation on 
rural societies has been deeply influenced by the principle of seeing water in volumetric 
terms and the language of the hydrological cycle. As a result, most empirical work on 
water has not focused on the possibilities of water savings (Lankford, 2014). The socio-
technical and the hydro-social approaches to water are not devoid of this focus on 
seeing water in volumetric terms and in terms of water quotas. A potential problem with 
an exclusive application of these frameworks in the context of this particular case study 
is that they would be unable to analyze and account for the social and ecological 
possibilities that are created by water efficiencies at the farm level and the waste 
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resulting from the underutilization of water. This is because in their application to the 
Indian context, the socio-technical and hydro-social approaches have been mainly 
applied to water scarce contexts (Mollinga, 2003; 2013). At the same time, the socio-
technical approach retains some of its utility to irrigation in Dahanu. The 
implementation of canal technology based on the principles of productive irrigation was 
developed from certain knowledge and experience that came to this region from the 
interior of Maharashtra (WAPCOS, 1996). However, while useful in analyzing canal 
technology and its reception by farmers in this area, the socio-technical approach is 
unable on its own to grapple with the material properties of water and its abundant 
availability in Dahanu context. A scalar approach that incorporates the possibilities of 
the creation of surplus and unutilized water is more useful here. The hydro-social and 
socio-technical approaches are also somewhat constrained by their Marxian lens in 
analyzing consequences of such efficiencies. Similarly, even the Common Pool 
Resource (CPR) literature is seriously constrained by lack of attention to efficiency. 
 In an important revisionist contribution to our understanding of the commons 
and water in particular, Bruce Lankford has drawn attention to the lack of attention in 
the Common Pool Resource (CPR) and the political ecology (PE) literatures to the 
consequences of micro level efficiencies in the use of water resources and the potential 
future pathways of such efficiencies (see Table 5.8). Where do the savings made in our 
use of resources end up? The silence of both literatures on this subject has made 
Lankford coin the concept of the “paracommons.” The paracommons views “social 
ecological systems as being shaped by efficiencies and the material salvaged losses 
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from efficiency improvements, giving rise to a wider system of systems than is usually 
recognized” (Lankford, 2013, p. 17). Thus, according to Lankford “the idea of the 
‘paracommons’ is to view water in a different way. As yet-to-be conserved gains within 
a system, water movement and use can waste or ‘save’ previously wasted water. But 
where does that ‘saved’ water go? Who has claims to freed up water resources from 
improved technological or social practices?” (Lankford, 2013, p. 29). 
In this paper, I have merged the paracommons framework with its close 
attention to the assembling, use and diversion of saved (and wasted) water with the 
socio-technical and hydro-social’s emphasis on the complex, stratified, heterogeneous 
and political nature of water governance (Mollinga, 2013; Linton & Budds, 2014). The 
fact that two thirds of the land in the horticultural belt under study is comprised of 
vegetables irrigated by drip and sprinkler irrigation points to the substantial savings on a 
canal system where engineers continue to release water at rates intended for more water 
–consumptive paddy cultivation. 
5.3 Water Surplus and Abundance: Socio-Ecological  
 Transformation and the Commons in the Mumbai- 
 Dahanu Region 
5.3.1  The Surya Project: Geography and Political Economy of the 
 Project and Villages 
The Surya project is a large multipurpose dam that lies in the western parts of 
Thane district in Dahanu and Palghar sub-districts (see Figure 5.1). It is one of the few 
irrigation projects in the country designed to benefit more than 25,000 hectares of small 
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holder agricultural land in 64 villages, most of which belong to tribal agriculturists in 
the area of Dahanu and Palghar. Work on building the reservoirs started in the 1970s 
and work on the storages and the first phase of the canal work was completed in the 
early 1980s. 
The project witnessed several obstacles in its completion: while most of the 
irrigation potential was created and the dam and appurtenant gates were completed, the 
spillway gates could not be lowered to impound water due to a non-transfer of 
designated forest land to the project. Similarly, certain lengths of the canal system 
remained incomplete due to the non-transfer of forest land (see Figure 5.1 for 
incomplete parts of the canal system in Palghar). Canal building in this region presented 
another challenge. Given the narrow terrain between the Western Ghats and the Arabian 
Sea coast, canals often run close to rivers in the Konkan and they require better 
foundations. For this reason, canal building is often more expensive for the government 
to execute. In Figure 5.1, the area in brown indicates a belt in the command area where 
canal construction has been left incomplete. Given the incomplete canals and the 
underutilization of water from other parts of the project, surplus water from the 
reservoir is conveyed to Vasai-Virar and Mira Bhayandar in the MMR. 
For years, work on the reservoirs was stopped due to a lack of environmental 
clearances; then work on the canal system was done in phases. The most difficult phase 
was in parts of Dahanu, where the system had to be constructed through forests and 
ravines during the 1980s and early 1990s. This had implications for agricultural 
development in the entire Dahanu beneficiary area. 
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Figure 5.1: Map of the Surya Project’s Command Area in Dahanu and Palghar with Sakhare and    
   Vanai villages in focus (Base Map courtesy of the Irrigation Department, Government of  
   Maharashtra).  
 As this was a productive irrigation project aimed at double cropping, farmers in 
the horticultural belt benefited from the canal system only from the mid-1990s which 
led to farmers on the head of the main canal branch starting with an advantage of prior 
access. The late execution of the canal system did not stop enterprising horticultural 
farmers from Vadaval and other communities from buying or leasing inland from 
Brahmin landlords in the area. The land ceiling laws in India had still left Brahmins in 
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this part of Thane with surplus land. Parts of that surplus were distributed among tribal 
beneficiaries in 1976; however, a substantial part of the land was distributed by these 
landlords among their families to escape provisions of land ceiling laws (Ambasta, 
1998; Lobo, 2012). Given that laws prevented Vadavals from purchasing tribal land in 
the newly irrigated belt, a strategy was employed in Dahanu to lease land from Brahmin 
landlords. Land was purchased and leased strategically on the canal minor systems. The 
problem, however, lay in the complex system of land tenure that characterized 
agriculture in Thane. The presence of customary tenures adjoining the land of Surya 
River and the command area of the canal project was a major obstacle for Vadaval and 
other farmers who wanted to cultivate a second commercial crop in this area. An 
excerpt from a 1983 thesis by the University of Mumbai sociologist, Indra Munshi-
Saldanha, anticipates this transition from the dominant landholding class (Gujarati 
Vanias, Brahmins and North Indians) to the Vadaval caste: 
The Surya project will most definitely lower the land ceiling in this 
area around Vangaon and that has consequences for our landholdings. 
Also, once the water comes, the Vadaval caste has able horticulturists 
and they will be able to take advantage of the irrigation facilities to 
expand and will surely grow powerful. (Munshi-Saldanha, 1983, Ch 
2) 
 This passage from Munshi’s thesis is also a useful pointer to the rise of new 
classes and castes that occurs frequently within Indian agriculture and the importance of 
place oriented studies in understanding the local political economy of agrarian change. 
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It also affirms the recent findings of human geographers who have argued about the 
centrality of caste in initiating new waves of capitalist accumulation in farming and 
agro-industrial enterprises in rural and small town India (Chari, 2004; Gidwani, 2008). 
In my first fieldwork report after a month of interviews with farmer in February 
2008 on the Palghar Branch canal of the main Surya canal, I wrote, “I have seen 
dispossession of small and marginal farmers from water and common land, but I have 
also seen precious water resources squandered from the main canal systems into the 
natural drainage.” This particular canal branch irrigated a wide belt of fifteen villages in 
the low lying fertile black soil tract of western Dahanu (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). It was 
here and in the railway agricultural town of Vangaon that I saw beautiful homes 
belonging to upper caste orchard owners, SUVs and the Dahanu creek where it meets 
the Arabian Sea, full of canal water (described as runoff and wastage by local politicians 
and canal engineers) from the irrigation project.  
5.3.2 Water Institutions and the Historical Background of   
 Multipurpose Dam Projects in the Mumbai-Thane Region 
 To understand the performance of Surya project at the local level in the villages, 
it is necessary to place it in a broader geographical framework of water policy and 
practice. The interactions of institutions and the physical geography of watersheds and 
river basins have received cursory attention in theoretical and empirical literature on 
irrigation in human geography. However, Indian and South Asian social science 
literature on irrigation emphasize geography and local institutional evolution in the 
history of water technology (Bolding, Mollinga, & Van Straaten, 1995; Mosse, 2003). 
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Contributions from South Asian economic history have also dealt centrally with the co-
evolution of institutions and geography in the irrigation context. For instance, a 
contentious debate between Ian Stone and Elizabeth Whitcombe revolved around the 
role of institutional variables, colonial water governance and related geographical 
factors in the performance of canal irrigation systems in the colonial period in North 
India (Whitcombe, 1972; Ali, 1982; Stone, 1984). The uneasy co-existence of local and 
modern land institutions, evolution of class structures, and economic objectives of 
colonial government came into special focus in the historical literature. 
I will focus on a definition of institutions for the purposes of this case study and 
later examine the interface of water policy and laws with the local physical geography 
of Konkan region, where the Dahanu region and Surya project are located. Rules, laws, 
customs and every-day practices play an important role in water governance in the 
developing world within which decisions and policy choices in the water sector are 
made. As demonstrated by a solid body of empirical work on Indian irrigation, both in 
economic history and development studies, institutions have been central tools in our 
understanding of the scenario around water in the country. The significance of an 
institutional framework for this paper is further enhanced by the fact that India is a 
formal democracy with a well-defined constitutional division of powers between 
different levels of government concerning water. Indian rural society also has a 
somewhat rigid social structure based on caste and kinship, but has witnessed rapid 
social change in the last six decades. At the same time India also enjoys a vibrant civil 
society sector, which includes a strong presence at the grassroots and a focus on 
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environmental governance. From a constitutional angle, water policy is primarily a state 
subject in India, but the Central Government has a role to play as it often allocates funds 
to build large water storages and also intercedes in river disputes between different 
states. The influence of institutions on water policy and politics finds overwhelming 
expression in the presence of laws and statutes created in the colonial period which 
continue to influence the country’s water laws (Iyer 2009; Cullet, 2013). 
 In the north Konkan region, the institutional framework on water co-evolved 
with historical experience of what modern dam systems in the Western Ghats could 
achieve for agricultural and industrial development purposes. The main physiographic 
features of Konkan region, shared with Surya command area, include its location in a 
very high rainfall tract and the availability of untapped small perennial rivers. Amongst 
other factors, the water policy framework has been primarily influenced by the physical 
geography of the river basins which constitute the units around which long term water 
planning was done. The main physiographic features of the Konkan region, which it 
shares with the Surya command area, includes its location in a very high rainfall tract 
and the availability of untapped small perennial rivers. Amongst other factors, the water 
policy framework has been primarily influenced by the physical geography of the river 
basins which constitute the units around which long term water planning was done.  
 In the context of canal irrigation, such assumptions of water abundance in 
resource planning made planners ignore the geographical variation within Konkan 
region. They also ignored important geographical and institutional differences in land 
tenure and water rights between this region and the interior of Maharashtra. Other  
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factors ignored were the potential scarcity of suitable locations for reservoir and canal 
construction, and the implications of prior rights established by Mumbai’s claims on 
water for power and water supply, thus intensifying competing sectoral demands on 
watersheds in the region (Government of Maharashtra, 2005).  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Figure 5.2 - Existing and proposed new dam projects in the Mumbai-Thane region and the 
Mumbai hydrometric area over the next two decades (Base Map courtesy of the Irrigation 
Department, Government of Maharashtra). 
Emphasis on tapping “open” river basins in this region for both irrigation and 
urban development continues to be the single most important variable that influences 
present day water policy and the planning of new dam projects in this region 
!209
(Government of Maharashtra, 2005) (see Figure 5.2 on new proposed projects). All the 
proposed projects in Figure 5.2 (identified by black circles with “P”), including the 
transfer of water from Damanganga basin to new reservoirs, are being planned to meet 
urban water demand from the Mumbai Metropolitan region. Given these factors that 
emerge from the local physical geography, rules around water management and sharing 
between different sectors have had a complex evolution. They have also been deeply 
influenced by the local rights around land and water, the physical geography, the agro-
ecological setting and the water policy frameworks of Maharashtra state government. 
5.3.3 Inter-Sectoral Rules and the Local Context: A Geographical-
 Institutional Profile 
As far as the structure of rules are concerned, while the institutional evolution of 
water laws in the North Konkan context continues to be largely informed by state water 
policy and broader national and state laws, the priority given to local water rights within 
Indian water law has also had its influence on rules around water allocation. The North 
Konkan has a governance system that is largely characterized by administrative 
decisions on water allocation and transfers with the absence of any kind of voluntary or 
market mechanism. Some factors that have become more important over others in the 
last six decades are the local water rights regimes that were created with the expansion 
of the city of Mumbai’s access to watersheds in north eastern Thane from the 1950s, 
and the reservation of entire river basins for metropolitan use in the 1970s (Government 
of Maharashtra, 1981). Other rights were created largely as a result of local water 
development for farmers on small irrigation projects in several parts of Thane and 
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Raigad districts. In addition, the construction of canal projects from the 1970s and the 
rights conferred to farmers by priority of use in irrigated agriculture, a result of the 
riparian influence in Indian water law, have also created local rights for these rural 
populations (Chitale Committee Report, 1993; Government of Maharashtra, 2005; 
MMRDA, 1996; Mumbai High Court, 2006). 
 Additional rights were also created by new dam projects and water sharing 
agreements between towns, cities and villages in and around the Mumbai metropolitan 
region (Paper Two of this thesis, Sivaramakrishnan, 2014, p. 68; Rao, 2015, p. 166). 
The continued access of urban areas to rural water storages exists as long as their use 
complies with the priority accorded in Indian water law to continued beneficial use of 
water, such as an urban jurisdiction’s entitlement to quotas related to domestic water 
use. Such institutional arrangements are regulated by the state government; however 
water re-allocation decisions are also closely informed by the state of local rights, water 
demand and utilization, and the local state’s attempts at balancing rural and urban 
political pressures. 
However, there can be some variation within the rules that inform rural-urban 
transfer of water (an increasingly contentious subject in this region since the early 
1990s). Here, the initial project objective of different multipurpose dams adds an 
important layer to the institutional water governance framework in this region. Large 
dams, such as the Bhatsa dam in Shahpur in north eastern Thane district, were 
constructed for both agriculture and urban use, though priority of access in the case of 
the Bhatsa was accorded to Greater Mumbai, with no known rules of allocation between 
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that city and other urban and rural settlements during times of scarcity (Government of 
Maharashtra, 1964). There are other dam projects which were planned purely for urban 
use, such as the various projects on the Vaitarna river for Greater Mumbai, and some 
others like the Surya project, which is the focus of this case study, that were planned for 
growing a second post monsoon crop, but are now a major source of water to the 
metropolitan region. Smaller reservoirs are mostly devoted to agriculture, the condition 
being that they continue to be utilized by farmers. Yet, there are a few examples of 
small reservoirs (Usgaon dam in Bhiwandi) being constructed for the purpose of 
irrigation and then having their water diverted to urban and industrial use on grounds of 
underutilization. The water rights structure for the farming population utilizing water 
from canal systems is largely riparian. While this ensures that the rights of farmers (with 
clear land titles) who access water from reservoirs for canal irrigation are guaranteed, it 
does not mean that water quotas for irrigation in the overall system cannot be diverted 
for urban use. Water re-allocation (or diversion) can occur if the construction of canal 
systems for projects has not been completed, as Indian water law gives the state 
government the right to divert surplus water from reservoirs for beneficial urban use 
(Mumbai High Court 1996). 
Another factor that influences the institutional architecture around water in this 
region is the ownership of reservoirs. This adds another complex layer to water 
governance. Some dams and storages in this region are owned by the Mumbai 
Municipal Corporation, giving it priority of access. Others, such as the Bhatsa and 
Surya, are owned by the Irrigation Department, giving the State Government more 
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influence in water allocation between different water users. The presence of a city like 
Mumbai and a fast expanding metropolitan region with senior water appropriation 
rights further complicates this picture and places urban and industrial water demand in 
direct competition, sometimes even overt conflict with farming communities in the 
region (see Paper Two of this dissertation). In such cases, the latter have little recourse 
for contesting rural-urban water transfers except to challenge such (often arbitrary) 
diversions in local courts or through social protest. The combined effects of institutional 
variation and the geography of water storage and use have also meant that in the 
absence of effective functioning of autonomous regulatory mechanisms, such as the 
Maharashtra Water Resources Regulation Act (MWRRA), to provide any countervailing 
influence the State Government plays an important role in adjudicating water disputes 
between jurisdictions (Wagle, Warghade, & Sathe, 2012; Paper Two). 
Canal technology has also played a major role in institutional evolution and 
directly affects the experiences of rural and urban communities with water for 
agricultural use. Some empirical work on the Konkan done locally has examined the 
role canal technology plays in the utilization of water and the shaping of water 
institutions. This paper will review the arguments from this literature next. In the 
empirical section following this section, I examine the implications of this technology 
for water politics and policy in this region. 
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5.3.4 Institutions, Technological Constraints and Canal Water  
 Management in the Konkan 
In the case of the operation and functioning of the rural canal systems in the 
North Konkan, this paper argues that the availability of water “on demand” on canal 
systems in irrigation projects in the region makes it imperative to examine the actual 
experiences of farming communities with water access from a perspective that is 
qualitatively different from the one that has been used in the canal irrigation literature in 
India. The projected availability of water to grow a second paddy crop in irrigation 
systems in the Konkan itself means that there is sufficient water available on demand 
(WAPCOS, 1996). The design and construction of the canal system has also factored in 
the abundant availability of water (WAPCOS, 1996). The resulting canal technology 
which includes the design of irrigation outlets and the local rules of water management 
on the canal system are closely influenced by the planned cropping pattern during the 
execution of the project, viz. paddy. Experiences with irrigating paddy have produced 
mixed results. In this regard, research done by local geographers and economists on 
water technology and practices in the north Konkan provides some useful insight. A 
survey by geographers on the canal system of the Vandri medium reservoir, a project 
next to the Surya in Thane district, points to the conveyance systems and outlet 
structures. Here, canals designed to irrigate paddy influence rules around water 
rotations on the main canal level and through the canal minors to agricultural fields. 
These rules which involve providing water for a second paddy crop with a weekly 
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rotation and flow type of irrigation are hard to change once the canal systems have been 
constructed (Gore & Phadke, 1996). 
The heavy flow of water through the canals that were originally designed to 
irrigate paddy became a disincentive in growing less water intensive crops in the Vandri 
project. So, while farmers continue to have notional rights over the water of the project, 
lower water utilization as a result of the design of the conveyance system and the non-
implementation of crop zoning rules resulted in massive wastage and underutilization of 
water. This technological-institutional constraint will be explored in the empirical 
section of the paper. 
Thus, in addition to the ownership and other organizational dimensions of water 
management, the technical design of irrigation systems and the tailoring of water 
rotation rules based on canal designs have created a challenging institutional obstacle 
for reform in water governance in this region. The findings affirm the claims of local 
irrigation engineers in the Konkan that the geography of the region, the difficult 
adaptation of canal projects to the local environment and the social relations within 
rural communities also make co-operation around water on village canal systems a 
formidable challenge (Sinchan, 2000). This does not mean that such claims by the 
bureaucracy should not be critically analyzed, as relations between social classes in 
agriculture are being constantly re-produced in the context of an unequal agrarian 
structure in villages that are still dominated by large rentier land holding classes and 
farming entrepreneurs (Ramachandran & Swaminathan, 2014). 
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5.4 Method and Scale: Justifying an Ethnography of the 
 Commons  
The best methods for understanding the social, cultural and collective 
implications of the commons might also be elastic and diverse. First, as 
landscapes change through state intervention, urbanization and 
globalization, the units of analysis to study the commons also change. We 
cannot decide on how to study the commons without understanding what 
led to the definition of commons in our analysis. (Rao & Appadurai, 
2008:p.165-166) 
When I started my field research on the access of farmers to water on the canal 
system in Sakhare village in Surya project area, the field research quickly turned 
towards a parallel investigation of dispossession from land being primarily experienced 
by small and marginal tribal farmers. The scale of analysis also shifted given that water 
from this project was claimed by a new group of farmers outside the official beneficiary 
area of the project in coastal Dahanu. Another claimant to the irrigation water in Surya 
project that emerged during the course of my field research was the fast urbanizing 
Vasai-Virar sub-region outside Greater Mumbai. Both new agricultural and urban 
claimants to the water of Surya project cited water wastage by tribal farmers. Thus, the 
flows of water became salient in a context that had already come to be increasingly 
characterized by the conversion of resources from sustaining agriculture to increasingly 
enabling the spatial expansion of suburban and peri-urban areas of Mumbai. 
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In focusing ethnographically on relationships between water, society, land tenure 
and geographical scale on resource access, this paper takes on a methodological 
challenge posed by social anthropologists who argue that the commons should be 
treated as an analytical and political construct rather than as a mere physical category 
(Rao & Appadurai, 2008, pp. 165-166; Linton & Budds, 2014).  
First, in terms of the physical space of the canal systems in villages in the 
horticultural belt, I argue that a study of the commons in rural areas should be part of a 
larger relational analysis examining impacts of regional processes on a local unit (Rao 
& Appadurai, 2008, p. 166). 
A second justification for a study of the commons that incorporates a scalar 
perspective is the multidimensional relationship between state territorialities and local 
resource rights in rural India (Agrawal & Sivaramkrishnan, 2000). The variety of 
institutions and the specific nature of local ecologies and land tenures in Dahanu and 
Thane make study of the impact of canal irrigation on a local unit such as a village an 
interesting methodological challenge for social scientists. Ethnography helps us 
appreciate the nature of relationships and histories around resources between state and 
communities in such contexts. It also helps emphasize the penetration of markets and 
the geographical interactions of industrial-urban forces with agriculture in rural areas in 
the context of rapid social and environmental change in Asia (McGee, 1995; Li, 2007). 
Therefore, the choice of ethnography is not simply another attempt to make 
claims about the importance of researching complexity in resource management, but is 
more of an attempt at a real engagement with the scalar dimension of a resource like 
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water. The allocation of water across crops to different sectors of the local economy, and 
the contrary experiences of abundance and scarcity of water in this region, make the 
observations that follow from an ethnographic route even more valuable. From the point 
of view of producing an ethnography of the commons in contemporary rural India, the 
importance of a holistic investigation is also reinforced by a scenario where agricultural 
livelihoods remain tethered to access to local commons in rural India (Gidwani, 2008). 
Moreover, unequal land distribution and uneven access of tribals and lower caste poor 
to agricultural land continue to be central policy issues for agrarian researchers in the 
country (Menon & Vadivelu, 2006; Ramachandran & Swaminathan, 2014). So, rather 
than dismissing the village as a unit of study, I have attended to social and ecological 
flows between villages and the external world while also furthering an analysis of micro 
water politics by undertaking agrarian research in two villages (Gupta, 2005). 
5.5 The Politics of Unequal Water Distribution and  
 Accumulation in Horticulture: Anarchy, Location, Water 
 Grabbing and Dispossession 
The water literature in political ecology does not take into account the centrality 
of land in the actual working of the socio-technicality in water systems (Mollinga, 
2003). A polarized discourse between Marxist scholars who work on agrarian change 
and critical political ecologists who research the politics and political economy of canal 
management is responsible for this disjuncture (Mollinga, 2010). The focus on flows of 
water and the multi scalar implications of water management in a local context in this 
study of canal irrigation make it imperative that this paper focuses on the consequences 
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of uneven agricultural development in the Surya project. Thus, the theoretical frames of 
socio-technicality and the hydro-social cycle (outlined above) become useful here. At 
the same time, a power centred view of technology and social relations that characterize 
both these approaches do not produce sufficiently insightful analysis on how the 
instruments of power in water systems actually work in practice in the Indian context. 
Besides being selective in their conceptualization of power, socio-technicality and 
hydro-socaility paradigms can produce an over-socialized explanation of ecological 
problems on water systems and do not incorporate the technological dynamism of 
farmers and water users. Here, my disagreement with the literature on water in 
geography stems from an overemphasis in that literature on a Marxian and Foucauldian 
definition of power to the exclusion of studying institutions at the level of organizations. 
Practices, habits and attitudes (Hodgson, 2006) that often remain deeply entrenched at 
the level of very centralized Irrigation Departments reinforce and exacerbate social 
differentiation and social inequities in a hierarchical context like India. Both 
frameworks also do not throw sufficient light on the movement of water across scale. 
Hence, in this paper, the socio-technical and hydro-social frameworks are in 
effect combined with the paracommons approach so as to “follow the water” (Lankford, 
2013). The central findings discussed in this section are the inability of the Irrigation 
Department to adapt to local needs for water, the obstacles posed by social relations and 
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Figure 5.3 - Map of the Horticultural belt that includes Sakhare, Vanai and other villages. The area in 
green indicates water logging as a result of water runoff and is taken from the Indian Government’s WRIS 
data source (Base Map courtesy of the Irrigation Department, Government of Maharashtra). 
local geography to efficient utilization and the scalar dimensions of water wastage and 
underutilization. Thus, the local politics of water becomes central, but in keeping with 
the ethnographic thrust of this paper, the political and social frame of the study extends 
far beyond the unit of analysis in Dahanu as it tries to follow the ‘wasted’ water.  
My findings that follow here are from the two villages of Sakhare and Vanai of 
Surya project located on Palghar branch canal (see Figure 5.3). The data is highly  
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Table 5.1 - Gross Command, Culturable and Irrigable Area in Dahanu’s Horticultural Belt (in hectares) 
Source: Draft Project Report, Surya Project (2005) 
 Table 5.2: Total Area (in hectares) under command in various administrative sub-divisions of 
 Surya project 
Source: Draft Project Report, Surya Project (2005) 
specific to the agro-ecological context of this part of the command area of the Surya 
project (see Table 5.1 on the extent of cultivable irrigable area in the horticultural belt). 
I state this at the very outset because there were other parts of the command area where 
I witnessed lesser social differentiation and inequality in access to water. Parts of 
Palghar in the Surya Command area (see Figure 5.1), for instance, had water user 
associations comprised largely of tribal farmers using water from the project. While my 
findings are highly specific to the horticultural belt of Dahanu, research findings on 
social differentiation, the functioning of water institutions, and the problem of 
No. Village Gross Command
Culturable 
Command Irrigable Area
1 Sakhare 260 130 130
2 Govane 408 204 204
3 Kapashi 200 100 100
4 Dehane 300 150 150
5 Vanai 800 400 400
6 Dabhale 478 239 239
7 Khambala 120 60 60
Total 2566 1283 1283
Name of sub-
division
Gross Command 
area
Culturable 
Command area Irrigable Area
Jawhar 60 30 30
Dahanu 12730 6111 6111
Palghar 17757 8555 8555
Total 30547 14696 14696
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underutilization of canal water (first pointed out to me by the engineers interviewed in 
2006 and 2008) resonate throughout the command area. However, the causes of such 
underutilization of water vary between different areas of the project. 
5.5.1 Planned Anarchy 
There is enough water wasted into the Arabian Sea from the release in 
the Surya irrigation project in Dahanu during the canal rotations that 
could last suburban Mumbai's demand for six months. This is a project 
as large as the Bhatsa. The local Irrigation Department is as 
incompetent as it is corrupt, no one knows what is going on with this 
project and the maintenance of canals is very poor. It irrigates far less 
agricultural land and its performance is a symbol of waste and 
bureaucratic sloth - Large Commercial Farmer. (Interview with Mr. 
Mistry, June 2008) 
It is not unusual to see chaos in Indian canal irrigation systems, as the presence 
of democracy and populism in rural India often leads to the Irrigation Department 
adapting to the wishes of local elected politicians. The release of water into the canals in 
Dahanu followed a prescribed pattern of paddy cultivation that catered to its 
predominantly tribal population. However, the paradox was that a significant portion of 
the land under this specific canal was also under vegetables, which required less water. 
The horticultural farmers from the Vadaval caste had adapted to these cultivation 
conditions by using wells, but the Irrigation Department continued to release water for 
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paddy. When Mistry, a large commercial farmer in Dahanu shared his frustration about 
the volume of wasted water in April 2008, I was into my fourth month of research in the 
command area of the Surya irrigation project. I had also been a firsthand witness of the 
waste of water and corruption around the irrigation project (see Paper One). However, 
the kind of graft around this important irrigation project outside Mumbai was one in 
which the upper caste Hindu-Vadaval and Parsi commercial farmers (both of whom 
represent the dominant faction of agrarian capital in this region) were complicit. Some 
of these early interviews and close interactions with the richer sections of the farming 
communities and engineers in the spring and summer of 2008 set the stage for my 
survey research in both the first and second villages. This was also a time when the 
canal rotations on the Surya Right Bank Canal system were close to an end in May 2008 
and farmers in the region had started preparing their fields for the monsoon (My field 
research had started in December 2007 and continued until September 2008). Some of 
the preliminary observations of the movement of water in the canal system in the 
villages yielded findings of a paradoxical nature. I had witnessed tribal farmers 
accessing water from wide streams at the tail end of the canal minors complaining of 
water scarcity and water grabbing by the large farmers on the middle reaches of the 
canal minor system. However, what was consistent about the picture was the quantity of 
water drained into rivulets and streams in the region and the haphazard organization of 
water rotations and constant violations of rules on the main canal system. Canal 
rotations were typically organized according to a weekly schedule between November 
2007 and May 2008. Water rotations would start on Sunday and would stop on Friday, 
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to begin a week later. On the main canal level, water would first be released to the tail 
of the main canal system in Palghar and a day later the gates in Dahanu would be 
opened (tail-head rotation). This was done to ensure fairness on the main canal system. 
A prescribed schedule of water rotation was advertised in local newspapers prior 
to the beginning of the rotations in November. Yet this schedule was violated in April 
and May of 2008 when the canal system broke down due to poor maintenance, and 
political pressure came from local large farmers wanting to harvest their produce in 
May and water to stop flowing through the canals. While, on paper, farmers had to 
submit applications to the local Irrigation Department for water, in practice no 
applications were made. Moreover, while tail-head rotations were implemented at the 
main canals level, no such rotation was practiced at the canal minors level. When I 
asked engineers in Vangaon why there was no policy of rotation on canal minors they 
said “this was an Adivasi area and there was no need for rotations on the canal minors.” 
The reasons for non-implementation of rules below the outlet were attributed to 
the dysfunction of local society and termination of the command area development 
programme funded projects that were focused on re-engineering the canal minors. 
However, closer observation of the canal system yielded interesting sociological clues. 
While it was true that water drained very quickly due to the design of the system and 
the Konkan topography, it was also true that both the rules and conditions on the canals 
below the outlet and on the main canal level were dictated by the large Vadaval 
horticultural farmers. Thus, while the quantity of water released into the main canal 
system was clearly meant to cultivate paddy, keeping in mind local tribal interest in that 
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crop, there was no effort by engineers to regulate water usage or even mediate water 
disputes between farmers. When I started my interviews in Sakhare, the rotations and 
water discharge had clearly not taken account of new cropping patterns that had evolved 
in the horticultural belt since 2000. This was in keeping with early productive irrigation 
objectives of the Surya irrigation project where the entire project design was developed 
and implemented to cultivate a second paddy crop and boost agricultural production. 
A report of the Surya Irrigation project published by the project two years before 
my fieldwork states: 
As actual water utilization is comparatively less and storage available 
in the reservoir is more, the rules of canal operations are not strictly 
followed and water for irrigation is released mainly as per demand of 
farmers. (Draft Project Report. Restructured Command Area 
Development Programme, 2007) 
A twenty year old report prepared by Water and Power Consultancy Services 
(WAPCOS) involving a technical survey and socioeconomic study of Surya Command 
area warned about possible loss of control over water use soon after the canal system 
was in place in Dahanu, and two years after rotations began on the main canal system: 
The water resources stored and available in the reservoirs are much 
more than needed in the field. The water is supplied as desired by the 
cultivator. Though the system is being operated on a demand basis 
and the numbers of rotations are fixed in advance and water is being 
supplied to the sanctioned area, there is no rotation or control at the 
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outlet level. The irrigation is mostly “field to field.” (WAPCOS, 1996, 
pp. 6-11) 
The design and construction of a canal system that was designed to irrigate a 
second crop of paddy, the absence of any institutional intervention below the level of 
the main canal, the poor management of water at the main level, the failure to account 
for the dynamism of farming entrepreneurs in the horticultural belt and their success at 
changing cropping patterns, all remained unincorporated into local water policy and 
practices in the project. The unanswered question here is: What were the reasons for 
such mismanagement of water? And was water the only object of politics here? 
The concept of ‘water control’ in the canal irrigation literature has now posited 
that technical/physical, organizational/managerial and socio-economic/political control 
of water are internally related (Mollinga, 2013). In the Surya project, engineers I spoke 
to told me about political pressure applied on them by the tribal MLA of Dahanu to 
make the main canals appear full of water. While they were aware that the consequence 
of releasing water into the main canal system for paddy was clearly not working, they 
wanted to ensure the MLA was kept satisfied. “The real problem here is not the 
availability of water, but that of social relations between the Vadavals and non-tribal 
farmers in the villages,” explained a junior engineer in a candid moment. “We cannot 
manage that turf because it is not our responsibility.” This deliberate separation of 
technical and social realms of irrigation by engineers speaks to the very heart of the 
socio-technical critiques of centralized modern canal systems (Mollinga, 2010: p. 424). 
By consigning the social and technical into separate realms of water management, the 
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engineers failed to acknowledge the political embeddedness of large irrigation systems 
and their management. 
5.5.2 Phase 2000-2008: Settler Farmers Increase their Grip on Land 
and Water  on the Canal Minors 
A broad literature on canal irrigation has focused on the main canal level and 
less on the experiences of farmers who enjoy the benefits of surface irrigation within 
villages on canal minor systems (for notable exceptions, see Mollinga, 2003; and 
Narain, 2003). Most analyses of canal irrigation have also neglected to analyze and 
understand the interface of water conveyance technology, the behaviour of users, and 
the institutional organization of irrigation. More recently, a critical lens has been 
extended to canal technology and the degree of social and technical organization needed 
for the successful working of such water conveyance systems at local levels (Mollinga, 
2003). However, even this literature is not without blind spots. The relationship of land 
and water institutions is not well understood; moreover, the geographical and scalar 
dimensions of local water management are also poorly researched. The findings in this 
section point to the centrality of the land-water nexus in villages under study. From both 
theoretical and empirical standpoints, that nexus is emphasized in this study because it 
reminds water researchers studying other contexts that land titles/ownership and actual 
access and control over land also play a key role in ensuring fair and equitable 
entitlement to water in rural contexts. Also, in the micro context of conflict on a rural 
water conveyance system, water may not be the only resource of interest; other 
resources may also be up for grabs. For example, appropriating water may serve a 
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particular class interest in re-ordering of agricultural accumulation strategies. 
Appropriation of water could also help richer sections of the farming community re-
work land ownership and access to their own advantage and the disadvantage of the 
rural poor on a canal system (Mehta, 2012, p. 203). By focusing mainly on access to 
water within political ecology and neglecting the interactions of land and water 
institutions in the agricultural landscape, one might be missing a vital part of the puzzle 
in the local politics of water in rural areas of developing countries. 
Sakhare village’s location at the junction of two large main canals and the 
presence of two distributary canals and three minors with a weekly rotation system of 
water makes it seem like a village that should be well endowed with water and in 
principle should enjoy benefits of surface irrigation evenly (see Figures 5.3 & 5.4). 
However, the presence of three distinct caste groups in one village, the leasing of land 
by settler farmers, and presumptions lying at the heart of engineering large dam projects 
and conveyance systems qualify the anticipation of an even distribution of benefits from 
irrigation. The population of Sakhare is 2,700 people and more than ninety percent of its 
inhabitants are from the tribal Warli community, while the rest are from Macchi caste. 
There are about 600 households in the village. Vanai village is of equal geographical 
size, with 2,600 people, mostly tribals, and also has about 600 households (see Table 5.3 
below for data on land use for both villages before surface irrigation). 
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Figure 5.4 - Land use in Sakhare and Vanai Villages 1971-2001. 
Source: Census of India, 1971; 1981; 1991; and 2001 
In Figure 5.5, the canal layout of the village command for Sakhare is further 
divided into sub-commands named “chaks” (see Chambers, 1990, pp. 54-59 for the 
origins of irrigation planning under chaks in India). The chaks are organized on the 
basis of the location of outlets and gates that are used to apportion the water equally 
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amongst users. Most of these sub-commands and the organization of irrigation within 
villages in the Surya Command area were developed during the period of the Command 
Area Development Authority (CADA, 1995-2001) where the objective was to 
implement a rule based rotation of water below the outlets. Under this principle, the  
   Figure 5.5 - Map of the Distributary, Canal Minor and Sub-Minor Network and the chaks (village sub-     
    commands) in Sakhare Village (Base Map courtesy of the Irrigation Department, Government of  
    Maharashtra). 
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tails of the sub commands in the village get water first and it is later released at the 
head. This rules based rotation of water was also intended to closely co-ordinate with 
water requirements of the farmers and the cropping patterns within every village.  
The lack of community experience with irrigation in this part of Maharashtra 
with canal irrigation made it imperative for the Government to implement the CADA 
programme here. However, when I started fieldwork in 2007, CADA had been 
withdrawn from the Surya Irrigation project amidst allegations of serious impropriety 
and misuse of development funds. During my fieldwork, I noticed that of the outlets and 
the gates regulating the flow between fields had fallen into a state of disrepair and water 
measurement devices on the system were missing. With the dissolution of CADA, a 
state of anarchy had gripped water management in Sakhare village. 
5.5.3 Canal Location and Land Grabbing:  
 The Centrality of  Social Relations 
Conventional analysis of irrigation systems have focused on access to water 
along the various reaches of the canal system. However, in contrast to protective 
irrigation systems in Southern India (Mollinga 2003), the experiences of water scarcity 
in the canal system of the Surya project were marked at the middle and tail reaches of 
the system. At the same time, water access followed the acquisition and subsequent 
fencing of land by Vadaval farmers at all reaches of the canal minor system. 
Consequently, water grabbing followed the grabbing of land in some instances. In a few 
cases Vadaval farmers had also acquired agricultural land at the head reaches of canals 
(see Figures 5.4 and 5.8). However, given the heavy flow of water, tribal farms 
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adjoining Vadaval farms at the head of the canal minor system (unlike those on the 
middle and tail sections) did not face any serious disadvantage regarding water access. 
At the head of the canal minors, changes in land use that were a result of a 
second irrigated paddy crop produced expectations amongst some tribal farmers about 
the possibilities of cultivating other crops. “There was great joy in the village when the 
canal water came” said Gehla, my first contact in the village. On other sections of the 
head of the canal system, during my interviews, most tribal farmers shared with me 
their interest in growing mostly traditional varieties of paddy. “It is our staple,” said one 
farmer. “I don’t care what others want from irrigation, I want to continue to grow paddy. 
A second crop of paddy helps us in providing subsistence for our households. We have 
to survive and cannot invest in horticulture like the Vadavals, it is risky. Besides, they 
have more experience in growing vegetables and fruits, we don’t.” A second tribal 
farmer on the head of the canal system pointed to the heavy water discharge from the 
minor branches of the gravity canals and said “We cannot grow anything but paddy 
here, because of the flow of water. Moreover, our land plots are small.” The average 
size of a tribal family plot is 0.5 ha in this area. 
 Both tribals and Macchis (a local caste in Sakhare village) who were 
numerically dominant at the head of the canal system consistently pointed out the heavy 
flow of the water that compelled them to grow paddy. “I did not take a canal irrigated 
crop this year, as we have to leave the land fallow this year,” said another farmer. 
Another tribal farmer pointed out to the fact that most members of his household were 
not interested in farming and he was himself employed on industrial estates in Palghar. 
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Farming families at the head of the canal system, being close to the road to the railway 
station in Vangaon, were more likely to have diversified outside agriculture. 
Tribal and Macchi farmers in Sakhare at the head of the canal minors pointed 
out how they had tried to get the Irrigation Department to do something about the heavy 
flow of water to their fields. “This is how it will stay, we cannot re-design the canals for 
you was the answer we got from the engineers,” pointed out another farmer. Several 
tribal farmers in Sakhare at the head of the canal minor also narrated to me how they 
had signed a joint written petition to the Irrigation Department to stop the canal 
rotations for a year in 2005 so that they could do some maintenance work on the field 
channels and also nurture the soil so that it could regain its nutrients. However, the 
Irrigation Department did not relent. “It is the demands of the Vadaval horticultural 
farmers in this belt that always prevail, we don’t matter, though it was the tribal 
community that made a sacrifice for the Surya project and lost land in the process.” 
Due to the undulating terrain, small land holdings, high intensity of rainfall, and 
terraced fields, the traditional pattern of canal irrigation below the outlet in the Konkan 
is “field to field” irrigation (WAPCOS, 1996). The conventional open channel 
distribution network that is present in the interior parts of Maharashtra does not work 
well in the Konkan and maintaining field channels has proved to be a costly and 
repetitive operation for local farmers. This mode of irrigation is a cause for the area 
irrigated per unit of water to be far lesser in the Konkan region. It was one of the 
reasons why farmers could not grow crops other than rice which was also a cause for 
underutilization of water (as rice had a limited market and not all farmers were 
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interested in growing a second paddy crop). Moreover, this also means that co-operation 
between farmers growing different kinds of crops becomes a challenge. 
Shiva and Ganpat, two tribal farmers at the head of the canal minor system who 
also had land plots on middle reaches of the canal system, noted an absence of co-
operation between farmers around water throughout the canal system in the villages. “I 
tried bringing farmers together, but it did not work. Some farmers have lost land to the 
Vadaval farmers; some others don’t trust each other because there is a lot of contestation 
and conflict around land. Some don’t even know where their land is located,” pointed 
out Shiva. 
 Ganpat who also had agricultural land on the middle reaches of Direct Minor 2 
spoke of how the field to field irrigation (a system where water courses have to be 
developed between fields and channeled by farmers) needed more cooperation between 
farmers. “Given that water courses had to be developed by farmers due to the nature of 
the soil and the quick run-off of water, the importance of building relationships cannot 
be underestimated,” said Ganpat. “However, while we developed such mechanisms of 
co-operation by starting groups to manage water, things would fall apart during night 
time when some individual farmers would destroy the channels and grab water at the 
expense of others. Things fell apart further after the Vadavals started irrigating their 
fields,” added Ganpat. Gehla, a farmer who has a forest plot on the outskirts of the 
village and cannot irrigate that particular plot, though it is close to the distributary at the 
northern end of the village, narrated an account of how he had tried to initiate a co-
operative arrangement around sharing irrigation water with Ganpat and two other 
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farmers in another plot he had clear title to near Direct Minor 1 (on the middle reaches) 
that went through the middle of the village (see Figure 5.6, the large farm is in yellow).  
Ganpat, Gehla and a third tribal farmer had constructed a field channel from the 
outlet in 2002 and were overjoyed at the prospect of cultivating an irrigated crop. Yet 
that very irrigation season, Raut, a Vadaval horticultural farmer, enclosed his farm (and 
by default the canal outlet and field channels) on a pretext that stray cattle were entering 
his farm and destroying the bell pepper crop. In a short time, Gehla and Ganpat started 
facing problems on their small plots of land as water started running short. When they 
approached Raut he claimed that he owned the land around the outlet and had no choice 
but to fence the farm because of the threat of stray cattle to his crop. Ganpat added: 
That was the end of the story for us, we never could take a second 
crop again as we did not know how to coordinate with Raut. When we 
complained to the irrigation engineers, they said that they had no 
jurisdiction over disputes over water that broke out between farmers 
and asked us to manage such differences on our own. The engineers 
also remained evasive when we questioned them about the canal 
being enclosed by the Vadaval farmers. 
The regulation of canal minors and dispute resolutions between farmers on field 
channels falls under the purview of the Maharashtra Irrigation Act (Government of 
Maharashtra, 1976, pp. 9637-9638). While co-operation between farmers on field 
channels is voluntary, enclosure of entire canal minors and manipulation of field 
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channels and water courses by Vadaval farmers constituted clear and flagrant violations 
of the Irrigation Act. 
 
     
     
     
Figure 5.6 - Map of land holdings on a Canal Minor in Sakhare Village. Plots of land   
 under this outlet were cultivated by tribal farmers, but access to water was lost as Lot 3  
 under the control of a large horticultural farmer sealed off the canal with a fence (Base  
 Map courtesy of the Irrigation Department, Government of Maharashtra). 
There were also agricultural plots at the head that were left unsown; farmers 
blamed the cattle problem for their choice not to plant. Thus, another reason for 
underutilization at the head of the canal minor system was the cattle problem. Forest 
hamlets in the village witnessed seasonal migration. Inhabitants in these hamlets and 
others with non-agricultural employment would let their cattle loose in the village and 
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they would destroy the standing crop. The enclosure of large Vadaval farms, common 
land, and entire paths exacerbated this problem after irrigation: “We don’t have fences 
like the Vadavals,” said Ghoda a farmer at the head of the canal. On one occasion when 
Ghoda’s farm was being rampaged by cattle, I personally ran and brought his attention 
to it, but a lot of damage was done by the time we reached his plot (see Figure 5.7). 
  
 Figure 5.7 - Cattle straying into tribal farms in Sakhare 
There were few instances of tribal farmers or Macchis grabbing each other’s 
land (detailed below), but many cases of Vadaval farmers having grabbed land of tribal 
and Macchi farmers on the head, middle and tail reaches of the canal minor system. My 
initial Sakhare interviews revealed cases of land grabbing in at least 25% of the 50 
marginal tribal farmers I interviewed in my first round; the grabbing of land was 
rampant throughout the head, middle and the tail ends of the canal, but more severe at 
the middle and the tail (for survey data from Sakhare, see table 5.4). 
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Table 5.3 - Reasons for non-irrigation or factors influencing lack of access to water on canal sub- minor 
one in Vanai village. N=23 
Source: Survey in Vanai Village (2008) 
Table 5.4 - Reasons for non-irrigation on two canal sub- minors systems. Sample survey of all classes of 
farmers: Sakhare Village (N= 31). Sub Minor 1= 15 Sub Minor 2 =16. Survey conducted in April-May 
2008  
On public canal systems in rural India, the land-water nexus has become even 
more crucial as contestation over resources intensifies. Given the state of social 
relations in Dahanu before the 1980s and difficulties involved in gaining access to tribal 
land, Vadaval farmers went towards a strategy of leasing in land from another dominant 
community who had lost interest in agriculture. Land was leased strategically on the 
Reasons for non-irrigation Head Middle Tail
Unlined sub-minors/Poor Canal Maintenance
Too much water 1
Absence of field channels/Water courses washed away 1
Lack of co-operation between Farmers
Canal minors and field channels enclosed and blocked within large farms 2
Agriculture is un-remunerative 4 1
Cattle Problem 1
Picks up drainage water (no need for Canal) 3
Accesses well 1
Unleveled Land 2 2 5
Reasons for non-irrigation Head Middle Tail
Unlined sub-minors/Poor Canal Maintenance 1 3
Too much water 9
Absence of field channels/Water courses washed away 1
Lack of cooperation between Farmers 1
Canal minors and field channels enclosed and blocked within large 
farms 10
Agriculture is un-remunerative 2
Cattle problem 1 2
Picks up drainage water (no feed for Canal) 1
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canal minor system and then enclosed. “Theirs is a strategy of consolidation,” said 
Shiva, adding “they leased inland from the Brahmins in Vangaon, but many land 
holdings were scattered throughout the village. Given that the canal runs through the 
villages, they had to bring everything together. This strategy has come at our expense. 
After they grabbed land, they fenced off their farms” (see Figure 5.8). “Then we lost 
access to water because the canals were enclosed too! Unless you work as agricultural 
labourer inside, no one knows what happens inside the farms of the Vadavals!” A third 
of farmers surveyed in Sakhare village revealed that they had lost land in various ways 
to the Vadavals in the aftermath of canal irrigation in the village (see Figure 5.8). A 
common complaint was of the loss of Varkas land. Varkas was a form of customary 
tenure that was mostly not entered in the official land records. It was used to make 
“rab,” a natural input that goes into local agriculture (Munshi, 1989). Tribal farmers 
reported losing varkas land to the Vadaval horticultural farmers throughout the canal 
minor system. Data from Vanai village on loss of land is unavailable but the numbers 
are fewer than in Sakhare given the resistance put up by the local social movement, the 
Kashtakari Sanghatana. The Sanghatana shared ten cases of Vadaval farmers grabbing 
land belonging to tribal farmers, some involving varkas land, others being unrecorded 
tenants while yet others involving open theft of tribal agricultural land and even village 
paths. For instance, there was a case of a large orchard owner grabbing land belonging 
to the tribal community’s village deity in Vanai. The Sanghtana fought back in court  
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Figure 5.8 - Fencing of a large Vadaval farm at the tail end of Direct Minor 2 in  Sakhare  v i l l a g e . T h e 
canal is not visible in the picture and the large fence prevents access to the farm. 
and won the case on behalf of the tribal inhabitants of Vanai and the owner was forced 
to return the land. The strategy in Vanai was to grab land belonging to tribals that had 
turned valuable and potentially remunerative after the onset of canal irrigation. 
This account of the canal minors being enclosed by Vadavals is represented well 
by the map in Fig. 5.6 and the picture in Fig.5.8. Throughout the upper, middle and 
lower reaches of this map, one can see that the outlets are enclosed within the large 
farms (in yellow) belonging to the Vadavals. Vadaval farms are surrounded by patches 
of tribal land (in brown), especially at the middle and tail reaches of the canal system.  
Vadaval farms were then fenced off by Vadavals who used domesticated dogs to keep 
out trespassers from the tribal village. The strategy of land consolidation is thus 
affirmed by the map, but whether Vadaval farmers needed the water remained a 
question. After all, they cultivated vegetables, flowers and fruits which require less 
water than paddy. The largest Vadaval farm in Sakhare was about 30 hectares while 
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there were at least nineteen other large farmers who owned farms ranging from 30 to 60 
hectares in other parts of the horticultural belt. These farmers dominated other villages 
in the belt where Sakhare was located, but came mostly from coastal Dahanu, having 
anticipated the opportunities of irrigated agriculture as a result of the Surya project. 
 
 Figure 5.9 - Map of Sakhare Village’s command area highlighting social and economic  
 differentiation between small irrigated tribal and non-tribal large farms on the canal minor 
 system. The area in yellow was under grass cultivated and sold in Mumbai and Gujarat. In the 
 1990s these particular land tracts came to be irrigated and brought under horticultural crops. The 
 area in brown shows land plots belonging to tribal farmers and were unirrigated in the  
 agricultural season year 2008. Green indicates tribal farms that were irrigated (Base Map  
 courtesy of the Irrigation Department, Government of Maharashtra). 
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“There is no money in agriculture” lamented Churi, the first large Vadaval 
farmer I spoke to. “Have you seen my farm? I grow bell peppers, flowers and fruits, 
where is the money in there?” Churi was reckoned in Dahanu as the most successful 
horticultural farmer who came from a family of small agriculturists and worked hard 
after leasing land from a Brahmin landlord from Vangaon. Churi explained, “we use 
tubewells, drip and sprinkler irrigation so our benefit from the Surya project is indirect. 
The Government still wants us to pay water charges and we won’t.” (see Table 5.6 for 
well ownership). While the onset of canal irrigation in this area had imparted a change 
in the hydrological cycle in the area, the rhythms of water rotations on the canal system 
had been further altered in Sakhare and other villages where horticultural farmers had 
managed to regulate water use on their farms through the use of tubewells while 
accessing canals at the same time. The distribution of wells between Vadaval and tribal 
farmers also points to a disparity. While most Vadaval farmers had tube wells, none of 
the tribal farmers in Sakhare had access to such wells because it required a heavy 
financial investment. The wells were used by Vadavals to regulate and optimize water 
use on the farms where the water discharge through the canals often exceeded 4-6 times 
than what the vegetable crops needed (Government of Maharashtra, Water Audit, 2011).  
Churi’s claim of not using the canal system wasn’t true because a sub minor of 
the canal system ran through Churi’s farm and, as the tribal farmers had told me, he was 
one of the biggest farmers in the area and employed a large number of agricultural 
labourers from tribal families in Sakhare and other villages in the interior of Dahanu. A 
very significant section of this farm labour came from the small farms that surrounded 
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Churi’s huge landholding that encompassed an entire section of Sub-minor 1. “We have 
to compete for this labour with industry. None of the new generation wants to work in 
agriculture; it is a challenge to find labour. We, Vadavals, have worked hard to survive 
the vagaries of the farming business here as entrepreneurs.” 
 Table 5.5 - Well Ownership in villages in the Horticultural Belt under Palghar Canal Branch 2. 
Sources: Calculated from Revenue Tables 2007-08, Surya Irrigation Project & Fieldwork  Notes. 
A month after I left Churi’s farm, my research assistant showed me how Churi 
had enclosed an entire sub-minor and flattened it and had diverted water to his tube 
well. While there was direct evidence of such siphoning away of water, other tribal 
farmers told me that competition for water in the past really became intense in March 
when the weather started turning hot and everyone (whether it was tribal or non-tribal) 
wanted water for their crops. While there were no fights on this issue, the Vadavals 
decided to fence their farms along with the sub-minors. The Vadavals move to grab 
water from the canal minors was also part of a strategy to deny water to neighbouring 
farms, so that agricultural labour from the adjoining smaller farms would continue to be 
Village Name Number of 
Tribal 
Farmers
Number of 
non-Tribal 
Horticultural 
Farmers
Total Hectares 
under 
Vegetables
Area 
cultivated by 
tribal farmers
Area 
cultivated by 
Horticultural 
Farmers
Sakhare 18 85.80 85.80
Govane 16 64.70 64.70
Kapashi 34 130.65 130.65
Dehne 26 89.30 89.30
Vanai 1 20 87.08 0.41 86.67
Dabhale 29 148.61 148.61
Khambale 18 80.91 80.91
Chandranagar 7 2 32.05 1.99 30.06
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employed on Vadaval farms. It was also a strategy to ensure that they would not have 
interruptions in their access to water. “Who will work on their farms, but the tribals” 
said an Irrigation Department employee on the condition of anonymity.” It is all an 
encompassing strategy, involving land, labour and water,” he chuckled and said. 
Table 5.6 - Reasons for dispossession from land in Sakhare Village. N=31. Almost a 
third of the surveyed farmers reported losing land to commercial farmers in the village 
since the late 1990s after irrigation (June 2008). 
Source: Survey of Sakhare Village (2008) 
In terms of the distribution of farmers who reported no access or issues with 
water from the canal minors, almost 80% of the tribal and Macchi farmers at the head of 
the canal in Sakhare were able to access water from the canals. However, this number 
declined as one entered the middle and the tail ends of the canal in Sakhare village (see 
Table 5.4 and Fig 5.9). In Vanai village, the picture was not different. In 2002, the 
Kashtakari Sanghtana lodged a court case against Tarporewala, a Parsi farmer who had 
grabbed land from a tribal agriculturist and was siphoning water away from the canal 
minor in Vanai. The Sanghatana records revealed that the Taraporewala lost the case as 
the canal was ruled by the judge to be a common resource to be shared by everyone. 
Still, the sharp inequity in land holdings and social power between tribal and large non-
tribal farmers makes this a tough struggle for the former in other villages where the 
Sanghatana is not powerful. 
Reasons for Dispossession from Land Head Middle Tail 
Loss of Land to Canal Building 3
Land Grabbing 1 2 3
Loss of Varkas Land/Unknown where land is lost 
No loss of land
2 
5
1 
6
2 
6
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The problems of farmers in Vanai village were of a different sort (see Table 5.4). 
While siphoning away of water was prevalent there too, the problems of tribal farmers 
with water access could be categorized into four types: 
1) Agricultural land plots were often above the canals and the farmers could not 
access the water for their fields. 
2) An intensive round of land disputes between large farmers, mostly Vadavals 
from the coast and the tribals, had also led to underutilization since the early 
2000s.  
3) A large part of the tribal community that was settled in Vanai after the 
construction of the Surya reservoirs were unable to cultivate land in the village 
as the formal process of transfers of land certificates was not done properly. 
4) Several Parsi farmers (former landlords) sealed off canals inside their farms and 
this led to disputes between the tribal community and these farmers.  
 In both villages, tribal farmers were often surrounded by large farms that fenced 
the canals inside (see Figure 5.7). Water drawn from canals was stored under-ground 
and ensured successful crops for the large farmers, while tribal farmers surrounding 
large farms either withdrew from agriculture into other occupations or were forced to 
look for wage work on the large farms. It was clear that Vadaval horticultural farmers 
flourished on the labour from families that came from the same village. The large farms 
in this belt have also relied on labour from the hilly interior of Dahanu, but it was easier 
for the large farmers to access labour from the same village (Mehta, 1999). 
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A visit to the farm of another Vadaval farmer, Raut, in Sakhare yielded more 
insight, as he was transparent about reasons behind the success of the Vadaval 
community:  
It is the canal system, we were like the tribals, my own father was an 
agricultural labourer on a farm on the Dahanu coast, but the surface 
irrigation in this area changed the entire picture. We wouldn’t be here 
if it was not for the canals. However, we don’t need the water from 
the canals as we grow vegetables with drip  and sprinkler, so though 
we use the canal water, most of the benefits are indirect as we use the 
recharged ground water. The flow of water through the canal system 
is unsuitable for our vegetable and fruit crops, we don’t need it. We 
understood the importance of the use of optimizing the use water from 
Israel where we undertook trips to learn the use of drip and sprinkler 
irrigation. When it comes to vegetables, fruits and flowers, they need 
the right amount of water at the right time; sprinkler irrigation ensures 
that we are able to water the plants adequately at the right time. 
A Gujarati landlord in neighbouring Vangaon who had diversified outside 
agriculture then told me how Syngenta, the agro seeds corporation, had sent these 
farmers to Oakland, California and Israel to learn the new agricultural technology, 
which included drip and sprinkler irrigation. Still, a question that continued to bother 
me was what happened to the water that went into Vadaval farms? The canal water 
discharge in Sakhare was meant for paddy, while vegetables consumed less than a third 
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of the water needed for paddy (Command Area Development and Water Management 
Programme, undated). “This isn’t just about water, it is about control of all three 
elements that are central to horticulture in the village,” I wrote in my fieldwork diary. 
Water was an important object of politics in this micro context, but not the only 
resource up for grabs. Moreover, water that was not needed was expelled by Vadaval 
farmers into neighbouring farms using pumps. After disputes over land, this was also a 
contentious issue between tribal and Vadaval farmers and caused more disputes on how 
village water should be managed. However, the power of local Vadaval horticultural 
farmers was quite overwhelming for tribal farmers in places like Sakhare. Closer 
observation of canal minors was supplemented by similar observation of the canal 
system at the main level. There, the water was often conveyed into the natural drainage 
system and rivulets by canal engineers (see Paper One). Perplexed, I checked with 
several tribal farmers whether they had always seen the main canal gates at Sakhare 
(Palghar branch) open to the drainage and they nodded their heads affirming my worst 
doubts about deliberate mismanagement at the main canal level. “Some of this is 
because they want the Vadavals to be able to pick up water from the drainage too at the 
tail end of the village; the canal system here is rigged to benefit them,” the tribal 
farmers added. This last comment exposed both the lack of knowledge of tribal farmers 
about local machinations around water, but also exposed their ignorance about the rules 
around rotations on the main canal. According to the Irrigation Act, 1976 for the state of 
Maharashtra, sluice gates leading to the natural drainage system have to be always kept 
closed unless there is an overflow in the reservoir or a flood (Government of 
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Maharashtra, 1976, Section 16, p. 9634). At the level of the canal minors, water that 
was not required was periodically expelled using pumps into surrounding tribal farms 
and waste land (see Figure 5.10). A lot of this water ended up in rivulets that led into the 
Khadkhada River and later into the Dahanu creek. 
Water waste was thus an important social-ecological consequence of introducing 
canal irrigation to the area. However, complicity of the local irrigation bureaucracy and 
Vadaval farmers in creating wastage was beyond any doubt from my nine month field 
research in Dahanu. Social relations in the area after the onset of canal irrigation had 
also completely transformed the agrarian landscape, while also facilitating urban claims 
on Surya water. 
 
 Figure 5.10 - Water expelled out of the large farms in Sakhare 
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5.5.4 The Significance of the Paracommons: The Social and Political 
 Discourse of Water Underutilization and Diversions 
The Surya project has not been able to meet most of its objectives 
around irrigation, but what has saved it is water demand from the city 
and industrial areas which keeps this project financially viable. The 
only projects that work for irrigation in the land constrained Konkan 
region are small irrigation projects. Large irrigation projects veer off 
their objectives and end up supplying their water to cities and 
industrial areas. (Executive Engineer Interview, Feb 2008) 
The unique ecological context of the Surya project, which irrigates an 
agricultural belt between the Western Ghats and the northern Konkan coastal belt with a 
canal system (with all its institutional underpinning and cultural assumptions of farmer 
response) imported from interior Maharashtra, clearly narrates a story about the 
unsuitability of canal technology for the tribal agriculturalists of this water rich, but land 
constrained region. Given these constraints, state attempts to shape the agrarian context 
with the help of various programmes to remodel the canal system for tribal farmers have 
also failed and social relations played a major role here (Sinchan, 2000). 
Given the overwhelming challenges posed by terrain as well as social relations 
and unfeasibility of canal technology, the socio-technical and hydrosocial frameworks 
help us understand the adaptation by Vadaval farmers to the canal system to grow a 
commercially viable but less water intensive crop. The sociotechnicality of Vadavals’ 
response is best embodied in the (illegal and subversive) re-working of the canal system 
!249
through drip and sprinkler irrigation which reflect Vadaval ingenuity and enterprise in 
horticulture. Thus, at the same time the cycle of water rotations through the canal 
system (in itself constituting a new hydro-social cycle) is also further re-engineered on 
Vadaval farms through the construction of tube wells and class relations transformed 
simultaneously to the detriment of small and marginal tribal farmers who don’t have 
similar access to capital and knowledge to utilize drip and sprinkler irrigation. 
However, since water was still released into canals for paddy, what happens to 
the wasted water? On their own, the socio-technical and hydro-social approaches only 
partially help to understand social consequences and material properties of “wasted” 
and underutilized water in this context. The concept of the paracommons focuses in a 
novel way on competition over water resources freed up as a result of efficiency in 
utilization or wastage. It is used to bring together the narrative above and explain how 
water claims are made on wasted water of the Surya (Lankford, 2013, p. 9). Thus, while 
the hydro-social cycle and socio-technical perspectives remain crucial to our 
understanding of the social context of canal irrigation in Dahanu, they are supplemented 
by the paracommons approach in order to understand dynamics of water use in a 
productive irrigation project (see Paper One) where canal water is distributed on 
principles other than strict crop zoning and based on meeting water demand from 
farmers. 
The canal engineers in Dahanu termed water runoff from the Surya canal system 
as wastage. Run-off from canal systems is not an uncommon phenomenon in rural 
India. Yet the scale of run-off from the Dahanu canal system created an interesting local 
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cultural discourse about tribal utilization of water in the area. In 2008, a separate, 
powerful lobby of Vadaval farmers in coastal parts of Dahanu outside the command area 
(where fellow farmers from that caste had benefitted) blamed the Government for 
poorly implementing the Surya project and wanted the Irrigation Department to 
construct a canal for Vadaval farmers in western coastal Dahanu to access “wastage.” 
The flow of wasted water into the natural drainage of the area created expectations for 
other users, especially farmers outside the dam’s official command area. Thus, within 
the paracommons perspective is a spatial dimension that explains this politics of water 
claims, “the loss portion of a unit withdrawn by one user is available for other users 
including the original, proprietor/withdrawer through different pathways” (Lankford, 
2013, p. 179). Therefore, the paracommons features modified subtractibility 
(subtractibility and non-rivalry in the consumption of common pool resource is assumed 
in the CPR literature, see Table 5.7), whereas, in Lankford’s new conceptualization, a 
loss of water in a system like the Surya could become available for other users outside 
the official beneficiary area. Raul, a Vadaval farmer specializing in organic agriculture 
and local leader on water issues for the west coast of Dahanu noted: 
If you take a look at the Khadkhada, you can see the volume of water 
being wasted during the irrigation season. We, Vadavals have proven 
ourselves and can put this water into better use and have formally 
approached the state government on many occasions for building a 
canal that takes this “surplus water” and wastage into irrigating our 
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Table 5.7 - How do the two theoretical frameworks explain underutilization of canal water in their 
separate domains? The political ecology/production relations, common pool resource and 
paracommons approaches. Sources: After K. Bharadwaj (1990) and Lankford (2013: p 172) 
Dimension Production Relations/
Political Ecology 
approach
The (principal) 
Commons approach
The Liminal 
Paracommons 
approach
Behavioural 
approaches
Access to water depends 
on class or caste status of 
farmers
Rational actor 
approach
Not worked out
Factors behind 
water losses 
and wastage
Socio economic 
environment and including 
conditions of production 
that users face that affect 
utilization. Geography of 
canal system and role of 
state acknowledged. 
Brief incomplete and 
summary treatment
Defining feature of 
the paracommons. 
Complex nested and 
scalar.
Property rights 
question
Not important, but this 
could change in a complex 
agro ecological context 
that involves customary 
tenure land, but property 
rights in water not central
Who owns the 
commons? How 
could rights be 
transferred?
Who owns the 
wasted and 
underutilized water?
Subtractibility No attention Water consumed in 
one place cannot be 
consumed elsewhere
Modified 
subtractibility
Regulatory 
Questions
State seen as representing 
dominant class interests
How to manage 
common pool 
resources and 
regulate demand? 
What common pool 
resource modes?
How to govern the 
commons with a 
significant 
proportion of 
salvageable wastage?
Design and 
Technology
 It is more important in 
political ecology, but 
socio-economic context 
more central
Canal technology 
related to harvest and 
water storage
Technology related 
to raising efficiency-
though often 
unpredictably so and 
requiring ‘systems 
thinking’
Spatiality 
Conferred 
Ownership 
claims and 
Competition
Not central. If geographical 
scale considered, class 
relations and sectoral 
priorities of the capitalist 
state become important. 
Within rural areas, some 
attention to spatial aspects
In parallel (all users 
acting 
simultaneously); or in 
geographical 
sequence with users 
in longitudinal, 
vertical or lateral 
sequence
Extrinsic- 
appropriation 
sequence; likely to 
be a complex 
intricate and unique 
set of resource and 
wastage flows in 
different contexts.
Non- 
Excludability 
or Rivalry
Not considered. Defining feature of 
the principal 
commons. Difficult to 
exclude others 
accounting for 
geographical and 
spatial factors.
Excluding others 
from waste fraction 
is one option; or not 
if recycling/reuse by 
others deemed 
normal
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fields, west of the railway line. But we are told that the tribal 
community has prior rights to the water. 
Seconding Raul’s argument was an engineer from the Surya project, whom I  
met separately. The engineer stated: 
There is indeed underutilization in the project, but what can we 
engineers do? The tribal community is utterly incompetent and 
underserving of the benefits of modern canal irrigation, this is a social 
problem. All this water I can tell you will end up in the city, it pays 
for the water. This could and might happen to more of the Surya 
water; it will end up in the city. 
The underutilization and wastage of water became grounds for the proposal of a 
new canal project to irrigate western parts of Dahanu where the Vadaval community 
originates. However, this project never fructified because the diversion was proposed 
from the existing horticultural belt where communities had now developed clear rights 
to waters of the Surya project. At the same time, the state government citing essential 
use and overall underutilization in the irrigation project has successively diverted water 
to the northern suburbs of Mumbai and to Vasai Virar, one of the fastest growing 
townships in the MMR. The diversion to Vasai Virar began in 1998 and has been 
renewed by the state government three times in the last 15 years citing underutilization 
in canal irrigation (see Figure 5.11 and Table 5.8). Another diversion of Surya water was 
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made to Mira-Bhayandar, a suburb in Greater Mumbai in 2009. Almost 25% of the 
project’s water has now been transferred to urban-industrial use (see Table 5.8). 
Table 5.8 - Water utilized for non-irrigation purposes, including diversions to Vasai   
Virar. Source: Various Reports, Surya Command Area Development Authority (2002-2010)  
!  
Figure 5.11 - Irrigation potential utilisation in Surya Project. Sources: Directorate of Economics and 
Statistics, Thane District, 2000-2012; Report on Benchmarking of Irrigation Projects in Maharashtra, 
(Various Years). This data has been calculated after using all these sources. 
“The water of the Surya is coveted by property developers in Vasai Virar 
because without water, there cannot be any urban expansion at the fringes of Mumbai,” 
said Navneetbhai Shah, a former MLA and litigant on the Surya dam water diversion to 
Water Supply to Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation, 
Tarapur (MIDC), Tarapur 
19.20 mm3 (6.17% of total 
water utilization
Water Supply to various towns (10 No.) and villages (27 No.) 24.56 MM3 (8.58%)
Water Supply to Industries like Bombay State Electricity Supply 
company, mills, industries etc. 21.93 mm
3 (7.76%)
Water Supply to following important Central Government Schemes 
Tarapur Atomic Power Station (Stages I, II, III, IV, V & VI) and Bhabha 
Atomic Research Centre, Tarapur
6.70 mm3 (2.34%)
Total 72.39 mm
3 (25.28% of 
total water utilization)
Irrigation Potential Utilisation  
in Surya Project
0
7500
15000
22500
30000
2000 2004 2008 2012
Irrigation Potential Created (in ha.)
Actual Irrigated Area (in ha.)
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Vasai Virar in the Bombay High Court. On the one hand, the Government says it wants 
to give a fair deal to economically depressed tribal areas; on the other, they take water 
away from poor tribal agriculturists to help with the contentious expansion of Mumbai 
into Vasai Virar. Now, the government has decided to construct a new dam called Susari 
in Dahanu to supply water to Vasai Virar (see Figure 5.2). Shah added,  
Where is the underutilization? On the one hand, the Government has 
not constructed the canals and maintains the existing system poorly. 
On the other hand, it wants to divert water from the tribal areas and 
now build a new dam displacing 10,000 people in an area that has 
already sacrificed land for this massive Surya project with negative 
results for tribal agriculture. There is no logic in the Government’s 
policy. 
 The politics of surplus and wasted water created by such “underutilization” in 
the neighbourhood of the horticultural belt points to the weaknesses of both the Marxian 
and political ecology approaches to irrigation in analyzing this phenomenon of water 
wastage. A classic Marxian political economy response would be to blame the condition 
of class relations for the underutilization of irrigation potential (see Bharadwaj, 1990 for 
an excellent Marxian analysis of underutilization in irrigation and Table 5.7 on political 
economy analysis of underutilization) While the Marxian political economy argument is 
validated by the above account, it neglects the assumptions that go into the technical 
design of large irrigation projects, the material properties of water, and the role of the 
!255
bureaucracy in water management (also see Table 4 above on the differences in 
approaches to underutilization of irrigation water).  
5.6  Conclusion 
The empirical findings of the paper that focus on the underutilization of 
irrigation water in the Surya project help us justify the theoretical framework that has 
been brought together in this paper. The introduction of a new irrigation project 
fundamentally altered the hydrological cycle in this region and transformed social 
relations and the ecology of the area. However, on their own, the hydro-social and the 
socio-technical approaches cannot explain the claims made on the unutilized water of 
the Surya project as a result of underutilization. The scalar politics which the urban 
claims to that water create justifies a synthesis of the paracommons approach with the 
hydro-social and socio- technical approaches. 
 From both theoretical and empirical perspectives, this paper forwards a new 
lens of understanding and analyzing the intra-rural water dimension in rural-urban water 
transfers in India, especially in areas that enjoy an abundant availability of water, but 
are characterized by significant social-geographical constraints. While this paper has 
dealt mainly with the experiences of farmers on the canal system in a rural area, it has 
shown that we need a combined grasp of the interface of local canal technology and 
water institutions at broader geographical scales to understand how intra-rural dynamics 
over water could facilitate rural-urban water transfers. This needs to be considered in a 
context where the utilization of water by agriculture is influenced by the social 
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geography as well as water institutions, such as rules of water management and the role 
of the Irrigation Department.  
In this paper, the various theoretical frameworks that exist in political ecology 
and the general literature on water were utilized to examine the interface of social 
relations, technology and institutions. An empirical attention to the micro politics of 
water utilization at the canal level constitutes part of that focus and highlights both the 
underutilization of water and the implications of underutilization for water management 
at a broader geographical scale. It is quite clear from the evidence that the dispossession 
of the tribal community from both land and water lies at the centre of the politics of 
resources in the horticultural belt in Dahanu. Any explanation of water diversion to 
Mumbai is thus incomplete without examining the contestation of resources between 
the tribal and the non-tribal communities on the canal system in this part of the Surya 
project. The analysis of water wastage due to the non-implementation of rotation rules 
at the level of the canal minors, the lack of incentives to farmers to optimize their water 
use, the excess conveyance of water in the canal system, and the state of social relations 
are some of the highlights of the empirical findings. They highlight the broader regional 
implications of the uneven nature of agricultural development in the Dahanu area for 
subsequent water transfers to Mumbai.  
While each of the theoretical frameworks from within political ecology (the 
hydro-social and socio-technical) remains useful in analyzing the empirical data 
presented in this paper, these theories present strengths, but also some key limitations. 
Therefore, approaches from outside political ecology are assembled together with the 
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hydro-social and socio-technical frameworks. In terms of strengths, while the socio-
technical parses the working and the adaptation of canal technology in the social-
geographical context (Section 5.6) by the large Vadaval horticultural farmers, the hydro-
social approach helps us to keep the political construction of geographical scale 
(Sections 5.6.4) and social consequences of the hydrological re-formatting of the entire 
landscape in focus. The paper uses some key features from both these frameworks to 
analyze the evidence from the experiences of farmers on the canal system.  
 It also becomes clearer that a treatment and analysis of empirical data on water 
utilization in this context by developing a hybrid framework is necessitated by some of 
the unique contextual factors at play. A significant one is the presence of underutilized 
and “wasted” water. In this context, the paracommons approach is critical for dealing 
with the material properties of water. The social and institutional mechanisms behind 
the creation of water wastage and underutilization at the canal level and local politics 
around wasted water necessitate theoretical hybridization in analysis. Key features and 
characteristics of the geography of the canal systems are thus also identified as playing 
a major role. Thus, the social and geographical context in which canal technology 
works, the political construction of geographical scale, and the politics of underutilized 
water all inform this hybrid framework. The scalar focus of the paracommons approach 
has some characteristics in common with the hydro-social framework 
While this paper does not claim to contribute to theory, it does emphasize the 
value of studying the movement and politics of water at different scales by using 
theoretical tools from both political ecology and water policy. By attempting to provide 
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an explanation that is both sensitive to social and geographical context, this paper has 
tried to understand how the politics of water and utilization at one geographical scale 
influences claims and water transfers to other scalar levels. Through a scalar approach, 
this paper also highlights the importance of more contextual studies on the social, 
institutional and geographical implications of rural water use, regional water 
institutions, and geography for rural-urban water transfers in India. 
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6. Conclusion 
6.1  Intent and Questions 
This dissertation set out to address the politics of water transfers and 
appropriation in the context of the Mumbai-Thane region, India. In the process, it has 
posed questions on the institutional, social, geographical and political context of the 
management and governance of watersheds and water districts (including irrigation 
Command Areas) that are shared between large urban centres and agricultural/rural 
water users. Given the growing contestation over water between cities and agricultural 
areas in India and other parts of Asia (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2005), this 
dissertation should be seen as an empirical and conceptual contribution to the subject of 
inter-sectoral water transfers. It should also be seen as a contribution to the literature on 
water politics in human geography, political ecology and environmental politics. In this 
concluding chapter, I present and reflect on the dissertation's theoretical, empirical and 
policy contributions, and make recommendations for future study. This chapter also 
summarizes the core findings of each of the component manuscripts of my dissertation, 
drawing them together to answer questions that guided my overall research project. To 
repeat them here: 
1) What aspects of farmers' social and economic locations (within overarching 
 relations of production) influence their access to water? (For instance, is access 
 to water influenced by size of landholdings? By proximity to canals? By a  
!264
 farmer's class- or caste-position? And how is water scarcity experienced by 
 farmers in Surya Command Area?).  
2) What are the rules, institutions and governance structures underpinning water 
 transfers from rural to urban areas (and water management more broadly) in 
 Mumbai-Thane region? (For instance, what factors might lead to water being 
 [paradoxically] underutilized for agriculture in locations such as Surya  
 Command Area? And, how do broader structures and practices of water  
 governance interact with social/class divisions in such rural areas?).  
6.2 Empirical Findings 
 This dissertation also sets out to research questions around water governance, 
institutions and social relations in the Mumbai-Thane region of western India, at two 
primary geographical scales: rural, and urban-regional. This section of the conclusion 
summarizes the answers to those questions which I identified as a result of my field and 
archival research. The latter was carried out in four locations: India; United Kingdom; 
Canada; and the United States. Such archival research in various locales helped me to 
situate my field and empirical data within proper historical and policy perspectives.  
All three of the manuscript components of this dissertation have pointed to the 
excessive centralization of decision making powers in both the Maharashtra Ministry of 
Irrigation, and the District Irrigation Department, in one of the most important 
economic regions of Maharashtra State. This is true not only in the context of how 
water is managed at the regional level in the Mumbai-Thane region, where 
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fragmentation of water governance has led the Ministry of Irrigation to make decisions 
about administrative re-allocations of water. It is also true in the context of the broader 
failure of governance and collective action at local levels. By focusing on three case 
studies - two from dam projects, and one from a water district catering exclusively to 
Greater Mumbai and adjoining towns - this dissertation also brings into sharp focus the 
institutional variation that exists within Mumbai-Thane region surrounding water 
appropriation and transfers.  
For example, Paper One explains how excessive centralization of power and 
decision making at the Irrigation Department is characterized by a lack of participation 
and transparency - which has in turn created opportunities for graft among engineers. 
That centralization has also created an environment in which the needs of small-scale 
farmers (who depend on the rural canal network for subsistence) have been completely 
neglected by Irrigation Department staff. In Paper Two, I closely analyze the political 
and institutional dimensions of relations between an ever-expanding Greater Mumbai, 
and the water district located outside its official boundaries (yet reserved for exclusive 
use of Mumbai and other nearby towns). There the dissertation also situates the 
interface of geography and institutions - as well as long term consequences of past 
policy decisions to reserve the entire Tansa-Vaitarna watershed for the eventual use of 
Greater Mumbai - within their proper institutional, geographical and historical 
perspectives. And in Paper Three, farming communities’ experiences with the canal 
technology prevalent in the Surya irrigation system are critically analyzed, along with 
political claims about how water is wasted and underutilized there. Studying how intra-
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rural water conflict results from (or is exacerbated by) the pressures of geographically 
distant urbanization also raises important contextual questions about the major actors 
facilitating changes to the 'waterscape' of Mumbai-Thane region. 
PAPER ONE focused on the governance of the canal system in Surya Project. 
That chapter was brought together using qualitative data gathered from interviews with 
engineers after the 2008 canal irrigation season was over. Conventional understandings 
of the political-bureaucratic corruption nexus surrounding irrigation projects in India 
has already been firmly represented in Indian social science scholarship by Robert 
Wade’s classic papers (Wade, 1982 & 1985). While acknowledging the strengths of 
Wade`s arguments, this chapter points to weaknesses in his use of the rational choice 
framework to explain the behaviour of junior bureaucrats who are unwilling or 
uninterested in job transfers to other locations. The chapter identifies possible reasons 
for them to avoid seeking promotions or transfers, such as the potential for them to skim 
off developmental subsidies in economically backward areas.  
Paper One also presents findings that challenge official narratives behind the 
underutilization of irrigation water - which are used to justify the transfer of water from 
Surya project to the Vasai-Virar sub-region (VVSR). The paper presents evidence that 
underutilization of irrigation water is explicitly the result of informal norms that project 
engineers have cultivated and followed, in which they deliberately under-maintain the 
rural canal network. The system of kickbacks that results from such poor maintenance 
work responds to a logic of self-interest among engineers (first identified by Wade in 
the context of Andhra Pradesh). It also reflects an institutional incentive for the 
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Irrigation Department to earn official water revenues from urban areas (amid political 
pressure not to collect water charges from the prosperous new class of commercial 
Vadaval farmers who have benefitted from the irrigation system). Thus, in the context of 
a poorly maintained rural canal system that does not respond to the needs of the small-
scale, marginal, tribal farmers, the extent of agricultural land that is actually irrigated 
(versus potentially irrigated) remained small and stagnant.  
Paper One thus brings together an analysis of how social relations, institutions 
and incentive structures can influence water policy at the local and regional level. It 
demonstrates how the uneven development of Dahanu`s agricultural landscape 
facilitates underutilization and water transfers to the Vasai-Virar sub-region and parts of 
Greater Mumbai. By taking a broad view of institutions and seeking to inform a more 
grounded understanding of the politics of water transfer, this paper also departs from a 
more narrow economic-legalistic view of the institutional underpinnings of inter-
sectoral transfers that some important policy studies in the Indian water literature have 
taken on this subject (World Bank, 1999). My focus on the informal dimension of the 
politics of water transfers and the role of the bureaucracy in that presents new 
information about the social and cultural dynamics of water transfers from Thane 
district`s reservoirs to Mumbai. 
PAPER TWO is situated within the theoretical framework of the environmental 
politics and common pool resource (CPR) literatures. It takes a slightly different route 
because of its reliance on multiple sources of information: archival material; dam 
project reports from the 1960s; newspaper reports; government reports on water 
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utilization; interviews with planners and municipal bureaucrats; and maps from 
conservation departments. This chapter uses the CPR literature and applies it to analyze 
geographical, social and economic data with a focus on an action situation around water 
entitlements in the Tansa-Vaitarna water district. It uses that case study to examine 
associated problems of water appropriation, as well as the long term environmental and 
human consequences of reserving entire watersheds for a metropolitan city based on the 
prior appropriation principle. It later juxtaposes the institutional analysis with an 
argument about the fragmentation of metropolitan water governance, while advocating 
for the establishment of a metropolitan regional water council to manage water conflict 
and specific contestations on a broader, regional scale. 
 Information was not forthcoming from the Maharashtra Government about rules 
of allocation from T-V reservoirs, among towns, cities, irrigation Command Areas and 
other villages. Thus, data for writing this section had to be compiled from primary and 
secondary sources, including newspaper reports on water diversions and interviews with 
local leaders, which were crucial. At the same time, archival material and a closer 
reading of dam Project Reports from the 1960s proved useful in piecing together a 
picture of the institutional architecture of water governance, and the historical legacy of 
water planning in Tansa-Vaitarna water district since the 1940s. Interview data with 
government officials was also valuable. Some individual planners in the Mumbai 
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA) spoke clearly about the legal 
rights of Greater Mumbai and the MMRDA to exploit the untapped water potential of 
the Hydrometric Area. But officially, Mumbai Municipal Corporation authorities were 
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reticent to speak about the status of rural communities' claims concerning water rights 
and access in the T-V water district. They were equally reticent about the rights of other 
towns in the MMR that lie on the water pipeline route to Mumbai. Given the resistance 
to share such information, greater transparency on the part of Mumbai municipal 
authorities would have helped immensely.  
The fragmentation of water management policies and procedures between the 
District Irrigation Department and the Mumbai Municipality also did not help matters 
while investigating these issues. After my persistent petitioning of both planning 
authorities and municipal officials, a brief, cryptic description of the City`s senior water 
rights was finally released to me; it simply stated: 'the water in this area has been 
allotted to us.’ Clearly, further research is needed on this question of water rights in 
Tansa-Vaitarna water district; for geographers, an empirical route to investigating this 
problem might be through the use of more archival sources, surveys, and Freedom of 
Information requests. 
PAPER THREE brings out the ecological salience of the urban–rural resource 
relationship between large Indian metropolitan centres and areas where water sources 
for smallholder farmers are located (such as Dahanu in Thane District). The experiences 
of small-scale, marginal farmers - as well as interviews with commercial, Vadaval 
farmers - revealed that smallholder agriculture in Thane District faces not only the brunt 
of intensive water demands from large cities, but also the challenge of the emerging 
class-interest of commercial farmers. This chapter shows how both land and water have 
acquired a new economic and cultural significance for the poor in the context of this 
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dual threat of dispossession. An enclosure-like situation in which smallholder farmers 
have lost access to land and water is another finding that sums up the experience of 
tribal small and marginal farmers. Institutional inertia on the part of the bureaucracy, 
partly a result of technological choices that accompanied the construction of large dams 
and canal systems in this region, hasn’t helped. Manifestations of this institutional 
inertia include the declaration of "underutilized irrigation potential" without adequate 
scrutiny of the functioning of the canal system at various levels; brazen neglect of the 
needs of smallholder farming; and a callous waste of water by the bureaucracy and large 
farmers. The paper presents new findings on the transformation of social relations in 
agriculture in Dahanu and how these get mapped onto institutional practices and 
ultimately water policies in the Surya Command Area and at the regional level.  
Given my focus on how water institutions impact rural livelihoods in Dahanu, 
this chapter was not able to investigate the influence of either seasonal migration or 
economic diversification upon small-scale, marginal, tribal farmers in the Mumbai-
Thane belt who are now slowly moving away from irrigated agriculture, as they do not 
find it sufficiently remunerative. The dominance of the non-farm sector has been 
demonstrated in other empirical work on Thane District (Ambasta, 1998; Mehta, 1999), 
as has been the finding that small and marginal farmers also remain tied to the land. 
Some of these issues around diversification remained uninvestigated as they were 
beyond the scope and organization of my planned field research on water, institutions 
and social relations, but they warrant further academic and policy attention. 
!271
Papers one and two bring out the central importance of developing a more 
transparent and autonomous water governance apparatus that monitors water use by 
different sectors. The findings from both these papers emerged only after careful 
conceptual analysis of the water problem in two locations drawing primarily on the 
rational choice and institutional frameworks. Paper three uses the political ecological 
framework explicitly, but also relies on institutional theory to analyze the problem of 
water underutilization in the Surya Project. All three frameworks are detailed in the 
following section, which outlines this dissertation’s theoretical underpinnings and 
conceptual contributions. 
6.3 Theoretical Framework: Merging Political Ecology and 
 Institutionalism  
This dissertation furthers understanding of the social and political processes that 
underlie water transfers and contestation between rural and urban areas. While there is a 
significant policy literature on this subject in the Indian and international context 
(World Bank, 1999; Molle and Berkoff, 2006), case studies that integrate the 
institutional dimensions of water transfers with the social, cultural and geographical 
context of irrigated agriculture are made are quite rare. Thus, in the three papers 
presented, I have sought to focus on the multi-scalar politics and geographies of water 
transfers, and how those interface with the formal and informal institutional rules and 
practices at the village level in the SMIP, the water districts and the hydrometric 
boundary of the Mumbai-Thane region. 
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Drawing on a wide literature about water and irrigation in political ecology, this 
dissertation asserts that claimed scarcity of water is a limiting perspective for analyzing 
water problems. Physical availability is only one dimension of water insecurity, as 
issues around access to water also hinge around local socio-geographical contexts and 
land and water institutions. Therefore, besides focusing on the dynamics of water 
allocation between cities and rural areas, this dissertation also investigates how water is 
managed and distributed for agricultural irrigation between different social groups, by 
actors such as the local water bureaucracy and the state Irrigation Department. It has 
further examined the implications of intra-rural management for water policy and 
politics in the entire Mumbai-Thane region (Paper three). The politics and political 
economy of local water management and regional water institutions also find a presence 
in all three case studies.  
To understand the experiences of farmers and rural communities in water 
districts, the policies of the local water bureaucracy and the evolution of policy 
frameworks of the State of Maharashtra, this dissertation brings together theories from 
political ecology and the common pool resource literatures. By utilizing the CPR 
literature to examine the rules that inform distribution and allocation of water, the 
dissertation tries to compensate for the policy gap in the political ecology literature 
(Walker, 2005). It does so by focusing on the evolutionary and institutional aspects of 
regional water governance. However, at the same time, it does not rely on merely 
analyzing the working of rules and rights in water transfers, but places these in the 
context of social relations, the agro-ecology of the water districts and the fast 
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transforming geography of water use in the Mumbai-Thane region. A disconnect 
between the political ecology and common pool resource literatures on water prevails 
primarily due to the exclusive reliance on rules and governance in the latter and a 
dependence on examining social relations and power in the former. By focusing on how 
social relations, geography and governance interact and are transformed after the 
execution of dams and modern canal systems, this dissertation draws attention to links 
between all three themes. The Indian context - with the presence of a populist 
democracy; a large water management bureaucracy; poor rural populations; social 
ferment; rapid urbanization; and a fast changing ecological landscape - necessitates 
such a pragmatic blending of theoretical frameworks. The politics of the regional water 
commons is thus situated in the overall context of the constant re-scaling of water 
governance, and the production of space and nature in the Mumbai-Thane region 
(Smith, 1984; Swyngedouw, 2004).  
The presence of a large and growing metropolitan city like Mumbai places an 
extraordinary ecological footprint on its rural hinterland. At the same time, the mapping 
of water resource availability and the rules that govern re-allocation of water from rural 
to urban use necessitate a closer analysis of local water practices and how scarcity of 
water on the canal systems in this context are experienced by rural communities. A mere 
focus on urban versus rural to explain water diversions would have been insufficient as 
agriculture is the dominant user of water in the Surya sub-basin. This political 
ecological dimension of the analysis is also informed by literature on the political 
economy of development and agrarian change in India. The findings presented in Paper 
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three emphasize the social and economic impact of the wasteful water practices of the 
rich horticultural Vadaval caste farmers on the small-scale, marginal, tribal farmers, 
whose villages are located on the middle and tail reaches of the canal system. The 
transformation of social relations in the aftermath of canal irrigation is thus identified as 
one of the major factors in the underutilization of irrigation water in the Surya Project. 
 Land grabbing, and the concomitant transformation of caste and class relations 
in the rural areas (and its effects) in the aftermath of canal irrigation become equally 
important in explaining practices and access to water. In this context, the paradoxes of 
water wastage and underutilization are confronted and analyzed in the context of a 
productive irrigation system by developing a merger of the socio-technical, hydro-social 
and the paracommons frameworks. The choice of the paracommons framework builds 
on and adds to the present theoretical tools that have been deployed to research canal 
networks in India within the political ecology literature (Mollinga, 2013; Lankford, 
2013). Furthermore, by using the paracommons framework to analyze the consequences 
of waste and efficiency on the canal system in the villages, the limits of the political 
economy and institutionalist frameworks for explaining underutilization of water in this 
context are highlighted and explained.  
While Papers one and two have relied on methods and theory from the rational 
choice and CPR literatures respectively, both papers develop a more hybrid theoretical 
framework that draws from rational choice and human geography. Thus, a pure 
dependence on rational choice is eschewed in Paper one, while retaining some of its 
features to explain corrupt practices in the Irrigation Department (such as a lack of 
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bureaucratic turnover amongst some sections of the staff, as well as the rent seeking 
activities of engineers). In this same paper, keeping with a critical geographical focus, 
attention is also paid to the local context, the state of social relations and other features 
of the bureaucratic system that manage water, thus merging attention to the politics of 
place and space with an equal emphasis on why corrupt practices flourish on the canal 
system. In Paper two, the rational choice framework typically applied in CPR theory to 
development problems (Forsyth and Johnson, 2014) gives way to a more evolutionary 
framework. A historical evolution of rules in the Tansa-Vaitarna water district provide a 
useful context and background to the failure of local collective action in solving the 
water problem. Given cultural and legal variations in the nature of water institutions and 
geographical context in Thane district, this dissertation thus tries to develop an 
institutional-geographical framework for researching the problems of water distribution 
and management in Mumbai-Thane region.  
Due to the emphasis in political ecology on developing a critical focus upon 
neo-liberal policies in the water sector, it is often forgotten that the water sector is still a 
state monopoly in countries like India. And that corrupt practices and lack of access to 
water can flourish under the aegis of the public sector too. This dissertation is thus 
informed by Karen Bakker`s advocacy within human geography of applying an ethical 
lens on urban and regional water governance in the developing world (Bakker, 2010). A 
common thread between all three papers is an ethical perspective that draws our 
attention to the relationships that exist between geographical place, social relations and 
water institutions.  
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The three papers in the dissertation share a focus on the actual experiences of 
communities with water scarcity in the water districts outside Mumbai. They also 
jointly contribute to developing an institutional and spatial understanding of the 
geographical relationship of a significant and growing metropolitan city-region like 
Mumbai to a socio-economically poor, agricultural hinterland in Thane district.  
6.4 Policy Implications 
 Through its focus on developing a combined institutional and political-
ecological understanding of water transfers, this dissertation also seeks to contribute to 
the policy literature on water in the Mumbai-Thane region and in the State of 
Maharashtra. All three papers contribute to the contemporary debate around water 
policy in the Konkan region and in the State of Maharashtra as a whole. The academic 
nature of the inquiry in this dissertation does not preclude such a focus on policy. The 
existing research literature on water in the city of Greater Mumbai and the surrounding 
region, including in human geography, does not engage with the policy dimensions of 
the problem (see Gandy, 2008). Alternatively, those who have done field research in 
Greater Mumbai on urban water problems have not paid sufficient attention to water 
policy and have neglected crucial legal-institutional aspects of the urban and regional 
dimensions of the water question (Anand, 2011). A synthesis of fieldwork, historical 
research and analysis of State Government policy around rural-urban water transfers has 
allowed me to throw light on the policy dimensions of the water question in the 
Mumbai-Thane region. It has also helped me to avoid the pitfalls that might have 
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resulted from an exclusive reliance on a political-ecological analysis of the regional 
water question.  
The chief policy contribution of this dissertation lies in the analysis of the legal- 
institutional framework of water transfers, and the conflict between urban and rural 
water entitlements, as presented in Paper Two. Greater Mumbai`s water rights in the 
MMR are critically scrutinized, and this is the first time that the role of prior 
appropriation has been highlighted in the water literature on Mumbai and urban India. 
The legal underpinnings of Greater Mumbai’s claims to the water were unearthed by an 
analysis of water by-laws and legal frameworks at various scales (urban, rural, and 
regional), as well as analysis of historical material that provided details about the 1950s 
decision to reserve an entire watershed for the purposes of the city (Modak, 1948). The 
policy implications of such institutional rules for sustainability and environmental 
justice are then made evident through the case study. This contribution also adds to the 
already voluminous case study literature on water law in the Indian context. It also fills 
a major gap in the urban water research on Mumbai and contrasts with the mainly 
cultural and ethnographic orientation in the literature (Gandy, 2008; Anand, 2011).  
A further policy contribution is made in Paper Three, where causes behind the 
underutilization of water for irrigation are researched at the level of the canal minors. 
There, the disinterest of engineers in maintaining the canal system points to the political 
dynamics of water contestation, and to their own complicity with rich farmers in 
constructing an official discourse of underutilization. The water rights of the city and 
the countryside are further outlined and highlighted in the paper, even as the regional 
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water governance structures that inform rural-urban water transfers are examined 
through an analysis of government and planning reports, as well as of High Court 
affidavits contesting water transfers. The administrative nature of water transfers meant 
that close attention was paid to the Irrigation Department as a main actor in the water 
politics of the region. Researchers have been unwilling to bring state actors in India 
who manage water under critical scrutiny. However, the wide coverage by local media 
in Thane district of corrupt practices within the Irrigation Department, and the various 
encounters this researcher had with the near breakdown of relations between senior 
level engineers and their junior counterparts, point to a serious dysfunction in the water 
bureaucracy in the region and the State of Maharashtra.  
In Paper One, the sensitive nature of my research on water governance precludes 
me from identifying the main political actors in the corruption nexus, but it is clear that 
closer attention should be paid to the welfare of poor agricultural communities in the 
tribal areas especially in the context of a modern irrigation project that has been 
implemented to further their economic well-being. If more attention were paid to 
developing better governance frameworks that ensure the accountability of public 
officials, and furthermore, if more efficiency in water use were to be ensured at the rural 
and urban levels, an outcome like the dispossession of the tribal community of its 
access to water is not necessarily inevitable. 
This research has demonstrated and also validated a long tradition in the 
political ecology literature which argues that water scarcity and shortages are socially 
and politically produced, and that solutions lie in social, political and ethical domains, 
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rather than the purely technological. The findings of this dissertation tell us that the 
water governance picture in the Mumbai-Thane region can be transformed only by a 
fundamental reform of water practices, local laws and policies inherited from the past. 
The present exclusive reliance on increasing water supply through new dam projects 
will not serve the needs of the varied sectoral demands within this region, especially in 
the context of very fast paced spatial transformation. Regulating water in a manner that 
balances sectoral (urban, industrial, agricultural, rural) interests is not impossible, if 
policy makers realize that successful collective action around water would necessitate 
the creation of water districts and decentralizing water management to democratically 
elected water district councils. An example of such co-operation around joint rural and 
urban water provision already exists in a formal governance setup within the MMR. For 
instance, a good example of such co-operation is the creation of the Shahad Temghar 
Water Authority by cities of the MMR (such as Thane, Mira-Bhayandar and Bhiwandi), 
who have partnered with villages in Thane District to set up their own water services 
system (Sivaramakrishnan, 2014, p. 68; Rao, 2015, p. 166).  
 Further experiments to create such independent water authorities encompassing 
urban and rural water users should be extended outside the boundaries of the MMR in 
Thane District. This is vital given that rural populations living outside the metropolitan 
boundaries of Mumbai (but inside the hydrometric area) do not have adequate legal 
leverage to have their basic water entitlements met under existing local water laws. 
Consequently, a reform of such laws (i.e. the Maharashtra Irrigation Act of 1976, and 
the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act of 1988) also acquires significance. The latter, 
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while exclusively protecting Greater Mumbai`s water demand and senior water 
appropriation rights, is a great obstacle to potential water governance reform at the 
regional level. The riparian underpinnings of the Maharashtra Irrigation Act 
(Government of Maharashtra, 1976) serve to exclude landless populations from access 
to water. Legal reform thus has to go hand in hand with reform of water policy at the 
regional level in Mumbai-Thane region.  
6.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
 This dissertation raises a number of questions that warrant further research. The 
difficulty of researching water governance in India has been highlighted in other places 
of this chapter and in other parts of the dissertation. The non-transparent nature of how 
the Irrigation Department functions; the lack of communication between various 
Government entities that manage water; and the absence of an umbrella organization 
with regional water data on Mumbai were particularly challenging. This research 
project helped me to better understand such informational gaps and also prepared me to 
continue with an urban component of this research in the near future. Secondly, this 
research highlights the theoretical limitations of political ecology as a framework for 
examining water problems. The absence of attention to policy within South Asian 
political ecology led me towards institutionalism in order to examine regional water 
governance in the Mumbai-Thane region. I plan to engage more closely with the broad 
corpus of work in institutionalism and the common pool resource literatures to research 
the regional water question in the Mumbai-Thane region. 
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  This dissertation could not examine the political-economic structures that 
underlie uneven agricultural development in the Dahanu area. However, in the near 
future I will be analyzing census data from the past two decades in order to examine 
migration patterns of the tribal community related to water scarcity, as well as the 
creation of exclusive water districts for Mumbai. Furthermore, I was not yet able to 
utilize archival sources of Maharashtra State Government; Mumbai Municipal 
Corporation; or the World Bank, regarding the development of the water supply system 
for Greater Mumbai and other towns in the MMR. Thus, I plan to conduct the following 
thematic research in future: 
• Develop an understanding of the historical context of urban water supply and 
hydroelectric dam projects outside Mumbai, from 1892 to 1990; 
•  Investigate and classify various litigation concerning water and land in the 
Tansa-Vaitarna water district and the Surya Command Area, in order to better 
understand legal- institutional frameworks; 
• Analyze the role of the World Bank in funding and developing multipurpose 
dam systems, canal systems, and long distance aqueducts (from the 1960s 
through the 1980s), that extend into northern Thane District from the City of 
Mumbai; 
• Comparatively study water governance practices of other large Indian 
metropolitan regions, such as Delhi, Chennai, Kolkata, Bangalore and 
Hyderabad against those of Mumbai. 
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6.6   Conclusion 
Through closer empirical work on institutions and the rules that inform water 
policy, as well as further field research on users' experiences with water scarcity on the 
canal system in the water districts, this dissertation renders a critical but nuanced picture 
of the nature and impact of water transfers upon rural communities within the Mumbai-
Thane region. Using an interdisciplinary analysis of the experiences of such small-scale, 
marginal, tribal farmers, this dissertation also narrates a story about the continued 
dispossession of India`s tribal communities from their access to resources. It is quite 
clear that tribal farmers on the canal system in Dahanu lose out in their access to water 
due to the brazen nature of the nexus between engineers and upper-caste, Vadaval 
commercial farmers. While this dissertation originally set out to investigate the role of 
formal water institutions, my findings also highlight the importance of both formal 
governance mechanisms and informal politics that revolve around such water transfers. 
Economic growth and development mean higher water demand and, consequently, more 
dam building in areas such as the Mumbai-Thane region (Joy et al., 2008). Thus, 
growing water demands of both the urban and rural sectors of the Indian economy mean 
that challenges of governance in the water sector will remain important in future.  
A singular focus on class and social differentiation in this dissertation could not 
by itself have revealed the working of the internal structures and institutions that play a 
role in the underutilization of water in the Surya Multipurpose Irrigation Project. That is 
also true of my analysis of the Tansa-Vaitarna water district, where prevailing 
institutions are also identified as important factors enabling Greater Mumbai to 
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exclusively access the watershed at the expense of rural communities. With an equal 
emphasis on the functioning of formal and informal institutions and other place-related 
factors such as caste and class, this dissertation thus makes an important 
interdisciplinary contribution to understanding the causes behind underutilization of 
water from Surya Project. The theoretical literature within institutional economics 
(Hodgson, 2006), as well as empirical and theoretical research within human geography 
and development studies, have identified caste and its metamorphoses as a modern, 
social and economic institution (Harriss White, 2003; Chari, 2004; Gidwani, 2000 & 
2008). The rise of the Vadaval caste-cluster, along with social change on the canal 
system in the agricultural belt of Dahanu and northern fringes of Mumbai Metropolitan 
Region, also confirm empirical research that points to the role of rising caste groups as 
vanguards of capital accumulation in urban and rural India. Thus, water conflict 
between small-scale farmers of the tribal community, Vadaval commercial farmers, and 
urban Mumbai is situated in its proper institutional and social-geographical context.  
The empirical findings of this dissertation also present a qualification on the 
urban political ecology literature, which tends to rely on a more structural critique of the 
state, of markets and of the modern water technology that enable cities to expand their 
water frontiers. The commodification of water resulting from urbanization and 
commercial agriculture is also an implicit part of the transformation of the water 
landscape of Mumbai-Thane region. Mumbai’s growing access to water from Thane 
District is not merely predicated on its political power and economic clout. It is also 
based on historic decisions taken in the 1950s that entailed reserving entire water 
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districts for the eventual use of Mumbai, as well as the creation of the Mumbai 
Hydrometric Area in the early 1970s. Moreover, the decision to implement canal 
technology in Thane District in the 1970s, along with the social, ecological and 
economic consequences of those technological choices, constitute an important part of 
the empirical puzzle about water management in this region.  
This focus of this dissertation on the geographical relationship of fast growing 
metro Mumbai and MMR to its rural hinterland in Thane District has hopefully 
demonstrated the value of more such studies on urban-regional water governance and 
urban-rural contestation over water, in the context of rapidly urbanizing regions of India 
and other parts of Asia. As contestation around water resources emerge with 
simultaneous ecological and political challenges in a number of urban-regional 
locations around the world, this dissertation makes a contribution to the theory and 
empirics of that particular problem. By applying a historical and institutional lens to the 
resource dilemmas faced by thousands of agriculturists in the Mumbai-Thane region, 
and placing some of the analysis in a framework that embraces a kind of theoretical and 
methodological pluralism, I have also affirmed my faith in the theoretical and 
methodological pragmatism that Elinor Ostrom and other institutional scholars 
have advocated in their research. I believe that by drawing from disparate streams of 
analysis - in disciplines such as environmental politics and political ecology - an 
interdisciplinary methodology in scholarly and applied research will continue to give us 
new answers regarding questions about the commons, such as we have just examined in 
the Mumbai-Thane context.  
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Appendices 
Questionnaire 
CAD Project Name ________________ 
  
Command 
Project Command (1); Outside Command (2) 
  
Canal System – 
Sub Minor 2/DM 1(1); Sub minor 2/ DM 2(2)  
Distributory/Minor Canal Reaches - 
 Upper (1); Middle (2); Tail (3) 
Respondent    Marginal      Small      Medium      Large  
Category        (up to 1Ha)     (1-2) (2-4)           (above 4) 
Code               (1)                 (2)          (3)                  (4) 
1. IDENTIFICATION 
1.1 Distt.       ______________             1.4 Head of Household name       ____________ 
1.2 Block     ______________              1.5 Caste SC/ST/BC/UP              ____________    
1.3 Village    ______________ 
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2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
2.0 Socio-economic 
Characteristics
Illiterate Literate Primary Secondary 
& above
 2.1 Male Adult (Nos)
Between(14-18)
Above 18
 2.2 Female Adult (Nos)
Between (14-18)
Above 18
2.3 Children (below 14 
yrs Nos)     
Male
Female
2.4 Main occupation of  
Adults of household
No. of Adults 
Male                             Female
Total
1. Mainly Cultivation
2. Farm. Wage laborer
a)Farm servant
b)Non-Farm wage laborer
3. Type of Job
a)Urban salaried services
b)Rural salaried services
4. Self Employed/Artisan
5. Non-worker 
Total
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3. LAND INVENTORY 
3.1 Owned Total   ___________ (a+b)  
(a) Cultivated        ___________      
 (b) Uncultivated (Varkas)   __________  
3.2 Leased in (+) ___________ 
  
3.3Leased out (-) ____________ 
3.4 Net area cultivated ___________ 
Reason of being non-worker: e.g. age, disability, disease, etc 
Type of Job 
a) Urban salaried services: ______________________ 
      b) Rural salaried services :________________________
2.5 Family Employment during the year 2007-2008
Sr. No Male Female
No. of months worked 
Own farm                   Outside Unemployed
Farm Non 
farm
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Details of lease terms; duration, cost, output share, labour tying inter linkages
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3.5 Net area irrigated   ___________ (a+b+c) 
(a)By Canal ______ha     
(b)Well/tube well _______ha     
(c)  Nalla 
(d) Others ________ha 
3.6 Annual cost incurred towards water charges last year       
3.7 Area unirrigated (ha)   _____________ 
3.8 Reasons for non irrigation _________ 
(a)Unleveled land or elevated  
(b) Absence of field channels/ Choked outlets  
(c)Scarcity of water  
(d) Cattle problem  
(e) other reason specify 
4. ON FARM DEVELOPMENT WORKS 
4.1 Whether field channels exist for fields               
       Yes (1);         No (2) 
4.2 Whether these channels are well maintained                     
         Yes (1);       No (2) 
4.3 Who maintains these channels?                               
       Govt (1); Irrigation  (2); Panchayat (3); Farmers (4) 
4.4 Do you get water in time?                                  
        Yes (1);          No (2)                                                                                 
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4.7 Whether you are told about the availability of irrigation         
       Water in advance   
         Yes (1);         No(2)                                                                                     
4.8 How do you get advance information of canal water?   
       Availability                                                      
Notice board (1); Slips (2); Verbal (3); Newspaper (4) 
4.9 Reasons for dissatisfaction with CAD/ Surya project works/any suggestion for 
correction in present activities ________________________________________ 
4.10 Farmers assessment about status of different CAD/ Surya project activities 
Activities Whether implemented 
on your farm 
Yes/No
Which of the 
following 
activities you 
consider useful 
(tick all that 
apply)
Activities you still 
require (tick all 
that apply)
1.Construction of channels
2. Maintenance of channels
3. Fields drains 
4.Land leveling 
5.Warabandi 
6.Lining of channels
7.Land consolidation
8.other Specific 
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5. CROPS GROWN/ CROP PRODUCTION 
Convert all the figures in qtls & acres 
Main produce -- rice, vegetables 
By product     -- grass etc 
Season/Crop 
variety NYV 
or Local
Irrigated Rainfed Total quantity of produce sold (qty)
Area in 
ha
Main 
qtl
By 
product 
qtl
Area in 
ha
Main 
qtl
By 
product 
qtl
Main 
product
By 
product
Kharif
Rabi
Summer
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6. CROP PRODUCTION INPUTS AND COST OF CULTIVATION 
PER ACRE 
*All the information to be converted into per hectare basis. 
*labor required for all the agricultural operation of the crop, such as land preparation sowing, 
manure/fertilizer application, inter culture, harvesting, threshing will be taken into account 
including family, hired and contract labor. Use open-ended questions in interview guide 
* IR – Irrigated UIR—Unirrigated 
* Fertilizer –Give quantities of fertilizer applied in kg. urea in column 1, Dap in column 2, 
Murate of potash in column 3, Ammonium sulphate in Column 4  Super Phosphate in column 5. 
*Type of seed: HYV or local 
Season & 
crop
Typ
e 
IR* 
or 
UI
R*
Seed 
Kg
Human 
Labor 
days*
Bullock 
pair 
days
Tractor 
hrs
Thres
her 
hrs
Org 
Fer Kg
Fertilizers in 
kg Cost 
of 
pesti-
cides
Irrig
atio
n 
char
ges
1 2 3 4 5
Kharif
Rabi
Summer
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7.1 DURABLE HOUSEHOLD ASSETS 
7.2 TYPE OF HOUSE 
Name Number Present value (Rs.)
(a) Bicycle
(b) Motor cycle
(c) Radio/Tape/VCR
(d) Watch/Clock
(e)Sewing Machines
(f) Others specify
Sub Total
Type of house Area Value
Kuccha
Pucca
Mixed
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7.3 AGRICULTURAL ASSESTS 
Sr. No Name of assets No. Value 
(Rs)
Sr. 
No
Name of assets No. Value(Rs)
1 Cows 9 Tractor
2 Buffalo 10 Seed drill
3 He-Buffalo 11 Thresher
4 Goats 12 Sprayer/Duster
5 Sheep 13 Chaff cutter
6 Pig 14 Diesel pump/
pump set
7 Poultry 15 Electric pump
8 Others specify 16 Bullocks
17 Improved 
bullocks drawn 
implement
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8. CREDIT/LOAN TAKEN 
8.1 Loan outstanding at the beginning of this year (in January 2007) Rs.__________ 
8.2 Loan taken during 2007-08 
What if we receive water for 12 months will u still go out to work? ______________________ 
What will u produce through the year? __________________________________________ 
Purpose for which taken
Amount 
Borrowed 
Rs
Source of 
loan. 
Whether 
employer/ 
money 
lender/bank
Rate of 
Interest
1. Agriculture
(a) Crop loan/input
(b) Purchase of Machine/Tractor
(c) Capital improvements (construction of 
well, diesel motor, PVC pipe, land leveling)
(d)Livestock purchase
2.Consumption Loan
(a) Marriage
(b) Religious functions
Total
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Interview Guide: 
Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews 
The Location of Study: Charoti village, Dahanu Block, Thane District, 
Maharashtra  
Questions for this village are as follows:  
1. How much land do you own (if any)? Does your land lie within the revenue 
boundaries of Charoti village? Did you inherit, purchase, or acquire the land by other 
means? How much of this land do you cultivate yourself? How much land do you rent 
out? To whom do you rent it and on what basis? Do you rent in any land in addition to 
the land you own? From whom and on what basis?  
If you are not a landowner, do you rent land? How much land do you rent? Does this 
land lie within the revenue boundaries of Charoti village? From whom do you rent the 
land and on what basis? Are the owners resident in the village? 
2. What is the land distribution in the village like? Is there is a preponderance of small 
and marginal farmers (1-2 hectares? Or does the village have several farmers with 
medium and large land holdings (five hectares and more)? 
 3. Is your main occupation agriculture? What crops do you cultivate? Does your 
production from agriculture meet the immediate needs of your family? Do you sell any 
agricultural produce? Where? Is agriculture carried out on your farm in both the 
monsoon and the Konkan hangam (post monsoon) season? 
4. How do you meet your needs for agricultural inputs e.g. credit, fertilizers, pesticides 
and water? 
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5. Do you employ labour to help in your farm activities? Do you employ labour during 
the peak agricultural season (July-November)? How many labourers? Do you employ 
labour at other times of the year? What are the main areas from where the labour 
utilized on your farm is drawn? 
6. Do you or members of your family ever work as agricultural labourers on other 
people’s fields in this village? Do you or other members of your household have to 
engage in non-farm work to take care of the needs of the family or enhance household 
income? Is the non-farm work within this village or outside the area? 
7. If you or members of your household migrate for work, do you look for work in 
coastal Dahanu or in Mumbai city? How many months in a year do you (or they) spend 
outside your village, either working or looking for work? What are the kinds of labour 
contract in these areas? Is the work predominantly in agriculture or is it non-farm work? 
Do you (or they) get paid daily? What are the work conditions like? 
8. How many (or what proportion) of the villagers from Charoti work in Vangaon or 
other agricultural areas in the coastal belt? How many work in Mumbai (or other urban 
areas)? 
9. What are your impressions of the role of water in your daily life? What importance 
does it have in the agricultural practices you follow? 
10. Is there any access to groundwater in this village (e.g.tubewell) irrigation in this 
village? 
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11. How do you perceive the Surya dam project? Has it brought any changes to the 
well-being of farmers in your village? Has it brought any improvement to your own 
farming situation? If it has, in what ways? If it has not, then why not? 
12. What do you have to say about the functioning of the Mahalakshmi irrigation water 
society in the village? Have you been involved in the society, and in what capacity? 
13. What are your views on the maintenance of the canal system by dam/project 
authorities? Are the canals maintained well and is the delivery of water on schedule?  
14. How do you cope with the unavailability of irrigation water? How do you see the 
larger farmers in the village coping with the unavailability of irrigation water? How do 
the small and marginal farmers cope, especially those without any access to irrigation 
water at all? 
 15. What are your opinions about water from the Surya project being distributed to 
Mumbai city and non-tribal areas in Dahanu and Palghar (such as Vangaon and 
Saphale)? Are you aware of this happening already? If it were to happen, what would be 
your reaction? 
16. Are land transactions in the village and other parts of the Surya command area 
increasing? Do you have any concerns about this? How are these land transactions 
affecting your overall welfare and the well being of the tribal community in the village? 
17. What have the political representatives of the tribal community done if anything to 
ensure better utilization of water from the Surya project? What have they done? Has any 
other organization been active in trying to improve access to irrigation water in the 
village? 
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18. To whom does the water of the Surya project belong in your opinion? The city of 
Mumbai, farmers from western Dahanu or the tribal farmers from the interior? 
Location of study: Vangaon Dahanu taluka, Thane district 
1. How much land do you own (if any)? Does your land lie within the revenue 
boundaries of Vangaon? Did you inherit, purchase, or acquire the land by other means? 
How much of this land do you cultivate yourself? How much land do you rent out? To 
whom do you rent it and on what basis? Do you rent in any land in addition to the land 
you own? From whom and on what basis?  
If you are not a landowner, do you rent land? How much land do you rent? Does this 
land lie within the revenue boundaries of Vangaon village? From whom do you rent the 
land and on what basis? Are the owners resident in the village? 
2. What is the land distribution in the village like? Is there is a preponderance of small 
and marginal farmers (1-2 hectares), or does the village have several farmers with 
medium and large land holdings (five hectares and more)? 
3. Is your main occupation agriculture? What crops do you cultivate? Does your 
production from agriculture meet the immediate needs of your family? Do you sell any 
agricultural produce? Where? Is agriculture carried out on your farm in both the 
monsoon and the Konkan hangam (post monsoon) season? 
4. How do you meet your needs for agricultural inputs e.g. credit, fertilizers, pesticides 
and water? 
5. Do you employ labour to help in your farm activities? Do you employ labour during 
the peak agricultural season (July-November?) How many labourers? Do you employ 
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labour at other times of the year? What are the main areas from where the labour 
utilized on your farm is drawn? 
6. Do you or members of your family ever work as agricultural labourers on other 
people’s fields in this village? Do you or other members of your household have to 
engage in non-farm work to take care of the needs of the family or enhance household 
income? Is the non-farm work within this village or outside the area? 
7. If you or members of your household migrate for work, do you look for work in 
coastal Dahanu or in Mumbai city? How many months in a year do you (or they spend 
outside your village, either working or looking for work)? What are the kinds of labour 
contract in these areas? Is the work predominantly in agriculture or is it non-farm work? 
Do you(or they) get paid daily? What are the work conditions like? 
8. How many (or what proportion) of the villagers from Vangaon work outside the 
village in other agricultural areas in the coastal belt? How many work in Mumbai (or 
other urban areas)? 
9. Do you have any business contacts in urban areas, especially with respect to 
marketing of produce in Mumbai and Gujarat states? Does the location of the village on 
the railway line benefit your farm? 
10. What are your impressions of the role of water in your daily life? What importance 
does it have in the agricultural practices you follow? 
11. Do you have access to irrigation water? From what source? How do you cope with 
the unavailability of irrigation water? How do you see the larger farmers in the village 
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coping with the unavailability of irrigation water? How do the small and marginal 
farmers cope, especially those without any access to irrigation water at all?  
12. What percentage of the village’s farmers access groundwater for irrigation? What 
are the other sources of irrigation? (E.g. small projects such as Minor tanks which are 
maintained by the Zilla parishad District Council of Thane)? 
13. How was the groundwater situation ten years back? Has there been serious depletion 
of aquifers? Has there been any salinization or any other decline in the quality of the 
groundwater? Has the Surya irrigation project improved the ground water levels on your 
farm or in other parts of the village?  
14. What is your opinion on the contention of the Surya command project authorities 
that farmers in Vangaon village should pay water charges for the improved groundwater 
levels, as some aquifers in the village have been recharged by the canals which bypass 
the village?  
15. Should the canal system be extended to Vangaon and western parts of Dahanu? 
Would you like to have the water from the Surya dam for your farm? If yes, why? If 
not, why not? Would the benefits of irrigation lower the land ceiling in the area and lead 
to redistribution of land? What would be the consequences?  
16. What are your opinions about water from the Surya project being distributed to 
Mumbai city? Are you aware of this happening already? If it were to happen, what 
would be your reaction? 
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17. Are land transactions in this village increasing? Do you have any concerns about 
this? How are these land transactions affecting your family’s welfare and the well being 
of the village overall? 
18. Have the political representatives of Vangaon done anything to gain access to water 
from the Surya project? What have they done? Has any other organization been active 
in trying to access Surya water from Vangaon? 
19. To whom does the Surya water belong in your opinion? The city of Mumbai, 
farmers from western Dahanu, or the tribal farmers from the interior? 
20. Is the grass trade still active in the area (last reported in 1984 and 1998)? How 
important is that to Vangaon’s economy?       
Semi-structured Interviews with the Chief Engineers and Section Engineers. 
1. What area of land was the Surya project designed to irrigate? Was there an over 
projection in the initial area of agricultural land to be irrigated by the Surya project? If 
so, why was this the case? 
2. How are farmers in the tribal beneficiary villages such as Charoti benefiting from the 
project? What are visible indicators of improvement in welfare in these communities? 
3. Is there underutilization of water from the Surya project? Does the fragmented nature 
of land holdings in the Surya command area affect the viability of tribal farms and their 
ability to use canal water? What other factors affect the ability of tribal farmers to 
utilize water from he project? 
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4. Why is the Mahalakshmi water society in Charoti not functioning? What steps have 
the Irrigation Department taken to improve the functioning of such farmer’s 
organizations/committees to ensure better utilization of the water? 
5. Does Vangaon come in the command area of the Surya projct? If yes, what are the 
steps the Irrigation Department is taking to make the farmers of Vangoan pay irrigation 
charges for the water? If no, does Vangoan benefit in other ways from the project? 
6. Under what rationale (legal and commercial) has the Surya project been supplying 
water to the western parts of Dahanu and to Saphale village in Palghar?  Are 
commercial reasons a paramount consideration as in the case of supply of water to the 
Mumbai metropolitan region? 
Is work on the project complete? If not, how long will it take to complete work on the 
canals and convey the water to the beneficiaries? Which interests (or certain 
communities) are blocking the completion of the Surya project? One view is that the 
farmers of Vangaon and western Dahanu have used their political clout to block the 
completion of the project so as to benefit themselves of water? Do you believe this to be 
the case? 
7. How is the growing influence of urbanization and pressure on land impacting the 
functioning of the Surya irrigation project? 
8. Has there been an increase in land transactions, land leasing activity and distress 
selling of land in the command area? 
9. How would improved access to water halt or reverse downward socio-economic 
mobility in the command area and its vicinity? 
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10. In addition to irrigation water, what are the other inputs needed to improve 
agricultural development indicators in the Surya command area communities?  
11. How would you outline the various phases of water resources development in this 
part of Thane over the past few decades? How have water resource development 
practices evolved over time? Do you think the Surya project was some sort of a 
“watershed” in Thane? 
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